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BALANCED AND PURPOSEFUL DEPARTURES
"Can we all get along?. .. I mean, we're all stuck here for a while.
Let's try to work it out."
-Rodney King'
INTRODUCTION
Rodney King's poignant plea may well have been resonating in
the Supreme Court's collective consciousness as it considered the
punishment of the Los Angeles police officers convicted of violating
King's civil rights. In Koon v. United States,2 the Supreme Court used
the dispute over these officers' federal sentences to address, in broad
terms, judicial authority to "depart" from the sentencing ranges pre-
scribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The clear effort in
Koon to enhance district judges' departure power suggests the Su-
preme Court hoped that, by imbuing sentencing courts with greater
discretion, it could help those "stuck" with the Guidelines to "all get
along" and "work it out."
The Supreme Court had the right instincts in Koon because, as
this Article will argue, a misguided departure jurisprudence lies at the
heart of what ails the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Refocusing this
jurisprudence would be a critical first step toward an improved federal
sentencing system. But, unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Koon
failed to set departure jurisprudence on the right course. In fact, by
focusing on the threshold decision to depart-rather than on the ex-
tent of departures-and by eschewing normative analysis in departure
decision-making, Koon at best retards the development of an effective
departure jurisprudence and at worst further propels the federal sen-
tencing system down a destructive path.
This Article discusses mistakes of both the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission and the federal courts that have produced a misguided depar-
ture jurisprudence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In so
doing, I hope not only to explain how this misguided jurisprudence
has undermined federal sentencing reform, but also to suggest how
an improved departure mechanism might help remedy problems asso-
ciated with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. I propose refocusing
the Guidelines' departure authority to give district judges broad dis-
cretion to depart, but with appellate judges carefully examining the
extent of departures and with the entire enterprise concerned prind-
pally with the purposes of punishment. In addition to its benefits for
the federal sentencing system, such a revised approach to departures
would comport better with both the spirit and the text of the Sentenc-
1 Rodney King Speaks Out: 'Can't WeA Cet Along?" N.Y. Tv Its, May 2, 1992, at 6.
2 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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ing Reform Act-the statutory foundation for the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
Providing context for this analysis of federal departure jurispru-
dence, Part I of this Article discusses the origins of modem sentencing
reforms and guideline sentencing systems. This Part highlights the
critical role of departures in the balancing of judicial sentencing dis-
cretion and the development of principled sentencing law within sen-
tencing guidelines systems. It then reviews federal reforms more
specifically, describing the Sentencing Reform Act and the fundamen-
tal place of departure authority within the Act's revolution of federal
sentencing.
Following this review of the background and theory of modern
sentencing reforms, Parts II and III examine the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and its departure mechanism in practice. Part II identifies
critical missteps in the initial development of departure standards by
the Sentencing Commission and the lower courts. As detailed in this
Part, because courts focused on the threshold decision to depart and
failed to consider the purposes of sentencing, the initial departure
jurisprudence undermined the Guidelines' efforts to balance judicial
sentencing discretion and to develop principled sentencing law.
Part III then turns to the Supreme Court's 1996 Koon decision,
examining the Court's key missteps in its effort to remedy the Guide-
lines' departure mechanism. This Part highlights that, despite a laud-
able effort to improve departure practices, the Court's opaque
opinion has failed to achieve a better balance in judicial sentencing
discretion under the Guidelines. This Part also details how the Koon
decision put forward a shallow conception of departures and es-
chewed purpose considerations in departure decision-making, which
has further undermined the role of departures as a means for princi-
pled and purposeful judicial contributions to sentencing law within
the Guidelines system.
Lastly, Part IV proposes a revised departure jurisprudence-an
approach that is balanced by focusing on the extent of departures and
purposeful by focusing on the fundamental goals of punishment.
This Part discusses the potential benefits for the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines from a departure jurisprudence that, with particular atten-
tion to the purposes of punishment, is primarily concerned not with
the threshold decision to depart, but rather with the extent of such
departures. Seeking a silver lining in what is otherwise a dark story,
this Part concludes by suggesting how the Sentencing Commission or
lower federal courts might still bring about an improved departure
mechanism. That is, this Part calls for the Commission and lower
courts to seize upon the opportunity missed by the Supreme Court in
[VOL- 76:1
BALANCED AND PURPOSEFUL DEPARTURES
Koon and to heed Rodney King's plea: they should take the lead in
refocusing departure jurisprudence to help all those involved in fed-
eral sentencing to "get along" and "work it out."
I. SENTENCING REFoRM IN THEORr. THE IERITs OF SFNrTENCqG
Guiim.mms AND THE ROLE OF DEPARTURES
The origins of modem sentencing reform and the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines merit review before examining federal departure
jurisprudence and the Supreme Court's decision in Koon. This back-
ground highlights the central and fundamental role of "departures"
in the efforts of sentencing guidelines systems to balance judicial sen-
tencing discretion and to develop principled sentencing law.
A. The Origins and Early Lessons of Modem Sentencing Reform
For the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, vast and vir-
tually unlimited discretion was the hallmark of the sentencing enter-
prise. Trial judges in both federal and state systems had nearly
unfettered discretion to impose on defendants any sentence from
within the broad statutory ranges provided for criminal offenses.3
During this period, punishment decisions and offender treatments
were premised upon a rehabilitative model.4 Broadjudicial discretion
in the ascription of sentencing terms-complemented by parole offi-
cials exercising similar discretion concerning prison release dates-
was viewed as necessary to ensure that sentences could be individually
tailored to the particular rehabilitative prospects and progress of each
offender.5
3 See, eg., Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Refonn: Steps Forward, Steps
Backward, 78JuDicAruaR 169, 169-70 (1995) ("Subject only to statutory maximums
and the occasional minimums, judges had the authority to sentence convicted de-
fendants either to probation (and under what conditions) or to prison (and for what
maximum term)."); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (dis-
cussing the "wide discretion" given to federal judges in ascribing sentences during this
time).
4 See, eg., SANDRA SHANE-DUBOw Er At-, SENTENCING REFOR.%t IN THE UNrrED
STATES: HIsrOmR, CoNTFw, AND EFFErc 5-6 (1985); J.L Myu.T i r E., S2ENacxoNc
REFoprli 1-6 (1981). See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, TE DECLINE OF THE REHK,%BIUT-
TwE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 3-7 (1981) (discussing the "domi-
nance" and "almost unchallenged sway of the rehabilitative ideal" through the late
1960s).
5 See, eg., Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's Fundions in THE SEN.
TENCING CoTfIssIoN AND ITs GUIDELINES 3, 3 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987)
("[W]ide discretion was ostensibly justified for rehabilitative ends: to enable judges
and parole officials familiar with the case to choose a disposition tailored to the of-
fender's need for treatment."); see also Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220
2000]
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By the early 1970s, criminal justice researchers and scholars be-
came concerned with the unpredictable and often widely disparate
sentences that this highly discretionary sentencing system produced.
Empirical research and anecdotal evidence revealed that sentencing
judges' exercise of broad and largely unreviewable6 discretion re-
suited in substantial and undue differences in both the lengths and
types of sentences meted out to similar defendants. 7 Even more worri-
some, some studies found that purportedly irrelevant personal factors,
such as an offender's race, gender, and socioeconomic status, im-
pacted sentencing outcomes and accounted for certain disparities.8
Troubled by the disparity and discrimination resulting from
highly discretionary sentencing practices-and fueled by concerns
over increasing crime rates and powerful criticisms of the entire reha-
bilitative model of punishment and corrections 9-many criminal jus-
tice experts proposed reforms in order to bring greater consistency
(1932) (discussing need "to individualize each case" through giving "that careful, hu-
mane and comprehensive consideration to the particular situation of each offender
which would be possible only in the exercise of a broad discretion"). See generally
KATE STrrIH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN TilE
FEDERAL COURTS 9-22 (1998) (reviewing the early history of federal sentencing and
the link between the rehabilitative ideal and discretionary sentencing practices).
6 See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1974); see also United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) ("[A] sentence imposed by a federal district
judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review."). Noting that trial
judges possess considerable discretion in many areas, Judge Cabranes and Professor
Stith suggest that "[wi hat made sentencing authority truly extraordinary was not the
broad discretion the judge exercised, but, rather, the fact that the decision was virtu-
ally unreviewable on appeal." Kate Stith &Jos6 A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1251-52 (1997).
7 See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentlnt
ing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895-97 (1990) (detailing studies
showing widespread, unwarranted sentencing disparities); Norval Morris, Towards
Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. RExV. 267, 272-74 (1977) (reviewing studies and assert-
ing that "the data on unjust sentencing disparity have indeed become quite
overwhelming").
8 See Nagel, supra note 7, at 895-97 nn.73-84 (discussing empirical studies docu-
menting sentencing impact of race, gender, socioeconomic class, and other status
characteristics); William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold
Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 GRIM. L.F. 355, 359-62
(1991) (reviewing studies revealing the impact of racial discrimination at sentencing).
9 See AMt. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); ERNEST VAN DEN
HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
See generally ALLEN, supra note 4, at 7-20 (discussing "wide and precipitous decline of
penal rehabilitationism" as a foundational theory for the criminal justice system).
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and certainty to the sentencing enterprise.10 An influential 1976 re-
port of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentenc-
ing exemplifies these sentiments. The report asserted that
discretionary sentencing schemes created "unexplained and seem-
ingly inexplicable sentencing disparity" and called for structural re-
forms in sentencing to construct a "system that is both more just to
individual defendants in terms of fairness and more effective in terms
of reducing crime."" Though varying in rhetoric, others urging sen-
tencing reform echoed a similar refrain.'
2
In many respects, the federal system was at the forefront of this
sentencing reform movement. As early as the 1930s, commentators
expressed concerns about "wide disparities and great inequalities" in
the criminal sentences being meted out by differentjudges in the fed-
eral system.' 3 A 1972 book by United States District Judge Marvin
Frankel, which assailed federal sentencing practices, was probably the
single most significant catalyst for modem sentencing reforms.' 4 In
Ciminal Sentences: Law Without Order,15 Judge Frankel lamented "the
10 See, e-g., DAvID FOGEL, "WE ARE THE LVING PROOF." THE JVsncE MODEL FOR
CORRECtIONS (2d ed. 1976); NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CONMt'RS ON UNiF. STATE LmWs,
MODEL SENTmCNG AND CORRECTIONS ACT (1979); PIERCE O'DONNELL ETAL., TObwi.%R
AJUST AND EFFEarl SENTENCING Smmxi: AGENDA FOR LEGIC SLAT REropus (1977);
VON HmscH, supra note 9; see also NORvAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF 1MPRISONtFI%-T
(1974) (stressing need to reform sentencing practices as a prerequisite to making
imprisonment a rational and humane means of punishment). See generally 1 Atnw
BLUMSTEIN ET AL., RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEA-RCH FOR REFOR.M% 12642 (1983)
(describing forces behind early reforms); MILLER ET At-, supra note 4, at 6-13, 13
(noting that sentencing reform was "stimulated by perceptions of increasing crime,
unwarranted differences in sentences, and ineffective rehabilitation programs").
11 TNENTITH CENmRY FuND TASK FORCE ON CRiLNtmL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CER-
TAIN PuNISi-HmNT- REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMhM'%L
SENTENCING 3-9 (1976) [hereinafter FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMEN-T].
12 See, e.g., FOGEL, supra note 10; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CO.Nt'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAws, supra note 10; O'DoELL Er AL., supra note 10; VON HIRSCH, supra note 9.
13 Wilkins et al., supra note 8, at 358 (quoting 1938 statement of Attorney Gen-
eral Frank Cummings); see also Nagel, supra note 7, at 895 (revieing studies of sen-
tencing disparities from the 1930s).
14 See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform. The Legislathe
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FoREST L RE,. 223, 228 (1993)
(discussing influence ofJudge Frankel in modem sentencing reform); sre also Kevin
R. Reitz, Sentencing Reform in tie States: An Overview of the Colorado Law Reinow Smpo-
sium, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 645, 650 n.21 (1993) (calling Judge Frankel's book "the
single most influential work of criminal scholarship in the last 20 years [tlat] ...
charted the general outline of sentencing reform through the 1980s and into the
1990s").
15 M.ARvn E. FRANKmRL, C imMu.L SENTENcEs: L-w WrIToLr aonrER (1973). Judge
Frankel first presented the ideas from his book in a series of lectures delivered at ie
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unruliness, the absence of rational ordering, the unbridled power of
the sentencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory" in the federal sen-
tencing system.16 Attributing these problems to judges' exercise of
unregulated sentencing discretion, Judge Frankel was among the first
to call for extensive reforms of traditional discretionary sentencing
practices.
Even before Judge Frankel's call for change, concerns about sen-
tencing disparities had prompted limited reforms in a few jurisdic-
tions. Seeking greater sentencing consistency, some judges and
researchers experimented With sentencing institutes or sentencing
councils and then later with "voluntary" guidelines.1'7 These reform
efforts typically involved judges collectively examining past sentencing
practices in order to develop general sentencing norms to consider in
future cases.' 8 However, such reforms proved to be an inadequate
solution to unwarranted sentencing disparities. Lacking enforcement
mechanisms, sentencing councils and voluntary guidelines largely
failed to meaningfully constrain judicial discretion. Studies revealed
these reforms had little impact on sentencing outcomes, and thus they
did not significantly reduce disparities.' 9
University of Cincinnati Law School. See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing,
41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1972).
16 FRAmmEL, supra note 15, at 49.
17 See 1 BLUMSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 129-30, 138-39 (reviewing these early
sentencing reform efforts). The federal system was among the first jurisdictions to
experiment with these sorts of sentencing reforms. During the 1960s, a few federal
courts, aided by the passage of authorizing legislation, see Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-752, § 1, 72 Stat. 845, 845 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1958)), convened
sentencing institutes and sentencing councils. See FRANmEL, supra note 15, at 61-74.
18 See, e.g., 1 BLUMSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 129-30, 138-39; BuarAu oFJVS.
ricE AssIsTANcE, NATIONAL AssEssMENT OF STRuTuRED SENTENCING 10-13 (1996)
(discussing voluntary sentencing guidelines); O'DONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at
16-18 (discussing sentencing institutes and councils).
19 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of
Sentencing Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHi. L. REa. 109, 148-49 (1975) (discuss-
ing limited impact of sentencing councils); O'DONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 16-18
(discussing limited value of sentencing institutes and councils in the federal system);
WILLIAM D. RICH ET AL., SENTENCING BY MATHEMATICs: AN EVALUATION OF TIHE EARLY
ATrEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES, at xxix (1982) (con-
cluding that "[violuntary sentencing guidelines do not work"); BuREAu OF JUSTICE
AssIsTANCE, supra note 18, at 12 ("[R]eview of all the major studies conducted on
voluntary/advisory guidelines reveals low compliance by judges and, hence, little in-
pact on reducing disparity."). Recently, a few states-in particular Delaware and
Pennsylvania-have had some success reducing sentencing disparities through purely
voluntary guidelines. There is reason to suspect, however, that unique forces operat-
ing within these jurisdictions foster greater-than-usual compliance with voluntary
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Meanwhile, some other jurisdictions, hoping to deliver a strong
deterrent message while also reducing sentencing disparities, turned
to laws that mandated specific sentences or minimum terms for cer-
tain offenses. 20 For instance, in 1956 Congress enacted a set of
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses.2 ' However, this ap-
proach to sentencing reform also proved largely unsuccessful. Experi-
ence showed that mandatory sentencing laws had little deterrent
benefit and actually tended to increase sentencing disparities, as
judges and lawyers often sought ways to circumvent these laws when-
ever they seemed to call for unduly harsh sentences. 22 For these rea-
sons, Congress in 1970 repealed nearly all mandatory minimum
sentences for drug offenses. 25 Although a recent resurgence in
mandatory sentencing provisions reveals their enduring political ap-
peal,24 criminal justice experts have consistently concluded that these
laws are rarely effective and often produce unjust sentencing
outcomes.2
guidelines. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guiddines in Minnesota, Other States, and the
Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SEmTECING REP. 69, 75 (1999).
20 See, e.g., Mc:HAE.L H. ToNRY, SENTENCING RFoast hMPAcTs 25 (1987); FIRAND
CERTAIN PUNSHmmENT, supra note 11, at 16-17; see also U.S. SEmTENc=x Co.INI'N, SPE-
CIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDUAL Camuu.
JusnicE Sys-i 5-8, 13-15 (1991) (discussing trends in use of mandatory minimum
sentences and justifications offered in their support).
21 See Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L No. 84-728, § 103, 70 Stat 567,
568-69 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7237 (1956)), repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-513, § 1104(b) (4) (A), 84 Stat.
1227, 1292.
22 See, e.g., ToNRY, supra note 20, at 98 ("Not only do mandatory sentencing laws
not achieve their stated goals [of increased deterrence], they increase the extent of
sentencing disparities by the divergence in punishment between those diverted from
the system to avoid the mandatory sentence and those few who ultimately receive it.");
BARBARA S. VINCENT & PAULJ. HOFER, FEDERA JUDICIA CENTER, THE CONSEQUENCES
OF MANDATORY MINIUM PRISON Tm.sS: A SU"mm OF RECENT FNDINGS 11, 17 (1994).
23 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L
No. 91-513, § 1104(b) (4) (A), 84 Stat. 1227, 1292 (repealing mandatory minimums);
see also U.S. SNTENCING CONMf'N, supra note 20, at 5-7 (describing the rise and fall of
federal mandatory sentencing provisions from 1956 to 1970).
24 See, eg., Henry Scott Wallace, Afandatoy Minimums and the Betrayal of Sentencing
Reform: A Legislative Dr. Jeckyll and Mr. Hyde, 40 FED. B. NEws &J. 158, 158 (1993);
Wendy Kaminer, Federal Offens Am c MoNTm., June 1994, at 102; see also Doug-
las A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age ofFederal Sentencing. The Need and Opportunity
forJudicialLawmaking 11 STANi. L. & POL'Y REV. 93,99-100, 107-08 (1999) (discussing
Congress's affinity for harsh mandatory sentencing la and politics behind their
passage).
25 See MicHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATrERs 134 (1996) ("FExperienced practi-
tioners and social science researchers have long agreed, for practical and policy
reasons ... that mandatory penalties are a bad idea."); David Yellen, iTatJuvenile
200]
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Tellingly, these early reform efforts were unsuccessful largely be-
cause they failed to strike an appropriate balance in the amount of
judicial discretion retained in the sentencing process. At one ex-
treme, sentencing councils and voluntary guidelines failed primarily
because, by retaining too much judicial sentencing discretion, they
proved too pliant. Sentencing outcomes still exhibited unwarranted
disparities. At the other extreme, mandatory sentencing laws failed
primarily because, by retaining too little judicial sentencing discre-
tion, they proved too rigid. Sentencing outcomes exhibited unwar-
ranted uniformity (or increased disparities due to circumventions).
B. The Guidelines Model and the Critical Role of Departures
Educated by these early experiences, reformers recognized that,
to be fair and effective, a sentencing system had to strike an appropri-
ate balance in the amount ofjudicial sentencing discretion. Sentenc-
ing reformers concluded-indeed, often stressed-that a sentencing
system must permit the exercise of some judicial discretion in order to
allow consideration of unusual or unforeseen circumstances in indi-
vidual cases. 26 Reformers spoke not of divesting judges of all sentenc-
ing discretion, 27 but rather of "structuring" or "guiding" its exercise to
Court Abolitionists Can Learn From the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 577,
583-84 ("[T] here is near unanimity... that mandatory minimums are failures, im-
posing unduly harsh sentences in many cases and inviting evasion and manipula-
tion."); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WARE
FOREST L. REV. 199, 210-11 (1993) (noting the "persistent criticism of mandatories"
and explaining how "uniform treatment through mandatories invariably produces un-
fairness and generates systemic pressure for evasion").
26 See, e.g., FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 11, at 18 (asserting that
"some degree of flexibility must be maintained ... in order for the system to be just
and effective"); DON M. GOTrFREDSON ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING
120 (1978) ("Uniform sentences for each statutory offense may lead to results as
unfair and unjust as does presently unguided discretion."); O'DONNELL ET AL., supra
note 10, at 34-35, 90-91 ("An inflexible, mechanical sentencing process... would be
as inequitable and unfair as the current nonsystem."). See generally KENNETH CULP
DAvIs, DISCRETIONARYJUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 4 (1971) (stressing that predict-
able and uniform rules must always coexist with a measure of flexibility and
discretion).
27 See Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of
Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 559
(1978) (noting that even those seeking drastic sentencing reform "recognize the need
for some small amount ofjudicial discretion to take account of variations in culpabil-
ity"); see also Lawrence F. Travis III, The Politics of Sentencing Reform, in SENrENCING
REFORM: EXPERIMENTS IN REDUCING DISPAR"n" 59, 64-69 (Martin L. Forst ed., 1982)
(reviewing a range of reform proposals all of which retained at least a measure of
judicial discretion in the sentencing process). Many reform proposals called for the
abolition of parole and advocated the complete elimination of the discretion tradi-
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achieve greater consistency across a range of cases without sacrificing
the flexibility needed to take account of differences between individ-
ual offenders.
28
Nearly all experts and scholars advocating sentencing reform
came to propose or endorse some form of presumptive sentencing
guidelines.2 9 The fundamental component of this reform model was
a set of binding rules to govern sentencing outcomes across a range of
cases from which judges would have authority to diverge under cer-
tain circumstances. That is, rules or "guidelines" were to be drafted-
preferably by an expert "sentencing commission"3 0-which, by incor-
porating pertinent characteristics of offenses and offenders, would es-
tablish applicable sentences for most cases.3 ' Judges would, however,
tionally exercised by parole officials as to offenders' ultimate release dates. With de-
clining faith in the rehabilitative ideal and heightened concerns about disparity and
uncertainty, many reformers concluded that discretionary decision-making by parole
officials concerning the end of sentencing terms was ineffectual or inappropriate and
tended to undercut other efforts to create a consistent and certain sentencing system.
See, e.g., O'DoNNEs.L Er Al, supra note 10, at 68-72; Morris, supra note 7, at 276-79.
28 See, e.g., FAR AN CErTn PuNismFrr, supra note 11, at 19; Gorrmmso. Er
AL., supra note 26, at 120 ("[T]he most appropriate remedy for the problem of umar-
ranted sentencing variation is not to attempt to eliminate judicial discretion, but
rather to develop methods to utilize discretionary power more appropriately.");JAcX
M. KRESS, PRESCRIPTION FORJUSTICE: THE THEORY AND PRACTCE OF SE ,UNCING GUIDE-
LNES 8 (1980) ("The solution is not to eviscerate or eradicate judicial sentencing, but
rather to restructure it so as to control potential discretionary abuses."); O'Do 'M..
ET AL., supra note 10, at 95 (highlighting that proposed reforms "have not tried to
abolish discretion, only to channel it"); see also other sources cited in note 10, supra.
29 See Charles J. Ogletree, The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. R-. 1938, 1944 (1988) (noting the "general consensus...
among judges, lawyers, criminaljustice experts, and scholars that sentencing guide-
lines were needed"); see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidefines and the
Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1, 3 (1988) ("At the federal
level before 1985, scholars and practitioners in the criminal justice community almost
unanimously favored the concept of guidelines.").
30 Some advocates of sentencing reform did not consider a sentencing commis-
sion to be an essential or even a necessary component of their proposals. Sze FocEL,
supra note 10, at 245-60; VON HmSCH, supra note 9, at 102-04. Most reformers, how-
ever, asserted that a permanent, specially constituted, administrative body--that
would be somewhat insulated from short-term political pressures and could be consti-
tuted with experts in sentencing and corrections-was the best-suited institution for
developing, monitoring, and revising sentencing standards. Se FR,%NIEL, supra note
15, at 108-24; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CONLM'RS ON UNIF. STATE Lws, supra note 10,
§ 3-110 cmt., at 129-30; O'DONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 73-74; FuR XND CER-
TAiN PuNrsHm r, supra note 11, at 25-26; see also Berman, supra note 24, at 94-96
(discussing the reasons sentencing reformers advocated the creation of sentencing
commissions).
31 See, e.g., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CO.NMI'RS ON UNIF. STATE Lxxvs, supra note 10,
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retain some discretion to "depart" from these presumptive sentences
when an individual case involved special aggravating or mitigating
factors.3
2
The failures of other early reform efforts highlighted the impor-
tance of balancing judicial sentencing discretion through departure
authority.3 3 If departure authority too readily allowsjudges to deviate
from the guidelines' presumptive sentences, the system will be too
pliant and have the difficulties of voluntary guidelines: judicial discre-
tion will not be sufficiently limited and unwarranted sentencing dis-
parity will persist.3 4 Yet, if departure authority too rarely allows judges
to depart from the guidelines' presumptive sentences, the system will
be too rigid and have the difficulties of mandatory sentencing laws:
judicial discretion will be overly limited and unwarranted sentencing
uniformity (or increased disparity through circumvention) will oc-
cur.3 5 In other words, the departure mechanism is at the focal point
art. 3, pts. 1-2, at 95-166 (setting forth and discussing model sentencing guidelines
system); von Hirsch, supra note 5, at 8-9 (reviewing the usual format for sentencing
guidelines); see also BUREAU OFJUsTICE AssisrANCE, supra note 18, at 59-80 (providing
detailed descriptions of various sentencing guidelines systems).
32 See Andrew von Hirsch, The Enabling Legislation, in THE SENTENCING CoMrm1s.
SION AND ITS GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 62, 71 ("A sentencing guideline system con-
templates departures from the presumptive terms or ranges in special circumstances
of aggravation and mitigation."); Stephen C. Rathke, Departure Criteria Under the Min.
nesota Sentencing Guidelines, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 296, 296 (1990) ("Sentencing
guidelines require adherence to two principles. First, judges must impose the pre-
sumptive sentence in the vast majority of cases. Second, judges must have discretion
to depart from the presumptive sentence in those cases which are unusual.").
33 See DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION or
MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 115-32 (1988) (stressing that departure rules
"will determine, in large measure, the guidelines' success"); see also Michael S. Gela-
cak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical andJurispruden-
tialAnalysis, 81 MINN. L. REv. 299, 303 (1996) (explaining that departure policies and
practices are "crucial to the effective functioning" of a sentencing guidelines system);
John H. Kramer & Jeffrey T. Ulmer, Sentencing Disparity and Departures from Guidelines,
13Jusr. Q. 81, 81-82 (1996) (describing departures as the "crucial 'window of discre.
tion' for judges and other court actors within any guidelines scheme").
34 See PARENT, supra note 33, at 187 (explaining that "[i]f departure rates are
high, disparity will not be reduced"); Andrew von Hirsch, Structure and Rationale: Min-
nesotas Critical Choices, in Tim SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES, supra
note 5, at 84, 106 (stressing that without "significant constraints [on departures] ...
the guidelines become little more than precatory"); see also Kathleen J. Hanrahan &
Alexander Greer, Criminal Code Revision and the Issue of Disparity, in SENTENCING RE.
FORM: ExPERuMm'rs IN REDUCING DisPARrry, supra note 27, at 35, 44-46 (explaining
that loosely defined departure provisions have the "potential to reintroduce substan-
tial amounts of discretion, and thus have potential consequences for disparity").
35 See Gelacak et al., supra note 33, at 303 ("[T] he failure to depart in appropriate
cases may result in excessive rigidity"); see also von Hirsch, supra note 34, at 106
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of a guidelines system's efforts to achieve greater sentencing consis-
tency without sacrificing needed sentencing flexibility.
Importantly, Judge Frankel and other reformers promoted the
guidelines model with its departure mechanism as promising benefits
even more profound than simply balancing judicial sentencing discre-
tion. Sentencing disparity, in Judge Frankel's words, was a symptom
of the greater disease of "lawlessness in sentencing."36 As he put it,
the failure of legislatures "to study and resolve... questions ofjustifl-
cation and purpose" left sentencing judges "andering in deserts of
uncharted discretion" and thus necessarily produced "a wild array of
sentencing judgments without any semblance of consistency."37 Sen-
tencing guidelines were needed to encourage the development of a
"code of penal law" to govern the assessment and application of the
"numerous factors affecting the length or severity of sentences."Ss
Frankel and other reformers believed that a guidelines system, by re-
quiring the creation of explicit sentencing rules, would serve as a cata-
lyst for the much needed development of principled sentencing law.3 9
In the words of Professor Andrew von Hirsch, another leading advo-
cate of sentencing reform, sentencing guidelines provided a "may of
introducing policy and purpose into what has largely been a normless
sanctioning system." 4°
(stressing the importance of departures for sentencing -ariations and praising Minne-
sota's departure standard for "afford[ing] a measure of flexibility in practice").
36 Frankel, supra note 15, at 1.
37 Id. at 7-8; see also Oversight on the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Guiddines for
Organizational Sanctions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on theJudiciay, 101st Cong. 54 (1990) (testimony of'Judge William W. Wilkins,
Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n) (explaining that the "root of the problem was
that sentencing... was essentially ungoverned by law"), reprinted in 2 FED. Smn-.EcING
REP. 214, 214-16 (1990).
38 FRANKEL, supra note 15, at 103-18; see also Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Or-
land, A Conversation About Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L REx.
655, 656 (1993) (explaining that the "overriding objective" of sentencing guideline
reforms "was to subject sentencing to law" (statement of Marvin Frankel)).
39 See FRANcm, supra note 15, at 118-24; Peter A. Ozanne, Judidal Revkw A Case
for Sentencing Guidelines andJust Deserts, in SENrcrNG REropw: Ex zu u.rs IN REDUC-
ING DmsPARnr, supra note 27, at 177, 188 ("A sentencing guidelines s)stem brings a
rule of law to the criminal sentencing process."); Morris, supra note 7, at 283--85
(advocating guidelines systems as a means to "at last bring principle, coherence, pre-
dictability, and justice to sentencing criminal offenders"); see also voN HiRsCu, supra
note 9, at 98-104; O'DoNELL r AL-, supra note 10, at 94-95; ,UR AND CERr.m
Pu5MENT, supra note 11, at 19-26.
40 Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines.: Do Thy Provide Puincipled Gui-
dance, 27 Azi. Ca i. L. REV. 367, 368 (1989). Professor von Hirsch and others
presented guidelines proposals in the context of specific recommendations that a
modem retributivist philosophy-that is, a "just deserts" model-serve as the norma-
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The departure mechanism was to play a fundamental part in a
guidelines system's development of purposeful and principled sen-
tencing law. The guidelines model called for sentencing judges to
provide written reasons in support of any decision to depart from the
guidelines' presumptive sentences, and appellate courts were ex-
pected to review closely these decisions.4' According to reformers, an
articulation and review of the reasons for deviating from the guide-
lines' presumptive sentences would provide meaningful feedback for
the continuous evolution of sentencing law and policy within the
guidelines system.42 Discussing the "reformist ideal," Professor Kevin
Reitz effectively described the critical role of departures in the guide-
lines system's development:
The courts, most of the time, would be bound by the commission's
guidelines. The courts would have responsibility, however, for de-
veloping ajurisprudential approach to those occasions in which it is
appropriate to set the guideline presumptions aside. The commis-
sion, for its part, would benefit from the ongoing elaboration of
such a common law of sentencing. Over time, the substantive prin-
ciples developed by judges could coexist with, or even be incorpo-
rated into, the guidelines themselves.43
This notion of judicial development of a "common law of sen-
tencing" was a fundamental component of the guidelines model that
hoped to take advantage of "the interlocking substantive lawmaking
tive principles for a revised sentencing system. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 9, at
35-104; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM.'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWs, supra note 10, § 3-101,
at 95-96.
41 See, e.g., FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 11, at 21-41 ("Any devia-
tion [from the presumptive sentence] would have to be justified in a reasoned opin-
ion subject to a searching review on appeal."); KRESS, supra note 28, at 222; NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE Lmvs, supra note 10, §§ 3-207, 208;
O'DoNNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 59-60; LESLE T. WIKNS Er AL., SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: STRUCTURINGJUDICIAL DISCRETION, at xvi (1978); see also Harold R. Tyler,
Sentencing Guidelines: Control of Discretion in Federal Sentencing, 7 HoFSrRA L. REV. 11, 21
(1978) (describing departure provisions of the bill that became the Sentencing Re-
form Act).
42 See WILKNS Er AL., supra note 41, at xvii (discussing value of departures in
providing "an informational feedback loop," which "inject[s] a continuous element of
self-improvement and regeneration into the guidelines"); O'DONNELL ET AL., supra
note 10, at 59-60 (asserting that requiring specific reasons for, and appellate review
of, the decision to deviate from the guidelines' presumptive ranges provides "an ide-
ally suited institutional mechanism to upgrade-through the gradual development of
case law-the rationale and rationality of sentencing').
43 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of
Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1455 (1997).
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competencies of the commission and the judiciary "44 Reformers
stressed that judges had special knowledge and insights as a result of
their fact-specific, case-by-case consideration of sentencing policy and
practice that counseled their involvement in the development of sen-
tencing law.4 Accordingly, departure authority was seen as especially
valuable because it fostered judicial contributions, through the devel-
opment of a "common law of sentencing," to the principled evolution
of the guidelines system. The initial drafting of the sentencing guide-
lines would make certain policy determinations and set a course for
the development of substantive sentencing rules. But then trial and
appellate judges, through their articulation and review of reasons sup-
porting decisions to depart from the guidelines in individual cases,
would have their say in the evolution of principled and purposeful
sentencing law and policy.46
In sum, reformers believed that sentencing guidelines, by codify-
ing standards which would directjudges' sentencing decisions in most
but not all cases, could reduce sentencing disparities and maintain
sentencing flexibility, while promoting the development of principled
sentencing law and policy.47 The departure mechanism was critical to
both the guidelines system's effectiveness and its broader mission.
44 Id.
45 See Morris, supra note 7, at 275 (calling thejudiciary an "inevitably appropriate
sentencing figure in the drama of crime and punishment"); see also Berman, supra
note 24, at 96 (explaining that sentencing reformers believed "a critical aspect and
asset of the guideline model was that it incorporated mechanisms to promote a 'com-
mon law of sentencing' and thereby not only allowed, but actually fostered, ajudicial
role in sentencing lawmaking").
46 See Morris, supra note 7, at 283-85 (urging broad departure authority to "pre-
serve flexibility and provide an incentive for the essential process ofjudicial develop-
ment of common law of sentencing"); Reitz, supra note 43, at 1455 (stressing
reformists vision of "a partnership model of shared institutional powers" between the
drafters of guidelines and the courts, which would apply and depart from them); see
also O'DoNNLL ET AL., supra note 10, at 94-95 (suggesting that "a coherent national
sentencing policy in time should develop" through the combined work of those devel-
oping sentencing guidelines and those rendering sentencing decisions).
47 See, e.g., O'DorNL.L E" At., supra note 10, at 94-95 (asserting that guidelines
would create a "structured, rational, and purposeful system designed to preserve our
commitment to individualized sentencing while producing sentences fairer to defend-
ants and to society"); Ozanne, supra note 39, at 188 (stressing that a guidelines system
"preserves a realistic amount of discretion to vary sentences in individual cases...
[while] increas[ing] the likelihood that the sentencing rules 1v5l be bised on
reason").
In addition, though not often stressed as a fundamental reason for sentencing
guidelines, some reformers highlighted that a guidelines system-especially when
managed by a specialized sentencing commission-could provide an effective and
appropriate means for controlling the growth of prison populations. See, e.g.,John M.
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Not only was departure authority to supply a balanced measure of dis-
cretion in the sentencing of individual cases, it would also "facilitate
the development of a 'common law of sentencing' to buttress and sup-
plement the guidelines."48
C. Congress Embraces the Sentencing Guidelines Model
In 1975, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a bill based largely
on Judge Frankel's and other reformers' ideas for a guidelines sen-
tencing system.49 This bill, in addition to calling for the abolition of
parole,5 0 proposed: (1) creating a federal sentencing commission to
produce sentencing guidelines, (2) authorizing judges to depart from
the guidelines when justified, (3) requiring judges to give reasons for
sentencing determinations, and (4) appellate review of sentencing de-
cisions.51 Assailing "shameful" disparity resulting from the "absence
in the federal criminal code of any guidelines and articulated goals of
sentencing," Kennedy touted his bill as providing "for the first time
the general purposes and goals of sentencing to be considered by the
judge."52 Kennedy also stressed that the guidelines model, by ex-
pressly permitting judges to impose a sentence "outside of the guide-
lines in an appropriate case," retained "[n)ecessary flexibility." 3
Thus, echoing the refrain of reformers, Kennedy advocated guidelines
as "preserv[ing] flexibility in sentencing while simultaneously propos-
ing a procedure for the reduction of disparity through the develop-
ment of more standardized procedures."5 4
Greacen, Foreword to RICH ET AL., supra note 19, at xii, xiv; von Hirsch, supra note 5, at
12-14.
48 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAws, supra note 10, § 3-208
cmt., at 165, 166.
49 See S. 2699, 94th Cong. (2d Sess. 1975). Judge Frankel's ideas first became the
centerpiece of a series of policy workshops at Yale Law School, which culminated in a
book setting forth proposed federal legislation for sentencing reform. See
O'DONNEI.L ET A.L., supra note 10, at xi-xii. Kennedy's bill was in turn based on the
findings of the Yale workshops. See Edward M. Kennedy, Foreword to O'DONNEL, vr
AL., supra note 10, at vii, ix.
50 As noted before, though always seeking to retain some judicial role in sentenc-
ing, many reformers did call for eliminating parole and the sentencing role of parole
officials. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
51 See S. 2699, 94th Cong. (2d Sess. 1975); see also Edward M. Kennedy, Criminal
Sentencing: A Game of Chance, 60 JuDcA rumR 208, 212-15 (1976) (describing in detail
the key features of S. 2699).
52 Kennedy, supra note 49, at viii-ix.
53 Edward M. Kennedy, The Federal Code Reform Act and New Sentencing Alternatives,
82 W. VA. L. Rxv. 423, 491 (1980).
54 Id.
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Senator Kennedy's proposals were the foundation for what ulti-
mately became the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.r- The provisions
of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), 5 6 as well as the Senate Report
that constitutes its principal legislative history,57 reveal that Congress
agreed with Judge Frankel and other reformers that the guidelines
model could not only help balance judicial sentencing discretion, but
also foster the development of purposeful and principled sentencing
law.58
Congress's overriding interest in establishing a principled and
purpose-driven sentencing system is clear from the Act's many refer-
ences to the purposes of sentencing 9 and from the Senate Report's
emphasis on the requirement that "each Federal offender be sen-
tenced ... in order to achieve the general purposes of sentencing."6
The SRA's first mandate for the newly created U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission was to "establish sentencing policies and practices for the Fed-
55 A lengthy legislative process preceded the final passage of federal sentencing
reform legislation based on Senator Kennedy's bill. See Stith & Koh, supra note 14, at
224-25, 230-66 (detailing the "long and complex" legislative history of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act and the leading role of Senator Kennedy in the federal sentencing
reform effort); see also Nagel, supra note 7, at 899-900 (discussing the Sentencing
Reform Act's legislative history).
56 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987
(1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994)).
57 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 37 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,3220. As
others have noted, the background and history of the Senate Report, which sup-
ported the Sentencing Reform Act, makes this Report an especially appropriate re-
source for assessing the meaning and intent of the SRA's provisions. See Kenneth R.
Feinberg, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Underl)ing Purposes of Sentencing, 3
FED. SENTENCING REP. 326, 327 (1991).
58 See Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated
Disparity? OneJudge's Perspective, 30 SUFroLK U. L. REv. 1027, 1062 (1997) (explaining
that the Guidelines "were implemented to address judicial, congressional and aca-
demic concerns about lawlessness in sentencing"); see also Ed ard Kennedy, Sentenc-
ing Reform-An Evolutionary Process, 3 FED. SENTENrcING REP. 271, 271 (1991)
(explaining that the SRA's drafters sought to "rationalize [the sentencing] stage of
the federal criminal justice system").
59 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551(a), 3552(b), 3555, 3562, 3563(b), 3572(a), 3582(a),
3583, 3584 (1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b) (1) (A), (b)(2), §§ 994(a) (2), (g), (m) (1994).
60 S. RE'. No. 98-225, at 66, repinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3249. Professors
Dan Freed and Marc Miller deserve considerable credit for first stressing the role of
sentencing purposes in the SRA. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the WMhe of
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Y,Lt LJ. 1681, 1708
(1992); Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CVL I RE%. 413, 417 (1992); see also
DanielJ. Freed & Marc Miller, Taking "Purposes" Seriously: The Neglectcd Requirement of
Guideline Sentencing; 3 FED. SENTNcING REP. 295, 295 (1991) ("Congress made one
principle clear. the 'purposes of sentencing' were to play a central role in formulating
individual sentences and in drafting Commission guidelines.")
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eral criminal justice system that... assure the meeting of the purposes
of sentencing as set forth in [the Act]."61 The same statutory provi-
sion also requires the Commission to continually "develop means of
measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correc-
tional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as
set forth in [the Act]."62
Critically, the SRA did not give sole responsibility for the consid-
eration of sentencing purposes to the Sentencing Commission. In
fact, the list of sentencing purposes repeatedly referenced in the
Act-which reflect "the basic purposes of sentencing[:] deterrence,
incapacitation, just punishment and rehabilitation"63 -appears in the
Act's instructions to judges concerning the "Factors To Be Considered
in Imposing a Sentence."" As the Senate Report explains, this precise
articulation of the purposes of sentencing was "to recognize the four
purposes that sentencing in general is designed to achieve, and to re-
quire that the judge consider what impact, if any, each particular purpose
should have on the sentence in each case."65 Thus, the SRA called upon
judges "in each case" to be responsible for and integrally involved in
ensuring that sentencing under the federal guidelines would be devel-
oped around and governed by the purposes of sentencing.66
61 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (A).
62 Id. § 991(b) (2).
63 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 67, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3250.
64 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994). In pertinent part, this statement of purposes
provides:
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,
to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider-
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner ....
Id.
65 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 77 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1984 U.S.G.CA.N. at
3260.
66 See Miller, supra note 60, at 417, 426-28 ("Congress... could not have been
more explicit in giving both the Commission andjudges responsibility for considering
how guideline sentences would achieve the purposes of sentencing."); see also Freed,
supra note 60, at 1708-10 (noting that the SRA stresses purposes in its instructions "to
the Commission and the courts"); Wilkins et al., supra note 8, at 373 (stressing that
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Though clear about the centrality of purpose considerations,
Congress was somewhat less clear in the SRA about exactly how the
Commission and judges were to incorporate purposes into the guide-
lines sentencing scheme.67 Nevertheless, many statements in the Sen-
ate Report suggest that Congress expected judges to address
sentencing purposes in departure cases and, in this way, aid the Com-
mission in its on-going development of principled sentencing law.
The Senate Report asserts, for example, that the articulation and re-
view of decisions to depart from the Guidelines will "provide case law
development of the appropriate reasons for sentencing outside the
guidelines [which], in turn, will assist the Sentencing Commission in
refining the sentencing guidelines."63 Similarly, the Senate Report
calls the statement of reasons for departure decisions "especially im-
portant" and then speaks of the role such statements will play in "as-
sist[ing] the Sentencing Commission in its continuous reexamination
of its guidelines and policy statements."69 These passages confirm
that the SRA seeks to foster a common-law dialogue about sentencing
purposes through which judges would contribute case-specific insights
to the evolution of federal sentencing law, and that Congress viewed
departures as the key means for this judicial contribution to princi-
pled sentencing law under a guidelines system.7 0
"the overarching purposes of sentencing identified in the SRA... enter into the
sentencing calculus to guide the Sentencing Commission in its construction of sen-
tencing guidelines [and] ... to direct sentencingjudges to the kinds of considera-
tions that are relevant and legally proper in imposing sentence").
67 See Feinberg, supra note 57, at 326-27 (discussing how Congress was "ambiva-
lent" about clearly defining the role and priority of sentencing purposes and thus
"largely fudged the issue in drafting the [SRA]"); see also Miller, supra note 60, at
420-22 (detailing numerous questionable conclusions drawn by those interpreting
the SRA about how purpose considerations are to be integrated with the guidelines
system).
68 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 151, reprinled in 1984 U.S.C.CA,_N. at 3334. Likewise, in
discussing the role ofjudges within the SRA's effort to establish consistent sentencing
law, the Senate Report highlights both the availability and the reiiev.ability of depar-
tures and then suggests that "case law developed from these appeals [of sentences
outside the guidelines] may, in turn, be used to further refine the guidelines." Id. at
50-52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3233-35.
69 Id. at 80, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. at 3263.
70 See Kennedy, supra note 58, at 271 (stressing that the "structure of the guide-
lines system draws upon the expertise of the judiciary in addressing [key] issues" in
sentencing law and that statement and review of reasons for departures were "the
cornerstone of the new system, because it will lead to the development of a common
law of sentencing"); see also Paul J. Hofer, Discrelion to Dipart after Koon v. United
States, 9 FED. SENTENCiNG REP. 8, 11 (1996) (discussing departures as part of SRA's
"model of collaborative policy development, in which the Commission's rules would
evolve through a process of appellate review"); Barry L Johnson, Diserelion and the
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Congress also stressed the role of departures in providing a bal-
anced measure of judicial discretion within the guidelines system.
The Senate Report makes clear that Congress did not want or expect a
guidelines sentencing system to "eliminate the thoughtful imposition
of individualized sentences"7' and that judges' authority to depart
from the guidelines was to be the central mechanism enabling individ-
ualized sentencing.72 The Senate Report repeatedly references the
Act's departure provisions when explaining that the SRA preserves
"considerable flexibility in the formulation of an appropriate sentence
for each particular case."73 Yet, Congress also appreciated that depar-
ture authority had to be circumscribed for the guidelines to control
most sentencing outcomes and thereby reduce unwarranted disparity.
The Senate Report recounts that Congress, fully aware that voluntary
guidelines had proved "ineffective in reducing sentencing disparities,"
rejected an effort to significantly expand the SRA's departure author-
ity because doing so would "make the sentencing guidelines more vol-
untary than mandatory. ''74
Rule of Law in Federal Guidelines Sentencing: Developing DepartureJurispntdence in the Wake
of Koon v. United States, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1697, 1740-45 (1998) (highlighting the
special role of departures and appellate review within SRA's effort to create "a body of
legal sentencing principles, a jurisprudence of sentencing").
71 S. RE-. No. 98-225, at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3235; see also Mis-
tretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (noting that the legislative history of
the SRA indicates that Congress "rejected strict determinate sentencing because it
concluded that a guidelines system would be successful in reducing sentence dispari-
ties while retaining the flexibility needed to adjust for unanticipated factors arising in
a particular case"); S. Rn,. No. 98-225, at 150-51, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at
3333-34 (stressing that "each offender stands before a court as an individual, differ-
ent in some ways from other offenders" and that "[s]ome variation [in sentencing
outcomes] is not only inevitable but desirable").
72 SeeJudy Clarke & Gerald McFadden, Departures fom the Guideline Range: Have
We Missed the Boat, or Has the Ship Sunk., 29 Am. Canm. L. REV. 919, 921-27 (1992)
(stressing the importance Congress placed on departures as the mechanism for re-
taining judicial discretion under the Guidelines); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the
Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Unifomity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
833, 861-62 (1992) (highlighting that "departures are an integral and important part
of the statutory scheme... [serving as] the crucial mechanism for avoiding undue
rigidity"); see also Johnson, supra note 70, at 1700-01 (explaining that Congress ex-
pected the departure provision of the SRA "to provide a safety valve for unusual
cases").
73 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3252; see also id. at
51-52, 78-79, 150-51, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3233-35, 3261-62, 3333-34.
74 Id. at 79, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3262; see also 133 CONG. REc. S16,
644-48, 16,647 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("If the standard
[for departures] is relaxed, there is a danger that trial judges will be able to depart
from the guidelines too freely, and such unwarranted departures would undermine
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Accordingly, Congress adopted a departure standard in the SRA
which provides that ajudge must impose a sentence within ranges set
forth in the guidelines, "unless the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different
from that described." 75 As detailed in the Senate Report, Congress
thought the language of this provision would guarantee that "most
cases will result in sentences within the guideline range" and yet still
provide "the flexibility necessary to assure adequate consideration of
circumstances that might justify a sentence outside the guidelines."76
Indeed, Congress expressed faith that the entire guidelines sentenc-
ing structure, buttressed by the departure mechanism, "should permit
enough flexibility to individualize sentences according to the charac-
teristics of the offense and the offender, while at the same time result-
ing in the imposition of sentences that treat offenders consistently
and fairly."77
II. THE FEDRA. SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN PACcICE: THE ORIGINS
A CONSEQUENCES OF A MISGUIDED DEPARTURE JURISPRUDENCE
Drawing upon the experience of early reforms and the recom-
mendations of criminal justice experts, Congress created through the
SRA what appeared to be an ideal model for sentencing reform.
Given the SRA's seemingly sound theoretical foundation and statutory
structure, the transition to guidelines sentencing should have been a
spectacular advancement in the federal criminal justice s)stem. 78
the core function of the guidelines and the underlying statute."); THo.,ms W. Hurctit-
SON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING L wv AND PRACICE 1390 (1999) ("In enacting the
enabling legislation, Congress recognized that an overly broad use of the departure
power could trigger the same concerns of unevenness that prompted the Guidelines
in the first place.").
75 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). A fuller discussion of this statutory provision ap-
pears infra text accompanying notes 92-95. The clause "of a kind, or to a degree" was
not originally part of this statutory section; it was added through the passage of the
Sentencing Act of 1987, which contained several amendments to the SRA that were all
designated as technical and clarifling. See Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L No.
100-182, §§ 1-3, 101 Stat. 1266 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3553
(1994)); see also Gelacak et al., supra note 33, at 328-31 (discussing history, meaning,
and importance of this amendment).
76 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52, 78, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3235, 3261.
77 Id. at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3252.
78 See Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States Sentending Commission Miss?, 101
YALE L.J. 1773, 1773 (1992) ("Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
amidst great optimism that federal sentencing guidelines would both fulfill Judge
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But, as is well known to those familiar with the federal system, the
implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has been
fraught with difficulties and marked by far more criticism than
praise. 79 Federal judges have been perhaps the most strident com-
plainants. Judge Jos6 Cabranes, in a widely cited 1992 speech,
deemed the Guidelines "a dismal failure."80 Otherjudicial critics have
called the federal guidelines system "a dark, sinister, and cynical crime
management program [with] . . . a certain Kafkaesque aura about
it,"81 and even "the greatest travesty of justice in our legal system in
this century."82 Many defense attorneys and academic commentators
have been only slightly more tempered in their criticisms. 8 3 Even sup-
Frankel's reform vision and build upon the states' pioneering experiences with sen-
tencing commissions by avoiding their failures and amplifying their successes.").
79 In accordance with the SRA's mandates, the United States Sentencing Com-
mission submitted the first set of Guidelines to Congress on April 13, 1987. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1.1 (1987). After the prescribed period of congres-
sional review, the initial Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987. Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 235, 98 Stat. 2031 (1984). However, within two years, over 200 district
judges declared at least some portion of the SRA's structure unconstitutional. See
TONRY, supra note 25, at 73-74 (discussing arguments made against the SRA's consti-
tutionality). Professor Michael Tonry sensibly suggests that many of these rulings,
"though necessarily couched in constitutional terms.... [revealed] judges' deep an-
tipathy to the guidelines themselves." Id. at 73. The Supreme Court conclusively
ruled in favor of the SRA's constitutionality by an eight to one vote in Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). The Guidelines have been continuously updated
through both yearly and emergency amendments; the latest incarnation of the Guide-
lines appears as U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1999).
80 Jos6 A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 11, 1992,
at 2 (reporting excerpts from remarks delivered at the University of Chicago Law
School); seeJos6 A. Cabranes, A Failed Utopian Experiment, NAT'L LJ., July 27, 1992, at
17.
81 G. Thomas Esele, The Sentencing Guidelines System? No. Sentencing Guidelines?
Yes., FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 20.
82 Id. at 21 (quoting U.S. DistrictJudge Donald Lay); see also STiTH & CAIPANES,
supra note 5, at 5 & n.12 (providing detailed evidence that "[m]any federal judges
have been openly and strongly critical of the Guidelines"); Marc Miller, Rehabilitating
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 JUDicATURE 180, 180-83 (1995) (detailing wide-
spread judicial hostility to the federal sentencing guidelines).
83 See, e.g., Judy Clarke, The Sentencing Guidelines: What a Mess, FED. PROBATION,
Dec. 1991, at 45; AlbertW. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea far Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 901-38, 949-51 (1991); Gerald F. Uelmen, Flederal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse than the Disease 29 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 899, 899-905
(1992); Ogletree, supra note 29, at 1938-40, 1944-60; Schulhofer, supra note 72, at
851-73; Freed, supra note 60, at 1682-87, 1700-54; Michael Tonry, The Failure of the
U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 131, 131-35 (1993); see also
Daniel Wise, After Five Years, No One Loves the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. LJ.,
Nov. 4, 1992, at 1 (reporting complaints for prosecutors and defense attorneys about
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porters of federal reforms readily acknowledge that the Guidelines are
flawed in many ways.84 Perhaps most tellingly, states that have re-
cently considered adopting guidelines systems have expressly rejected
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a model for their own reform
efforts.8 5
So what went wrong? How did the guidelines model that, in the-
ory, was widely advocated become a federal guidelines system that, in
practice, is widely abhorred? Though there is no single or simple an-
swer to this question, much of the difficulties and discontentment
with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines can be traced to misapplica-
tions of the SRA's departure authority.8 6 The misguided departure
the way the Guidelines "have revolutionized the practice of criminal law in the federal
courts").
84 See AssociateJustice Stephen Breyer, Speech at the University of Nebraska Col-
lege of Law (Nov. 18, 1998), in 11 FED. SENTENcING REP. 180, 184-85 (1999); Thomas
N. Whiteside, The Reality of Federal Sentencing: Beyond the Criticism, 91 Nw. U. L REx,.
1574, 1598 (1997); Frank 0. Bowman, The Quality of Mercy Mu.st Be Restrained, and
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Senten ing Guiddines, 1996 Wis. L RE%-. 679,
740-49; Steven Dalzell, One Cheer for the Guidelines, 40 ViLu. L RE%,. 317, 3"25-34
(1995).
85 See ToNRY, supra note 25, at 73 (noting that, in numerous states considering
sentencing reforms, "commissions at early meetings adopted resolutions expressly re-
pudiating the federal guidelines as a model for anything they might develop"); see also
Kevin R. Reitz & Curtis R. Reitz, Building a Sentencing kfon Agenda: The ABA s Nel
Sentencing Standards, 78JuticA-ruRE 189, 189-92 (1995) (explaining tiat, during the
American Bar Association's drafting of model sentencing standards, "the federal sys-
tem. was held out repeatedly as a bad example," requiring the proposed standards "to
be defended as very different than the federal guidelines").
86 Technically, "departure authority" encompasses several distinct elements of
the guidelines system. The Sentencing Commission utilized the departure mecha-
nism to implement Congress's directive that the Guidelines "reflect the general ap-
propriateness of imposing a lower sentence ... to take into account a defendant's
substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution" of others. 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(n) (1994). The Guidelines' provision for departures based on "substantial assis-
tance," U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES IM-NUAL S.G. § 5Kl.1, raises many issues that are
conceptually distinct from those that are the centerpiece of this Article. See HuTctu-
SON Er AL., supra note 74, at 1411 (discussing the "ideological difference" between
section 5K1.1 departures and other departures). See generally Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Power Over Substantial As-
sistance Departures, 50 RUTGERs L. REv. 199 (1997) (discussing substantial assistance
departures). Further, in certain guideline sections, the Commission has expressly
provided for "guided" departures by specifying particular fact situations in which a
departure would be appropriate. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GULIDEMIES MANUAL
§ 2G1.1, cmt. n.1; § 2Q1.3, cmt. n.7; see also id. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b)
(discussing these sorts of departures). As others have noted, because "guided depar-
tures are more akin to adjustments... whichjudges use to calculate the applicable
Guidelines range, rather than a departure from the Guidelines range," such depar-
tures do not implicate the same issues and policy concerns as "unguided" departures.
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jurisprudence developed by the Sentencing Commission and the fed-
eral courts fails to give effect to the fundamental role of departures
within a guidelines system and has had dire consequences for the en-
tire federal sentencing enterprise.
As suggested in the Introduction, the Supreme Court seemed to
be trying in Koon v. United States to remediate the system's difficulties
by enhancing sentencing judges' discretion to depart.8 7 However, as
discussed in Part III, the Court's decision in Koon may have ultimately
exacerbated some of the worst features of an already troubled depar-
turejurisprudence. 88 Yet before we can effectively assess the Supreme
Court's failure to fix the Guidelines' departure jurisprudence, we
need to examine how this jurisprudence initially got broken. This
Part thus identifies the critical missteps by the Sentencing Commis-
sion and the lower federal courts that initially produced a departure
jurisprudence that undermined, rather than fostered, both the effec-
tiveness and broader mission of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
A. Initial Develapment of the Departure Standard
1. The Sentencing Commission's Direction of the Departure
Inquiry
Though the background and legislative history of the SRA em-
phasized the importance of departures, the Act itself set forth only in
broad terms the framework and standards for departure authority.
Thus, how the Sentencing Commission initially expounded upon the
SRA's statutory directives was largely to determine the scope and func-
tioning of departure authority under the Guidelines. It was ultimately
Gelacak et al., supra note 33, at 315. Like most other commentary on departures
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, this Article is principally concerned with
so-called unguided departures. Unless otherwise noted, general references to "de-
partures" under the Guidelines are directed to this aspect of the system.
87 See supra text accompanying note 2.
88 See infra text accompanying notes 229-87.
89 The failure of the SRA to address departure authority with particularity is not
surprising given the sentencing reform proposals on which the SRA was built. Early
advocates of reform typically described only the broad contours of the guidelines
model, and few addressed in detail how the departure mechanism would operate;
though the principles and justifications for departure authority were presented, little
attention was given to the functioning of departures in practice. See, e.g., NAT'L CON.
FERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAws, supra note 10, §§ 3-207, 3-208, at 160-66;
O'DoNNE.LL ET AL., supra note 10, at 59; VON HIRscH, supra note 9, at 99-101; see also
PARENT, supra note 33, at 118-32 (noting many issues of departure policy and practice
that Minnesota's legislature did not address when passing guidelines sentencing re-
form legislation); Hanrahan & Greer, supra note 34, at 44-46 (noting the "lax defini-
tion" of departure standards in states that adopted the guidelines model).
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the Sentencing Commission's task to develop a departure mechanism
that would appropriately balance judicial sentencing discretion and
also foster the development of principled sentencing law within the
guidelines system.
But rather than recognize and embrace departures as a funda-
mental component of guidelines sentencing, the Sentencing Commis-
sion approached departure authority quite warily. Viewing the SRA
principally as a mandate for sentencing uniformity, the Commission
seemed exceedingly concerned when formulating the Guidelines that
retaining any significant sentencing discretion could subvert efforts to
reduce disparities.90 The Commission appeared to regard departures
not as an integral part of a guidelines scheme, but rather as a danger-
ous necessity whose scope and significance needed to be narrowly
conceived and greatly confined.9 1 This cramped view of departure au-
thority colored the Commission's work as it expounded upon the
SRA's departure provisions. In the initial Guidelines Manual, the
Commission developed a restrictive and narrow approach to the
SRA's standard for when judges can depart from the Guidelines. At
90 See Ronald F. Wright, Complexity and Distrust in Sentendng Guiddines 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 617, 632 (1992) (noting that "the way that the Sentencing Commission
read its statute and defined its task... made uniformity the key objective of the
guidelines"); Nagel, supra note 7, at 934 (suggesting that, in formulating the Guide-
lines, the Commission's "emphasis was more on making sentences alike"); see also
Freed, supra note 60, at 1704-05, 1728-30, 1740-47 (discussing ways in which the
Commission exalted uniformity over discretion and flexibility in the guidelines sen-
tencing process).
91 See Nagel, supra note 7, at 938-39 (suggesting that, when formulating the
Guidelines, the Commission was especially concerned about "the potential disparity
introduced by excessive judicial 'departures' from the guidelines"); Hutrcttso.4 Er
Al.., supra note 74, at 1411 (explaining that "the Commission's purpose was to mini-
mize those occasions on which ... departures would be allowed"); see also Schulhofer,
supra note 72, at 862-69 (discussing the "penasive assumption" by the Commission
that "departures are highly suspect,... a sign of disloyalty to the Guidelines or of
some flaw in their implementation").
The initial Commission's failure to appreciate the fundamental role of departure
authority was tellingly revealed in its Supplementay Report on the Initial Sentencing Guide-
lines and Poliky Statements. This lengthy document, which was released along ith the
original Guidelines and purported to explain the "background, empirical basis, struc-
ture, underlying rationale, and significant estimated effects" of the Guidelines, barely
even mentioned departure authority. See U.S. SENTEcNIG CO. LM'N, SUPPLE.MENr,%,Rv
REPORT ON THE INrAL. SENrENNCING GumaLNEs AND Pouch" STAT MENTS, at i (1987).
Similarly, the Commission's cramped view of departure authority was also revealed
through its early record-keeping, wherein the Commission labeled sentences involv-
ing departures as "non-compliance" with the Guidelines. Sce Katherine Oberlies, Re-
viewing the Sentencing Commission's 1989AnnualReport, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 152,153
(1990).
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the same time, however, the Commission virtually ignored the SRA's
standard for how much judges should depart from the Guidelines.
a. When Judges Can Depart
The key provision of the SRA that grants departure authority,
§ 3553(b), states:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range, [established by the Guidelines] unless the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentenc-
ing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in
a sentence different from that described.
92
Though rarely noted, this statutory standard for when judges may de-
part from the Guidelines actually has two distinct requirements, which
might be labeled separately as "descriptive" and "prescriptive" compo-
nents.93 The first requirement-the descriptive component of
§ 3553 (b)-concerns the presence of an aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstance that was "not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." This require-
ment calls upon a sentencing court, after identifying the aggravating
and mitigating factors present in the case at hand, to assess whether
the Sentencing Commission "adequately" incorporated these factors
into the applicable guideline. The second requirement-the pre-
scriptive component of § 3553(b)-concerns the presence of an ag-
92 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). A 1987 amendment to this provision adds the
instruction that, "[i]n determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into
consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy state-
ments, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission." Id. The legislative
history that accompanied this amendment indicates that it was principally designed to
protect Commissioners and their work product from being subjected to discovery by
litigants seeking information on the background of specific guideline provisions. See
133 CONG. Ric. S16,647-48 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statements of Sens. Thurmond
and Kennedy); see also Gelacak et al., supra note 33, at 328 n.127 (discussing this
amendment).
93 Interestingly, Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., who served as the Chairman of the
Sentencing Commission when the Guidelines were first drafted and implemented, is
one of only a few to have discussed in detail the "two-prong test" set forth in the
departure standard of § 3553(b). See William W. Wilkins, Jr., Sentencing Reform and
Appellate Review, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 429, 438-39 (1989); see also United States v.
Summers, 893 F.2d 63, 66 (4th Cir. 1990) (Wilkins,J.) (discussing the "two-prong test"
for departures). Judge Wilkins' insight is ironic because, as discussed herein, many of
the problems with the Guidelines' departure jurisprudence can be attributed to the
Commission's failure to place appropriate emphasis on each element of the depar-
ture standard.
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gravating or mitigating circumstance "that should result in a sentence
different from that described." This requirement calls upon a sen-
tencing court, after identifying the aggravating and mitigating factors
present in the case at hand, to assess whether the sentencing court
itself believes these factors justify a sentence outside the Guidelines'
prescribed range.
Critically, in setting forth the initial Guidelines, the Commission
made the descriptive component of § 3553(b) the focal point of the
departure inquiry. In expounding on departure authority in the first
Guidelines Manual, the Commission twice quoted only the descriptive
portion of the statutory standard.94 The Manual intimated that the
central issue for any departure decision was whether tie Commission
"had adequately considered a particular factor."95 The Commission
further indicated that sentencing courts should "treat each guideline
as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the con-
duct that each guideline describes" and consider a departure only
when confronted with "an atypical case, one to which a particular
guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs
from the norm."96 In other words, the Commission suggested that a
sentencing court's departure decision-making should involve first di-
vining the parameters of the "heartland" of the applicable guideline
and then contemplating a departure only if the case at hand somehow
fell outside these parameters. 97
Moreover, in articulating this approach to departures, the Com-
mission intimated that the Guidelines were comprehensive and com-
plete and thatjudges would not, and should not, find many reasons or
opportunities to depart. Though parts of the Guidelines Manual
seemed to welcome sentencing judges' use of their departure author-
ity,98 the Commission ultimately asserted that departures would be
94 See U.S. SENTENCING GumEnuNs MANUAL, ch. 1, pL A, introductory cmL 4(b),
at 1.6; ch. 5, pt. K, introductory cmt. 2, at 5.30 (1987).
95 d. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b), at 1.6.
96 Id.
97 SeeWflkins, supra note 93, at 439-40 (discussing the Commission's "heartland"
approach to departures roughly in these terms).
98 In the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statement's introduction, for exam-
ple, the Commission explained that it did "not intend to limit the kinds offactors...
that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case." U.S. Sm-rENci-c
Gum.ui'nxs MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b), at 1.7 (1987). Further,
through a series of policy statements, the Commission identified more than a dozen
factors that it had not fully taken into account in the initial Guidelines and could thus
provide a basis for a departure. See id. ch. 5, pt. K, introductory cmt. 2, at 5.30; id.
§§ 5K2.1-2.14. And, in § 5K2.0, the policy statement that addressed departure au-
thority in general, the Commission recognized that the circumstances "that may war-
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"rare" and that relatively few cases should involve factors that it had
"not adequately taken into consideration."99 In the Guidelines Man-
ual's introduction, the Commission explained that "despite the
courts' legal freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do
so very often... because the guidelines, offense by offense, seek to
take account of those factors that the Commission's sentencing data
indicate make a significant difference in sentencing."100 Thus, as-
serted the Commission, departures on grounds not mentioned in the
Guidelines "will be highly unusual."101
The text of the Guidelines re-affirmed the message that cases call-
ing for the exercise of departure authority should be few and far be-
tween. The sheer size of the initial Guidelines Manual, which ran
more than 200 pages and c6ntained over 100 multi-section guidelines,
implied that the Commission had considered most sentencing fac-
tors.10 2 The strict language and many details of particular provisions
likewise suggested that sentencing judges would seldom find opportu-
nities to depart from the Guidelines' prescribed sentencing ranges.' 03
rant departure . . . cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and
analyzed in advance," and thus controlling decisions as to precisely when a departure
is warranted "can only be made by the court at the time of sentencing." Id. ch. 5, pt.
K, introductory cmt. 2, at 5.30. See generally Freed, supra note 60, at 1745 (noting that
some parts of the introduction to the Guidelines Manual "spelled out a policy of flexi-
bility, under which departures were welcome").
99 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINFS MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b), at
1.6-7 (1987); see also Terence F. MacCarthy & Nancy B. Murnighan, The Seventh Cir.
cuit and Departures from the Sentencing Guidelines: Sentencing by Numbers, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 51, 56 (1991) (detailing how the Guidelines "indicat[ed] the Commission's be-
lief that courts will rarely in fact need to exercise their legal freedom to depart");
Colloquy, Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summarj of Proceedings, 101
YALE LJ. 2053, 2058 (1992) (asserting that the "Commission's interpretation of
§ 3553(b) clearly discourages departures" (statement of Benson Weintraub)).
100 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b), at
1.7 (1987).
101 Id. at 1.7-1.8; see also Gelacak et al., supra note 33, at 315 ("Because the Com-
mission felt it had accounted for most significant sentencing factors, it believed depar-
tures would rarely be needed."); Wilkins, supra note 93, at 441 (explaining that "the
Commission expects that departures based upon factors that it has not identified will
be associated with highly unusual cases").
102 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL; see also Stith & Cabranes, supra note
6, at 1275 (suggesting that the Commission "deliberately employed minute quantita-
tive distinctions in the Guidelines precisely in order to minimize the opportunity for
sentencing judges to make discretionary judgments").
103 See, e.g., STrrr & CABPANEs, supra note 5, at 73-76 (detailing guideline provi-
sions through which the Commission "directly circumscribed judicial power to de-
part"); Freed, supra note 60, at 1745 (discussing how the "strict language of the
guidelines and policy statements" suggested that departures were disfavored and that
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Of particular note, the Commission declared many potentially mitigat-
ing personal characteristics "not ordinarily relevant" or entirely irrele-
vant to whether an offender's sentence should involve a departure. 0 4
In sum, the Commission in the initial Guidelines elaborated a
narrow and restrictive approach to whenjudges could depart. By fo-
cusing on the descriptive component of the SRA's departure stan-
dard, the Commission suggested that a court's departure decision-
making should focus only on divining what was in the heartland of the
applicable guideline. Moreover, the Commission also intimated that
its heartlands were quite large; departures would be "rare," because
very few cases would involve factors outside the Commission's
heartlands.
b. How Much Judges Should Depart
Though the SPA addresses when judges can depart from the
Guidelines, the Act does not set forth a clear standard for hown much
judges should deviate from the Guidelines' sentencing ranges when
having the authority to depart. Section 3553(b) provides a statutory
standard for the threshold decision to depart, but no corresponding
section directly governs the extent of departures. Instead, the extent
of departures is addressed only indirectly through the SRA's provi-
sions concerning appellate review. Specifically, § 3742 states that "the
court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence... outside of
the applicable guideline range... is unreasonable."10 In this way,
the SRA simply instructs that the extent of any departure must be
"reasonable."
The Commission did not expound upon this statutory provision
anywhere in the initial Guidelines Manual. The Commission's only
direct reference to this part of § 3742 was in the Manual's introduc-
tion, where the Commission simply cited the statute and stated: "If the
district courts should "interpret each guideline strictly as though it were written in
stone").
104 See U.S. SENmcnmG GUmELwnES LuAL §§ 5H1.1-1.6 (providing that age, ed-
ucation and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, physical condition,
previous employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties are
.not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
guidelines"); id. § 5H1.4 (providing that drug dependence or alcohol abuse "is not a
reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines"); see also Reitz, supra note 43, at
1464-65 (explaining how the "restrictive flavor" of particular guideline provisions
"could be understood as an announcement that many of the 'human elements' of
punishment decisions, which were salient considerations before the guidelines were
created, are now for the most part off the table").
105 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (3) (1994); see also id. § 3742(f) (2) (providing instructions
for setting aside a departure if it "is unreasonable").
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judge departs from the guideline range, an appellate court may review
the reasonableness of the departure."' 0 6 In its discussions of depar-
ture authority, the Commission did not address in any way what sorts
of departures might or might not qualify as "unreasonable.' u0 7
More generally, the Commission in the initial Guidelines did not
set forth any general standards or methodology concerning the extent
of departures. s08 On this issue, the initial Guidelines said no more
than that controlling decisions as "to what extent departure is war-
ranted can only be made by the court at the time of sentencing."' 0 9
2. The Courts Follow the Commission's Lead
The Commission's initial approach to departures set the tone for
the federal courts as they began applying the Guidelines. The courts
of appeals, in particular, largely carried forward the Commission's fo-
cus on sentencing uniformity and the concern that too many depar-
tures could undermine efforts to reduce sentencing disparity.' 0 As a
106 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 2, at 1.1.
107 See United States v. Nuno-Para, 877 F.2d 1409, 1414 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989) (la-
menting that neither the SRA "nor the guidelines express clear guidance for deter-
mining when a sentence that departs from the guidelines is unreasonable"); see also
S=rrs & CABRANxs, supra note 5, at 127 (noting that the Commission has not ampli-
fied the SRA's requirement that departures be reasonable).
108 See HUTCHISON ET AL., supra note 74, at 1419-20 ("The guidelines do not set
forth any procedures for the district courts to follow when departing under Section
5K2.0."); JEFRI WOOD & DIANE SHEEHEY, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINES SEN-
TENCING: AN OUTLINE OF APPELLATE CASE LAW ON SELECTED ISSUES 213 (1997) ("The
guidelines do not . . . recommend procedures for departures."); see also S-riir &
CABR.ANEs, supra note 5, at 127 ("By and large, the Guidelines only govern the bases for
departure, not the amount of departure."); Saris, supra note 58, at 1042 (noting that
"[o]nce a court has decided to depart, generally there is no formula governing the
degree of departure").
109 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. K, introductory cmt. 2, at 5.30.
In the context of the few particular guidelines provisions that recommended a depar-
ture on specific grounds, the initial Commission did occasionally outline a methodol-
ogy or some considerations for the extent of the departure. See, e.g., id. § 4AI.3
(recommending a procedure for departures based on criminal history); id. §§ 5K2.1,
5K2.2, 5K2.3 (discussing relevant factors for an increased sentence when death, physi-
cal injury, or extreme psychological injury resulted from the commission of the of-
fense); id. § 5K2.10 (discussing relevant factors for a decreased sentence when the
victim's wrongful conduct provoked the offense behavior).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1989) (asserting that
Congress's overriding purpose in the SRA was "achieving general uniformity of treat-
ment" and that "attempts to impose uniformity will be destroyed if courts often depart
from the Guidelines"); United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 511 (6th Cir. 1990)
(asserting that the Guidelines were "designed to bring about uniformity"); United
States v. Russell, 917 F.2d 512, 515 (11th Cir. 1990) (stressing that "one of the main
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result, most courts gave effect to and even extended the Commission's
restrictive approach to when judges could depart from the Guidelines.
Yet, these courts, like the Commission, failed to give serious attention
to how much judges should depart from the Guidelines when having
authority to depart.
a. When Judges Can Depart
In line with the Commission's discussion of departure authority
in the Guidelines Manual, early departure decisions focused almost
exclusively on whether particular factors at hand had been considered
by the Sentencing Commission and thus fell within the applicable
guideline's "heartland."'' In considering their authority to depart,
courts concluded that the "crux of the matter is whether the guide-
lines have taken the principal sentencing factors into account."
1 12
District and appellate courts surmised that it was "only when the case
before the court falls outside the 'heartland' that departure comes
into play."" 3 In other words, taking their cue from the Commission,
the federal courts focused almost exclusively on the descriptive com-
ponent of the SRA's departure standard.
114
goals of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was the achievement of a high degree of
uniformity in federal sentencing"); United States v.Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 988 (10th
Cir. 1990) (expressing concern that "uniformity is threatened" by "a judge w-ho de-
parts [and] no longer strictly follows the standards of dhe Guidelines"); sr? also
Schulhofer, supra note 72, at 862-69 (discussing the "general view" of the courts of
appeals that "departures are a threat to the... s)stem").
111 See; e.g., United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 323-25 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Crawford, 883 F.2d 963, 964-65 (11th Cir. 1989); Xuno-Para, 877 F.2d at
1413-14; United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 601-04 (5th Cir. 1989); Uca, 867
F.2d at 787; United States v. Paccione, 751 F. Supp. 368, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd,
949 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Donatiu, 720 F. Supp. 619, 622-23
(N.D. Ill. 1989); United States v. Mederiros, 710 F. Supp. 106, 108-10 (M.D. Pa.
1989), affd, 884 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Klinefelter, 709 F. Supp. 653,
656 (W.D. Pa. 1989), vacated sub no. United States v. Cheape, 889 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.
1989); United States v. Weidner, 703 F. Supp. 1350, 1356 (N.D. Ind. 1988), aff'd, 885
F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1989).
112 United States v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254, 257-60 (1st Cir. 1990); see also cases
cited supra note 111.
113 United States v. Aguilar-Pefia, 887 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Marc L
Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin' Heart(land): The Long SearchforAdininistratkie
Sentencing Justice, 2 BuFF. Cur. L. RExv. 723, 765-79 (1999) (discussing the focus of
lower courts on the heartland concept in their departure decision-making); Bruce M.
Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of EmergingDeparture Jurispndence Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NoTm D~wE L. Rv. 1, 21-22 (1991) (same).
114 See supra text accompanying notes 92-97 (discussing descriptive component of
SRA's departure standard). When setting out the general terms of departure author-
ity, courts would on some occasions include a reference to or a brief discussion of the
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The courts of appeals also made a number of their own conse-
quential decisions about the jurisprudence of departure review.11,
The circuits all decided that, in the absence of a legal misunderstand-
ing about departure authority, a district court's decision not to depart
from the Guidelines was unappealable. 1 6 In addition, the courts of
appeals concluded that whether a particular factor provided a valid
basis for a departure involved a question of law calling for de novo
review." 7 Neither of these determinations was clearly mandated by
the SRA; the Act's provisions might be read to permit review of a dis-
trict court's decision not to depart," 8 and they suggest various possi-
SRA's prescriptive requirement that a factor could serve as the basis of a departure
only if it "should result" in a sentence outside the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States
v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 947 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441,
1445-47 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lira-Barraza, 897 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir.
1990). However, courts' analysis of whether factors in these cases would allow a de-
parture rarely include serious or extended discussion of this requirement.
115 The SRA expressly provides for appeal by defendants of any upward departure
and for appeal by the Government of any downward departure. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a) (3), (b) (3) (1994).
116 See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 103 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Tucker, 892 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973,
978 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir. 1989);
ROGER W. HAINES, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 744 (1997)
(citing cases and explaining that "all of the circuits have repeatedly held that they lack
appellate jurisdiction to review a district court's discretionary refusal to depart down-
ward from the Guideline range"); HtrrcHsoN Er AL., supra note 74, at 1429 n.8
(same).
117 The First Circuit's decision in United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43 (1st
Cir. 1989), was among the first to address departure review standards. In Diaz-Vit.
lafane, the First Circuit developed a three-part test for appellate review of departures,
the first step of which called for plenary review of "whether or not the circumstances
[relied on by the district court] may appropriately be relied upon to justify depar-
ture." Id. at 49. The basic approach articulated in Diaz-Villafane-which the First
Circuit itself further refined in United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1993),
through an opinion by then-CircuitJudge Stephen Breyer-was expressly adopted in
four other circuits, and its substantial equivalent was followed in others. See Selya &
Kipp, supra note 113, at 18-21 nn.88-96 (reviewing the Diaz-Villafane standard and
cases from other circuits that adopted a similar departure review methodology); see
also Miller & Wright, supra note 113, at 770-93 (discussing at length the decisions in
Diaz-Villafane and Rivera and noting their impact on all of departure jurisprudence).
118 The failure to depart might in some cases be characterized as "a violation of
law" appealable under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1), (b) (1), or as "an incorrect application
of the sentencing guidelines" appealable under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2), (b) (2). See
David Yellen, Appellate Review of Refusals toDepart, I FED. SENTENCING REP. 264, 264-65
(1988); Freed, supra note 60, at 1738-39; see also United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d
269, 272 (3d Cir. 1989) (BeckerJ., dissenting) (arguing for appellate review of refus-
als to depart under certain circumstances). But see Wilkins, supra note 93, at 437
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ble standards for review of a decision to depart.119 Nevertheless,
adopting procedures that clearly operated to discourage depar-
tures, 120 the courts of appeals concluded that they were to review
closely any decision to depart, but were not to review at all any refusal
to depart.
Though the courts developed a uniform approach to departures,
the early results of departure decision-making were somewhat mixed.
Because application of the Sentencing Commission's abstract "heart-
land" concept proved challenging,12 1 outcomes in departure cases
often varied from court to court and from circuit to circuit.Y2 Some
(suggesting that Congress made a conscious decision in the SRA to deny any right to
appeal a sentencing court's decision not to depart from the Guidelines).
119 The SRA's appellate review provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3742, does not dearly ad-
dress the appropriate standard for reviewing departures. This section indicates that
appellate courts shall determine whether a sentencing outside the Guidelines "is un-
reasonable," and it further provides that the "courts of appeals shall give due regard
to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the itnesses, and
shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are dearly erroneous,
and shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the
facts." Id. § 3742(e) (3). Commentators have debated, particularly with respect to
review of departure decisions, how appellate courts should interpret and apply the
directives of § 3742. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 70, at 1724-28 ("Neither section
3742 nor any relevant legislative history tell us how departure reiew should be
treated."); MacCarthy & Murnighan, supra note 99, at 60-63 (debating what the
"vague" terms of § 3742(e) mean for review of departures); Steven E. Zipperstein,
Certain Uncertainty: Appellate Review and the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. Qu.. L RX. 621,
634-39 (1992) (noting that "appellate courts have struggled to formulate appropriate
standards of review").
Of course, as discussed in Part m11, the Supreme Court's decision in Koon t. United
States expressly concerned the appropriate standard for appellate review of
departures.
120 See STrr & CABRANxs, supra note 5, at 73 (noting that the "asymmetrical rule
of appealability [through which] a decision to depart risks an appeal and reversal,
while a decision to adhere to the prescribed sentencing range insulates the judge
from second-guessing .... [serves] to discourage judges from departing").
121 See Miller & Wright, supra note 113, at 765-79 (noting that judges have
"struggl[ed] to give meaning to the heartland idea in theory, and in the context of
particular cases and guidelines"); MacCarthy & Murnighan, supra note 99, at 55 (ob-
serving that the heartland idea "has not been a simple concept for the courts to grasp
and apply").
122 See Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Departures Wisible and Invisible: Perpetuating
Variation in Federal Sentences, 5 FED. SENrENCING REP. 3, 3-5 (1992) (discussing statistics
which indicated "that circuits in fact depart quite unevenly"); Gelacak et al., supra
note 33, at 337-51 (detailing how, though "each appellate court applied the same
formal standard of review," the outcomes in departure cases in the circuits "differed
significantly... with respect to downward departures"); see alsoJohn FrazierJackson,
Departure from the Guidelines: The Frolic and Delour of the Circuits-How the Circudt Courts
are Undermining the Purposes of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Dic. L RE%,. 605,
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district courts, stressing those Commission statements that seemed to
welcome departures, readily found factors falling outside the heart-
land of particular guidelines that could provide a basis for depar-
ture. 123 A few appellate decisions lent support to the notion that
sentencing judges possessed considerable discretion to depart from
the Guidelines. In some cases, particularly in the Second, Third, and
Ninth Circuits, appellate courts affirmed departures with opinions
that suggested a number of factors had not been adequately consid-
ered by the Commission.'
24
But early decisions which countenanced the exercise of depar-
ture authority were in a decided minority. Most district courts rea-
soned that "valid departures are likely to be few in number," since the
Sentencing Commission "already considered all but the most esoteric
factors.' 1 25 Reflecting the views of many colleagues, one sentencing
judge concluded that "[i]t is clear... that the Sentencing Commis-
sion intended to leave the departure window open only a crack."'1'2
612-31 (1990) (noting that departure decisions "are not uniform: at the least they are
diverse, and more likely are in conflict with each other"); Zipperstein, supra note 119,
at 651-55 (discussing "decisional disparity emanating from the appellate courts" in
departure cases).
123 See, e.g., United States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1259-61 (D. Minn. 1990);
United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 633-42 (E.D. Wash. 1990), vacated, 952
F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1119-22
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Swapp, 719 F. Supp. 1015, 1024 (D. Utah 1989);
United States v. Valle, 716 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1989), affJd, 929 F.2d 629
(11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Birchfield, 709 F. Supp. 1064, 1065-70 (M.D. Ala.
1989); United States v. Aguilar-Pefia, 696 F. Supp. 781, 782 (D.P.R. 1988), vacated, 887
F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Pipich, 688 F. Supp. 191, 192-93 (D. Md.
1988).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Valdez-Gonzales, 957 F.2d 643, 649-50 (9th Cir.
1992); United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1991), amended ly 956
F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Takai, 941 F.2d 738, 7,14 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1117 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Bierley, 922
F.2d 1061, 1068 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 602-03 (2d Cir.
1990); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Cor-
rea-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1988); see also DanielJ. Freed & Marc Miller,
Contrasting Approaches Toward Guidelines and Departures in Six Circuits, 5 FED. SEtrrNC,.
ING REP. 243, 244-45 (1993) (reviewing tendency of Second, Third, and Ninth Cir-
cuits "to display respect for departures in different circumstances"); Gelacak et al.,
supra note 33, at 343-44, 347-50 (citing cases and discussing patterns of departure
decisions in the Second and Ninth Circuits).
125 United States v. Bethancurt, 692 F. Supp. 1427, 1430 n.12 (D.D.C. 1988).
126 United States v. Davis, 715 F. Supp. 1473, 1482 (C.D. Cal. 1989), afJ'd in part
and vacated in part, 960 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Freed, supra note 60, at
1745-46 (discussing tendency of district courts to interpret the Guidelines strictly
with little room for departures); Saris, supra note 58, at 1040-41 n.69 (explaining
that "the general perception in district courts-according to my own experience and
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The courts of appeals often validated this perspective through rulings
that suggested that the Commission's "heartlands" were large and left
little room for departures. Often stressing that departures should be
"quite rare,"127 the appellate courts frequently held that any consider-
ation of a factor (or even the likely consideration of a factor) by the
Commission constituted "adequate" consideration thereby precluding
a departure on that basis.' 28 In particular, many circuits strictly con-
strued the Guidelines' instructions that most offender characteristics
are "not ordinarily relevant" and disallowed departure on these
grounds in all but the most exceptional circumstances.1
that of numerous commentators-was that departures were disapproved deviations
from the standard").
127 United States v.Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1989); see also United States
v. Bell, 974 F.2d 537, 538 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Downward departures are permitted only
in the rare case. .. ."); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1027 (10th Cir. 1991)
("Given the Sentencing Commission's comprehensive treatment of the factors in-
volved in sentencing and the Congressional goals of uniformity and proportionality in
sentencing, we have determined that departures should rarely occur." (quoting
United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc))); United
States v. Enriquez-Munoz, 906 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) (departure should be
.rare").
128 See; e.g., United States v. Piche, 981 F.2d 706, 719 (4th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 962-63 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States %, Jackson, 921
F.2d 985, 988 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc); United States v. Russell, 917 F.2d 512, 515
(11th Cir. 1990); see also Douglas 0. Linder, Jouruying Through the Valby of Evil, 71
N.C. L. Rrv. 1111, 1144-47 (1993) (reviewing cases reversing departures and noting
that "Commission consideration of a circumstance has been found to be 'adequate'
even where there is scant evidence to support that conclusion"); Marc Miller & Daniel
J. Freed, Honoring Judicial Discretion Under the Sentening Reform Act, 3 FED. SFircjNo
REP. 235, 238 (1991) (reviewing cases reversing departures based on a broad concep-
tion of what the Commission has adequately considered); Robert H. Smith, Diparture
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Should a Mfitigaling or Aggravating Circumstance be
Deemed "Adequately Considered" Through ANegative Implication?," 36 Amuz. L RE%- 265,
275-78 (1994) (discussing appellate cases finding by negative implication that a cir-
cumstance had been adequately considered by the Commission).
129 See, e.g., United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Guajardo, 950 F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d
588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 138-39 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Brewer,
899 F.2d 503, 511 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sutherland, 890 F.2d 1042, 1043
(8th Cir. 1989); see also STrr & CABRaNms, supra note 5, at 99-100 (detailing many
early appellate rulings which reversed departures based on defendants' personal char-
acteristics); Schulhofer, supra note 72, at 863 ("In most cases considering downward
departure based on individual circumstances, appellate courts have set aside the de-
parture, usually in terms suggesting that the Guidelines essentially preclude departure
or place an extremely heavy burden ofjustification on the district judge.").
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b. How Much Judges Should Depart
Though always giving considerable attention to the threshold de-
cision to depart, courts typically treated the extent of any departure as
an afterthought. In many early cases, district courts provided ex-
tended justifications for threshold decisions to depart, but then gave
little or no rationale for the extent of these departures. 130 The courts
of appeals likewise gave scant consideration to how much judges
should depart. Once convinced that the sentencing court in fact had
authority to depart, appellate courts regularly affirmed even large de-
partures without even addressing the extent or with a conclusory as-
sertion that the departure was reasonable.
13'
Fostering the tendency to give little consideration to the extent of
departures were the reviewing standards adopted by the circuits. The
courts of appeals universally concluded that the beneficiary of a de-
parture could not appeal its extent-that is, a party receiving a
favorable departure could not obtain review of a departure that it
thought was too small.13 2 The courts of appeals also decided that
their review of whether a departure was too large should show great
deference to the sentencing court. Though vigorously scrutinizing
130 See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 740 F. Supp. 1502, 1509-19 (D. Kan. 1990),
affd, 941 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256,
1259-61 (D. Minn. 1990); United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1119-22
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Swapp, 719 F. Supp. 1015, 1024 (D. Utah 1989);
United States v. Valle, 716 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1989), affd, 929 F.2d 629
(11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Aguilar-Pefia, 696 F. Supp. 781, 782 (D.P.R. 1988),
vacated, 887 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1989).
131 See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 927 F.2d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v.
Hummer, 916 F.2d 186, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Snover, 900 F.2d
1207, 1209 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ramirez-DeRosas, 873 F.2d 1177, 1180
(9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Salazar-Villarreal, 872 F.2d 121, 122-23 (5th Cir.
1989); United States v. Spraggins, 868 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1989); see also S=r & CnaABR, ES, supra note
5, at 127 (noting the failure of "the federal courts of appeals [to] put much effort into
placing constraints on the amount by which a judge may depart"); Marc Miller &
Daniel J. Freed, The Emerging Proportionality Law for Measuring Departures, 2 FED. SEN-
TENCING REP. 255, 255 (1990) ("Early appellate cases reviewing departures focused on
whether the ground stated by the district court was 'of a kind or degree not ade-
quately considered by the Sentencing Commission.' Departures of substantial magni-
tude were upheld without considering principles of proportionality.").
132 See, e.g., United States v. Hazel, 928 F.2d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United
States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Wright, 895 F.2d 718,
720 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1556 (2d Cir. 1989); see
also Selya & Kipp, supra note 113, at 14-15 & nn.65-67 (citing cases holding that "the
beneficiary of a departure cannot appeal the departure's extent on the ground that
the court was too parsimonious"); HtrrcHisoN ET AL., supra note 74, at 1429 & nn.10-
12 (same).
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threshold decisions to depart through a de novo standard of review,
the circuits concluded that their review of the "reasonableness" of a
departure's extent should be "quite deferential to the district
judge."1 33
The courts of appeals did assert that sentencing courts had to
give some rationale for the extent of a departure. A few courts of
appeals called for district courts to make an analogy to other Guide-
lines sections to support the extent of their departures,'3 and every
circuit indicated that the Guidelines should serve as a reference in
constructing a departure.135 And, on occasion, an appellate court
133 Unites States v. Hernandez Coplin, 24 F.3d 312, 316 (1st Cir. 1994); accord
United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 751 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); United
States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 991 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc); United States v.
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1110 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d
555, 560 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Summers, 893 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1990);
see also Selya & Kipp, supra note 113, at 39 & n.205 (citing cases and explaining that
"once sufficient reasons are given, appellate review of the departure's extent is defer-
ential"). Once again, many of these rulings expressly adopted or implicidly followed
the reviewing standards set forth by the First Circuit in United States v Diaz-Villafane,
874 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1989). In Diaz-Vilafane, the First Circuit stressed that the magni-
tude of a departure "involves what is quintessentially ajudgment call.... Therefore,
appellate review must occur with full awareness of, and respect for, the trier's superior
'feel' for the case." Id. at 49-50.
134 The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits held that trial courts were expressly
required to determine the extent of departures through analogies to other Guideline
provisions. See Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d at 748; United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057,
1062-64 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 685 (2d Cir. 1990). The
Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits strongly recommended, but did not require, linking
departures to the Guidelines. See United States v. Lassiter, 929 F.2d 267, 271 (6th Cir.
1991); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 991; Kikumura 918 F.2d at 1112-13. The other circuits
permitted analogies, but never required or endorsed this approach. &eUnited States
v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64,70 (1st Cir. 1991); Hummer, 916 F.2d at 194 n.7; United States
v. Landry, 903 F.2d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Shuman, 902 F.2d 873,
877 (l1th Cir. 1990).
To its credit, the Tenth Circuit articulated an approach to review which, by call-
ing for courts to justify the extent of a departure "in light of the Guidelines' pur-
poses," Jackson, 921 F.2d at 989, is a move toward the approach I urge. Se infta Part
IV; see also United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 278 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing the SRA's
list of sentencing purposes and explaining that to "determine whether the degree of
departure is reasonable, [an appeals court] must consider the district court's prof-
fered justifications as well as such factors as: the seriousness of the offense, the need
forjust punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, correctional treatment, the
sentencing pattern of the Guidelines, the policy statements contained in the Guide-
lines, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities").
135 See HUTCHISON E" Al., supra note 74, at 1420-21 (noting that all circuits agree
that the Guidelines should be a point of reference, but "appellate courts disagree...
over the extent to which a Section 5K2.0 departure must be linked to analogies to
other guideline levels"); Selya & Kipp, supra note 113, at 40-42 (noting that "the
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would enforce these requirements with some rigor by reversing a de-
parture when the sentencing court had failed to explain adequately its
extent.136 But, by and large, the courts of appeals' application of the
statutory requirement of "reasonableness" exhibited far more bark
than bite. Often emphasizing the deference due the sentencing
court, the courts of appeals typically upheld even very large depar-
tures if the sentencing court provided just a nominal justification for
the departure's extent.
13 7
In sum, though circuit courts carefully examined threshold deci-
sions to depart, the amount of any allowed departure typically re-
ceived little or no serious scrutiny. As one set of commentators
summaiized the prevailing approach to appellate consideration of de-
partures, "review of the decision to depart is rigorous, but the extent
of departure is almost entirely left to the discretion of the district
court."
1 3 8
B. The Troublesome Consequences of the Early Departure Jurisprudence
The initial approach of the Commission and the courts to depar-
tures under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was misguided and
harmful. As detailed in Part I, departure authority within a guidelines
scheme has a crucial role in balancing the amount ofjudicial sentenc-
ing discretion and in enabling judges to contribute to the develop-
ment of principled sentencing law.1 39 But the restrictive and narrow
departure jurisprudence which first developed under the Guidelines
undermined both of these important goals.
1. Undermining the Balancing of Judicial Sentencing Discretion
From the outset, departure authority under the Guidelines did
not effectively balance the amount of judicial discretion retained in
the sentencing process. By overly restricting the availability of depar-
courts of appeals unanimously agree that the Guidelines should not be wholly dis-
carded once a departure is taken, [but] they differ over the extent to which guideline
analogues are required"); cases cited supra note 134.
136 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir.
1992); Lassiter, 929 F.2d at 271; United States v. Gentry, 925 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. St. Julian, 922 F.2d 563, 570 (10th Cir. 1990).
137 See United States v. George, 911 F.2d 1028, 1030-31 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Snover, 900 F.2d 1207, 1209 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Correa-Vargas,
860 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Saris, supra note 58, at 1042 (noting how
reviewing courts accord "substantial deference [to] the sentencing judge's decision to
determine whether [a departure] is in the 'realm of reason'").
138 Gelacak et al., supra note 33, at 337.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 26-48.
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tures, the Guidelines' initial departure jurisprudence created a system
that was unduly and harmfully rigid in most cases. At the same time,
this jurisprudence also produced troublesome pockets of sentencing
disparity.
a. Undue Rigidity
Many sentencing participants and observers found the initil
Guidelines inflexible for disallowing the consideration of relevant and
important sentencing factors in individual cases. District judges and
defense attorneys in particular complained that the Commission's sen-
tencing rules, especially the limits on considering offenders' poten-
tially mitigating personal circumstances, deprived judges of the
discretion they needed to achieve individualized and just sentencing
outcomes.' 40 Academic commentators likewise complained that, in
the effort to reduce disparities, the Guidelines had overly restricted
sentencing judges' opportunities to make pertinent and important
distinctions between offenders.' 41 One original Commissioner admit-
ted that the Commission's emphasis in the initial Guidelines "mas
more on making sentences alike, and less on insuring the likeness of
those grouped together for similar treatment."142 Consequently, as
Professor Stephen Schuihofer lamented at the time, the Guidelines
140 See FEDERAL CoURTs STUDY COM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STruD
Conerrr 137 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS REPORT] (notingjudicial com-
plaints that Guidelines "do not give the sentencing judge clear or adequate authority
to adjust sentences in light of all factors thatjudges and others regard as pertinent for
ajust sentence"); id. at 142 (lamenting that in "guideline sentencing... key facts
about the 'offender' are eliminated from the sentencing computation" (Statement of
Judge Keep)); Jos6 A. Cabranes, Letter to the Editor, Incohermt Sentencing Guiddins
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1992, at All (asserting that the Guidelines "ignore individual
characteristics of defendants"); Clarke, supra note 83, at 45 (criticizing the Guidelines
for saying "goodbye to the human aspects" of sentencing); see also Miller, supra note
82, at 183 (notingjudicial complaints "that the guidelines' excessive rigidity leads to a
focus more on 'points' than people").
141 SeeToiP.y, supra note 25, at 11 ("The commission has forbidden judges to take
account... of many considerations... that manyjudges (and most people) believe to
be ethically relevant in ajust system."); Alschuler, supra note 83, at 915-34 (arguing
that aggregation of harms under the Guidelines requires courts to impose tie same
sentences on offenders of differing culpability); Freed, supra note 60, at 1704,
1730-40 (asserting that the Guidelines are unnecessarily rigid and require dispropor-
tional sentences); Ogletree, supra note 29, at 1952-55 (complaining that tie Guide-
lines do not sufficiently account for differences in offenders); Schulhofer, supra note
72, at 835, 851-70 (explaining how the Guidelines lack "the flexibility that the federal
sentencing process needs to function effectively, with tie degree of individual differ-
entiation" needed for achieving just sentences).
142 Nagel, supra note 7, at 934.
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"require undue uniformity by blocking needed differentiation among
offenders."
143
Complaints about the Guidelines' inflexibility recognized, and
often stressed, that an overly restrictive departure jurisprudence was at
the heart of the problem. As one set of commentators put it, the Sen-
tencing Commission and the federal courts had "missed the boat" on
departures. 44 While some primarily faulted the Sentencing Commis-
sion for promulgating strict departures standards, 145 and others
stressed the impact of circuit court decisions reversing and otherwise
discouraging departures, 4 6 all agreed that an overly restrictive juris-
prudence failed to give effect to the role of departure authority in
providing needed sentencing discretion and flexibility under the
Guidelines. The departure mechanism was supposed to ensure that
judges could craft individualized sentences, but restrictions on depar-
tures gave judges the impression that their sentencing role under the
Guidelines was reduced to "filling in the blanks and applying a rigid,
mechanical formula."
14 7
In the words of Professor Michael Tonry, though the Guidelines
"were intended to be presumptive, not mandatory... [i]n practice,
[because of] limit[s] [on] departures from the guidelines, they [were]
more and more like mandatory sentencing laws.' 48 Believing depar-
tures were largely verboten, judges ascribed sentences without making
some significant sentencing distinctions among offenders. Conse-
143 Stephen Schulhofer, Excessive Uniformit'-And How to Fix It, 5 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 169, 169 (1992). See generally Schulhofer, supra note 72 (discussing at length the
problem of undue uniformity under the Guidelines).
144 Clarke & McFadden, supra note 72, at 919.
145 See S=m & CABRANFs, supra note 5, at 72-76; TONRY, supra note 25, at 11,
76-77; Terence F. MacCarthy et al., Individualized Sentences and Alternatives to Imprison-
ment, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 211, 211 (1993).
146 See Clarke & McFadden, supra note 72, at 919-32; Schulhofer, supra note 72, at
870; see also Freed, supra note 60, at 1744-45 (allocating blame to both the Commis-
sion and the Courts for developing a restrictive departure jurisprudence); Reitz, supra
note 43, at 1463-64 (same); Clarke, supra note 83, at 45 (same).
147 United States v. Russell, 685 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1988), rev'd and
vacated, 880 F.2d 419 (11th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664,
666 (8th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that, under the Guidelines, sentencing has become a
"mechanical process"); United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1163 (S.D. Fla.
1988) (AronovitzJ., concurring) (describing the Guidelines as a "mechanistic admin-
istrative formula"); Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 364 (1992) (noting judicial complaints
that the Guidelines converted judges into "rubber-stamp bureaucrats" and "judicial
accountants" in the sentencing process).
148 Michael Tonry, Mandatoy Minimum Penalties and the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion's "Mandatory Guidelines, "4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 129, 129 (1991).
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quently, sentencing under the Guidelines produced unwarranted uni-
formity as offenders of differing culpability were given similar
sentences.
b. Pockets of Disparity
While the initial departure jurisprudence led to unwarranted uni-
formity in most cases, it also produced pockets of sentencing disparity
as a result of (1) differing applications of the "heartland" concept, (2)
circumventions of the Guidelines, and (3) departures of varying
magnitudes.
As noted before, a few circuits concluded the Guidelines' "heart-
lands" were not too expansive and thus applied a somewhat less re-
strictive approach to departures.1 49 Indeed, in response to early
complaints about the Guidelines' rigidity, some judges in these cir-
cuits used academic commentary to stress that departure authority
under the Guidelines still provided an avenue of flexibiity.'50 How-
ever, while these judges accurately indicated that the Guidelines could
be applied less rigidly in theirjurisdictions, other observers accurately
noted that the openness of some circuits to departures created a form
of "appellate decisional disparity."151 As commentators highlighted,
nationwide sentencing consistency throughout the federal system 'was
undermined when, in contrast to the strict limits enforced by most
courts, a few circuits were more permissive of departures.
52
149 See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
150 See John M. Walker, Jr., Loosening the Administrative Handcuffs: Discreion and
Responsibility Under the Guidelines, 59 BRooK. L Rv. 551, 551-52, 558-64, 571 (1993)
(CircuitJudge in Second Circuit); Edward R. Becker, lexibility and Discretion Available
to the SentencingJudge Under the Guidelines Regime, FED. PRO anON., Dec. 1991, at 10
(ChiefJudge for Third Circuit); see alsoJack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on
Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENTNCING REP. 6, 8 (1992)
(DistrictJudge within Second Circuit) (complaining about restrictions on departure
authority, but still suggesting that there "are almost invariably adequate guideline-
permitted reasons to depart where the guidelines seem unfair").
151 Zipperstein, supra note 119, at 651-55, 656; see alsoJackson, supra note 122, at
606, 634 (lamenting the failure of the circuit courts to "develop any uniform system of
application" for departures).
152 SeeJackson, supra note 122, at 606, 634 (suggesting sentencing disparities re-
suiting from differing approaches to departure review);Jody L King, Avoiding Gender
Bias in Downward Departures for Family Responsibilities Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 1996 ANN. S Rv. AM. L. 273, 300-02 (noting disparities between circuits as to
when family circumstances permit a departure); Zipperstein, supra note 119, at
651-55, 656 (suggesting sentencing disparities resulting from differing approaches to
departure review); see also Freed & Miller, supra note 122, at 3-5 (reviewing statistics
on varying departure rates); Gelacak et al., supra note 33, at 337-51 (highlighting
differences in departure outcomes among circuits).
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Furthermore, the very fact that the Guidelines were widely per-
ceived as inflexible resulted in an even more pernicious disparity prob-
lem, one generally associated with mandatory sentencing laws. As
Professors Ilene Nagel and Stephen Schulhofer detailed in a series of
articles,15 3 and as others reported in accounts of federal sentencing
practices, 54 the Guidelines' apparent rigidity prompted some sen-
tencing participants to craft plea agreements or strike other bargains
to avoid their strict application. Though there has been some dispute
over the extent of Guideline circumvention, no one disputes that such
evasions through sentencing bargains have impacted a significant
number of cases. 155 For the litigants striking sentencing bargains and
for judges approving such agreements, Guideline circumvention may
have often appeared to be a way to achieve the needed differentiation
in offenders that the departure mechanism did not seem to allow.',
However, even when done seeking justice in individual cases, such cir-
153 See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical
Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 501 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 Am. CrM. L. REv. 231
(1989); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Fedetal
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Pe-
iod, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284 (1997) [hereinafter Schulhofer & Nagel, Guideline
Circumvention].
154 See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Dispar-
ity, 28 AM. CrM. L. REv. 161, 190-200 (1991);Jack B. Weinstein & Nicholas R. Tur-
ner, The Costs of Avoiding Injustice by Guideline Circumventions, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP,.
298, 298-300 (1997); see also FrD.v.AL COURTS REPORT, supra note 140, at 138 (discuss-
ing reports that "some prosecutors (and some defense counsel) have evaded and
manipulated the guidelines"); Freed, supra note 60, at 1683 n.2 (suggesting that an
"underground level of sentencing" involves significant "informal noncompliance"
with the Guidelines).
155 Through a variety of measures, Professors Nagel and Schulhofer arrived at an
.estimate of Guidelines evasion or circumvention in roughly 20-35% of the cases re-
solved through a guilty plea." Schulhofer & Nagel, Guideline Circumvention, supra note
153, at 1290. Some commentators have suggested that one methodology employed by
Professors Nagel and Schulhofer may underestimate guidelines evasions. See David N.
Yellen, Two CheersforA Tale of Three Cities, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 567, 569-70 (1992).
Others have suggested that Professors Nagel and Schulhofer may overstate the extent
of the problem. See Bowman, supra note 84, at 729 & n.177. See generally Douglas A.
Berman, Does Fact Bargaining Undermine the Guidelines?, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 299,
300 (1996) (noting varying views of extensiveness of bargaining over facts relevant to
sentencing).
156 See Schulhofer, supra note 72, at 852 (explaining how "circumvention is, in
effect, a form of departure from the applicable Guideline range"); Schulhofer &
Nagel, Guideline Circumvention, supra note 153, at 1289 (suggesting circumventions
involve instances in which the "applicable Guideline range has been manipulated to
achieve the same result as a downward departure").
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cumventions necessarily produced sentencing disparity as some de-
fendants garnered the benefits of evading the Guidelines while others
did not.157 As Professors Nagel and Schuhofer stress, such "hidden
departures" are highly problematic, because "circumvention, unlike
overt dowvard departure, is hidden and unsystematic .... By com-
parison to explicit departures, circumvention is far more likely to in-
volve unwarranted disparity, and it occurs in a context that precludes
oversight and obscures accountability."158
Last, but not least, the initial departure jurisprudence produced
still another pocket of disparity by failing to seriously examine and
regulate the extent of departures. As noted before, with district and
appellate courts focused primarily on whether there was a permitted
basis for a departure, limited consideration was given to the appropri-
ateness and proportionality of the magnitude of any allowed depar-
ture.159 As a result, departures of widely varying extents were upheld
even though premised on seemingly quite similar grounds.GO In addi-
157 See Heaney, supra note 154, at 199-202 (discussing how circumventions of the
Guidelines produces disparity); Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nv. U. L. RE%,. 1342, 1414 (1997) (noting
that even limited "guideline manipulation ... create[s] an unacceptable threat of
unwarranted sentencing disparities"); Schulhofer & Nagel, Guideline Circurention,
supra note 153, at 1285-86; see also Dan Freed & Marc Miller, Pka Bargained Sentences,
Disparity and "GuidelineJustice,"3 FED. SEIrrm'ciNG REP. 175, 175 (1991) (suggesting
that "disparity among plea bargained cases is very high" (emphasis omitted)).
158 Schulhofer & Nagel, Guideline Circumvention, supra note 153, at 1312.
159 See S=rrn & CABRANEs, supra note 5, at 127 (noting the failure of "the federal
courts of appeals [to] put much effort into placing constraints on the amount by
which ajudge may depart"); Miller & Freed, supra note 131, at 255 (noting that appel-
late courts did not consider "principles of proportionality" when reviewing the extent
of departures); supra notes 130-37.
160 For large variations in upward departures on similar offense-related grounds,
compare United States v. Ono, 64 F.d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding sbc-level
upward departure adding years to sentence for psychological injury caused by stalk-
ing), with United States v. Ailer, 993 F.2d 16, 19-21 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding two-
level upward departure adding only six months to sentence based on lengthier period
of stalking). For large variations in upward departures based on criminal history,
compare United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding
departure from a range of six to twelve months to a sixty-three-month sentence based
on under-representation of criminal history), with United States v. Brown, 899 F.2d 94,
96-98 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding departure to twenty-one-month term from similar
sentencing range). For large variations in downward departures on similar offender-
related grounds, compare United States v. One Star, 9 F.d 60, 61-62 (8th Cir. 1993)
(upholding departure to probation from sentencing range of thirty-three to forty-one
months based on hardships of life on Indian reservation), with United States v. Big
Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1330-32 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding departure dow n only to
twenty-four months from sentencing range of thirty-seven to forty-six months on simi-
lar facts).
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tion, a number of enormous departures both upward and downward
were affirmed on various grounds, 61 often based on facts that seemed
not too dissimilar from those in cases in which a departure was disal-
lowed.162 In other words, the failure of the Commission and the
courts to regulate effectively how much judges should depart led to
considerable variations in the extent of departures and thereby pro-
duced significant disparities not only among cases that involved depar-
tures, but also between those cases that involved departures and those
that did not.
1 63
In sum, then, the Guidelines' early departure jurisprudence pro-
duced an array of problems that undermined efforts to effectively bal-
ance judicial sentencing discretion. In most circuits, a restrictive
approach to departures overly limited judicial discretion and resulted
in unwarranted sentencing uniformity. At the same time, significant
pockets of disparity developed as a result of differing inter-circuit in-
161 See, e.g., United States v.Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 128-30 (2d Cir. 1992) (approv-
ing departure from range of forty-six to fifty-seven months to home detention based
on family circumstances); United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 1991)
(approving departure from range of twenty-seven' to thirty-three months to probation
based on diminished capacity); United States v. George, 911 F.2d 1028, 1030-31 (5th
Cir. 1990) (approving departure from range of fifteen to twenty-one months to sen-
tence of fifty months based on failure to appear after release on bond); United States
v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 51-52 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding departure from range
of tventy-seven to thirty-three months to sentence of 120 months based on aggravat-
ing aspects of drug offense); United States v. Ramirez-De Rosas, 873 F.2d 1177, 1180
(9th Cir. 1989) (affirming departure from range of zero to four months to sentence
of thirty months based on initiation of high-speed chase); see also Saris, supra note 58,
at 1042 ("Upward departures which literally triple the sentence and downward depar-
tures from a range of thirty-three months to probation have all been held to be within
the 'realm of reason.'").
162 Compare George, 911 F.2d at 1030-31 (approving large upward departure based
on failure to appear), with United States v. Singleton, 917 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir.
1990) (reversing departure based on similar facts). Compare Johnson, 964 F.2d at
128-30 (upholding large downward departure based on family circumstances), with
United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1992) (reversing departure
based on similar facts). Compare Glick, 946 F.2d at 339 (upholding large downward
departure based on diminished capacity), with United States v.Johnson, 979 F.2d 396,
400-01 (6th Cir. 1992) (reversing departure based on relatively similar facts).
163 See Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Editors' Notes, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 2, 2
(1990) (noting that without "appellate courts develop [ing] common law principles to
govern the magnitude of departures, substantial sentencing disparities are bound to
pervade the realm of departures"); see also Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law
Analysis, 40 EMORY LJ. 393, 427-28 (1991) (expressing concerns about sentencing
uniformity in light of some appellate courts' failure to regulate extent of departures);
Zipperstein, supra note 119, at 655 (stressing that "setting no limit on the extent of...
departures invites disparity for otherwise similarly situated defendants").
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terpretations of the departure standard, efforts by some to circumvent
the Guidelines, and departures of widely varying extents.
2. Undermining the Development of Principled Sentencing Law
The Guidelines' initial departure jurisprudence had a deeper
problem than its failure to effectively balance sentencing discretion.
The narrowness of this jurisprudence undermined the development
of principled sentencing law under the Guidelines.
Because courts in departure cases focused almost exclusively on
the "descriptive" component of the SRA's departure standard-the re-
quirement that a particular factor was "not adequately taken into con-
sideration by the Sentencing Commission"-departure decision-
making centered upon what the Commission considered in drafting
the Guidelines and whether particular factors were within certain
guidelines' "hearlands."I' Courts, in turn, neglected the prescriptive
component of the SRA's departure standard, the part that concerns
whether a factor "should result" in a sentence outside the Guidelines.
Departure decision-making did not address what factors should impact
sentences within the guidelines scheme, as judges failed in departure
cases to focus on whether factors in the case at hand might norma-
tivelyjustify a sentence above or below the sentencing range specified
by the Guidelines. Departure cases involved significant "descriptive
deliberation" as courts contemplated and discussed what the Commis-
sion had described in the Guidelines' heartlands, but they lacked seri-
ous "prescriptive deliberation," as courts did not contemplate or
discuss what they prescriptively thought should result in a sentence
outside the Guidelines.
The initial departure jurisprudence's narrow focus on the de-
scriptive component of the SRA's departure standard-that departure
decision-making involved descriptive deliberation and lacked pre-
scriptive deliberation-undermined, in two critical ways, the develop-
ment of principled sentencing law within the Guidelines. This narrow
focus allowed for purposeless departure decisions in individual cases
and produced a purposeless departure jurisprudence across cases.
164 See supra notes 111-14; see also Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Deparfures Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two Distrkis, 30 CoNN. L RE%% 569, 585 (1998)
(explaining that "appellate review of judge-granted departures merely focuses on
whether the sentencing court properly based a departure on a circumstance 'of a
kind' or 'to a degree' not adequately taken into account by the Commission"); Miller
& Wright, supra note 113, at 766-79 (discussing courts' concentrated focus in depar-
ture cases on the heartland concept).
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a. Purposeless Departure Decisions
As detailed in Part I, Congress sought and expected the SRA to
produce a principled and purpose-driven sentencing system. The nar-
rowness of the initial departure jurisprudence undermined this goal
by having courts engaged in "purposeless" departure decision-making
that, in turn, allowed for "purposeless" departures.
This problem of "purposeless" departures was most apparent in
cases involving factors such as family ties that the Sentencing Commis-
sion had declared "not ordinarily relevant" to a decision to depart be-
low the applicable guideline range. 165 Courts were quick to interpret
the Commission's instruction to mean that, though not ordinarily rel-
evant, family circumstances that were "unusual" or "extraordinary"
could serve as the basis for a departure. 16 6 In other words, as one
court put it, though "ordinary" family ties had been considered by the
Commission, "extraordinary family circumstances [were] outside the
'heartland' of cases the Guidelines were intended to cover.' 6 7 Conse-
quently, the determinative issue in a series of departure cases became
exactly what sorts of family circumstances were "extraordinary" as op-
posed to being simply "ordinary."68 Similar case law developed
around other factors, such as age and employment history, that the
Commission had declared "not ordinarily relevant;"169 courts stated
165 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (1987) (providing that "fam-
ily ties and responsibilities... are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
sentence should be outside the guidelines"). In the first years of guidelines sentenc-
ing, family ties developed to be one of the most frequent grounds upon which down-
ward departures were granted. See 1995 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 87, tbl.
30.
166 See, e.g., Johnson, 964 F.2d at 128-30; Moge4 956 F.2d at 1565; United States v.
Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1494 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326,
1331-32 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.Jackson, 756 F. Supp. 23, 27 (D.D.C. 1991);
see also HAINES Er AL., supra note 116, at 698-700 (discussing doctrine and citing cases
holding that extraordinary family ties and circumstances can be the basis for a
departure).
167 United States v. Harrison, 970 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting United
States v. Shortt, 919 F.2d 1325, 1328 (8th Cir. 1990)).
168 See HAINES ET AL., supra note 116, at 698-700 (reviewing departure cases on
family circumstances); WooD & SHEEHEY, supra note 108, at 190-92 (same); Donald
C. Wayne, Chaotic Sentencing Downward Departures Based on Extraordinaty Family Circum-.
stances, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 443, 444-53 (1993) (noting cases struggling to determine
what family circumstances are extraordinary); see also Patricia M. Wald, "Wat About
the Kids?: Parenting Issues in Sentencing, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 137, 137 (1995) (not-
ing that "courts have gone every which way in deciding if a particular case presents
'ordinary' or 'extraordinary' circumstances").
169 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5HI.1 (1987) (declaring age "not
ordinarily relevant"); id. § 5H1.5 (employment history).
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that departures could be based on such factors if and only when a
particular defendant's circumstances qualified as "extraordinary."
70
Though consistent in their doctrine, these cases were also consis-
tent in their pedantry-missing in the dickering over what circum-
stances merited the label "extraordinary" was any serious or developed
inquiry into why a defendant's family circumstances should result in a
sentence below the applicable guideline's sentencing range. That is,
the considerable case law addressing family circumstances under the
Guidelines included almost no discussion of the normative justifica-
tions for considering family circumstances-whether extraordinary or
simply ordinary-as a basis for reducing a sentence.' 7 ' In this sense,
many "purposeless" departures were allowed: district courts granted
and appellate courts approved departures based simply on the deter-
mination that a defendant's family circumstances qualified as "ex-
traordinary" without expressly considering whether, in the case at
issue, a reduced sentence based on such circumstances actually served
the purposes of punishment set forth in the SRA.'-
Of course, arguments can certainly be made in specific factual
contexts that a defendant's family circumstances justify a reduced sen-
tence.1 78 For example, a defendant who commits bank fraud to fund
a necessary medical caretaker for his or her aged mother seems less
culpable than a defendant who commits the same fraud to finance the
170 See, eg., United States v. Guajardo, 950 F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1991) (age);
United States v.Jagmohan, 909 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1990) (employment history)); see
also HUTC-ISON ET AL, supra note 74, at 1416 (explaining that "most courts have read
this restriction on the use of 'ordinary' circumstances to imply that 'extraordinary'
occurrences will permit a departure").
171 See Wald, supra note 168, at 138 (lamenting that departure decision-making in
this context turns simply on "Talmudic definitions of what is 'ordinary' and 'ex-
traordinary'"); cf Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Gender and Sentencing: Family Responsibility
and Dependent Relationship Factors, 8 FED. SuEmruNcnt'o R . 145, 145 (1995) (com-
plaining that departure jurisprudence concerning family circumstances does not ef-
fectively allow for normative considerations of culpability and crime control).
172 Cf Gelacak et al., supra note 33, at 363-65 (suggesting after a review of 1400
cases that departures are sometimes granted based on facts that are not "meaningfully
atypical").
173 Some commentators, distressed over the decision of the Commission to deem
family circumstances "not ordinarily relevant" and over court decisions applying this
directive strictly, have argued that normative considerations do make a reduced sen-
tence based on some family circumstances appropriate and justified. See, e.g., Cook,
supra note 171, at 145; Susan E. Eingstad, The Sentencing Guidelines: Downward Depar-
tures Based on Defendants'Extraordinary Family Ties and Responsibilities 76 Mims. L RE%.
957, 977-84 (1992); Myma S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Wo-
men, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 20 PuP. L. REv. 905, 936-69 (1993); Eleanor L. Bush, Not Ordinarily Relevant?
Considering the Defendants' Children at Sentencing, Fun. PROBkroI, Mar. 1990, at 15.
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purchase of a yacht. A court might sensibly conclude that the dutiful
child's "family circumstances" merit a lesser sentence in line with the
SRA's concern "to provide just punishment for the offense.""74 Simi-
larly, consider a devoted single parent who gets involved in drug distri-
bution, only to discover upon being caught the real possibility of
permanently losing custody of his or her children. With the prospect
of losing custody itself providing a significant deterrent to any further
wrongdoing, a court might conclude for this parent that, because of
"family circumstances," a sentence below the otherwise applicable
guideline range would suffice "to afford adequate deterrence" and "to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant" as required
by the SRA.
175
Given the SRA's avowed interest in developing principled and
purposeful sentencing laws and its requirement that judges "consider
what impact [the traditional punishment] purpose[s] should have on
the sentence in each case," 176 these sorts of normative considerations
about culpability and crime control ought to have been the center-
piece of early case law debates over departures from the Guidelines
for. family circumstances. But such purpose considerations were never
a significant part of courts' decision-making in departure cases. In-
stead, as noted above, because of the narrow focus on the descriptive
portion of the SRA's departure standard, this jurisprudence simply in-
volved quarrels over what sorts of circumstances should be deemed
"extraordinary." Courts adjudicated these cases by engaging in pur-
poseless departure decision-making, which, in turn, allowed for pur-
poseless departures.
In the end, it does not appear that all or even most departures for
"extraordinary" circumstances were truly purposeless. A review of this
case law reveals that often lurking beneath debates over "ex-
traordinariness" were underlying concerns and judgments about cul-
pability, crime control, and the traditional purposes of punishment
embraced by the SRA.177 But the very fact that such normative consid-
erations were subterranean rather than explicit in these cases high-
lights the deeper problem with the narrowness of the early
174 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (A) (1994).
175 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C).
176 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 77 (1983) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3260.
177 See Freed & Miller, supra note 60, at 298 (reviewing cases in which courts "offer
reasons for departure that avoid the language [of punishment's purposes] but seem
predicated on a theory of purpose"); cf. United States v. Mason, 966 F.2d 1488,
1494-96 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (suggesting that early cases did involve normative consider-
ations when assessing permitted departures, even though it was not obvious).
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Guidelines' departure jurisprudence. Not only did the focus on the
descriptive component of the SRA's departure standard allow for pur-
poseless departure decisions in individual cases, it also produced a
purposeless jurisprudence across the range of cases that kept depar-
tures from serving as an effective means for principled judicial contri-
butions to the Guidelines' evolution.
b. Purposeless Departure Jurisprudence
As developed in Part I, sentencing reformers and the SRA's draft-
ers both sought and expected judicial contribution to the develop-
ment of principled sentencing law under the Guidelines. But in few
early Guidelines' decisions did judges expressly contemplate and dis-
cuss the purposes of punishment. Even though the SRA instructs
judges to consider the traditional purposes of punishment when
ascribing sentences, 78 very rarely did normative concepts find expres-
sion in sentencing opinions. As noted by Kenneth Feinberg, a princi-
pal architect of the SRA in Congress, early cases brought "littlejudicial
discussion about purposes in conjunction with the imposition of indi-
vidual sentences.... [LIost in the application of the appropriate
guidelines is any visible, meaningful discussion of the purposes to be
served by the sentence."17 9 Or, as put by Professors Dan Freed and
Marc Miller, "the [early] years of guideline sentencing [were]
'purposeless.'"180
Though various forces account for the purposelessness of guide-
lines sentencing, this problem can and should be traced first and fore-
178 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (B)-(C); see also supra text accompan)ing notes
64-66.
179 Feinberg, supra note 57, at 327; see also Robert Weisberg, Guideline Sentendng,
Traditional Defenses, and the Evolution of Substantive Criminal Law Docdrine, 7 FED. SE'-
TENCING REP. 168, 168 (1994) (observing that sentencing decisions under the Guide-
lines have been comprised of "more complication of detail than richness of
concept"); Lawrence S. Lustberg, The Importance of Purposes in Choosing Between Prison
and Probation, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 334, 334-35 (1991) (lamenting "the divorce of
sentencing from its purposes" based on the fact that "guideline sentencing in practice
appears to take place largely without reference, by either counsel or the courts, to the
notion of purpose").
180 Freed & Mfiller, supra note 60, at 295; see also Stith & Cabranes, supra note 6, at
1270 ("In the explosion of case law on federal sentencing, there is almost no discus-
sion of the purposes of sentencing generally or in the specific case-almost no articu-
lated concern as to whether a particular defendant should be sentenced in the
interests of general deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, or incapacitation."); Stith
& Koh, supra note 14, at 284 (noting that "federal sentencing jurisprudence [is] al-
most entirely about tangential issues... rather than about fundamental questions
relating to the trade-offs among sentencing purposes").
200o]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
most to the narrow focus of departure jurisprudence. As highlighted
in Part I, departure authority provided the central means for judges to
contribute to the development of principled sentencing law under the
Guidelines. But because the descriptive component of the SRA's de-
parture standard became the focal point of departure decision-mal-
ing, judges in departure cases contemplated and discussed what
factors they thought were considered by the Commission, rather than
what they thought provided normative justifications for a sentence
outside the Guidelines in the case at hand.'"' Conducting "descrip-
tive deliberation," judges became focused in these cases on the minu-
tia of the Guideline structure and preoccupied with divining the
parameters of the Commission's heartlands.'8 2 Courts' energies and
opinions in departure cases were devoted to deciding what circum-
stances qualified as "extraordinary" or "atypical," rather than ponder-
ing and articulating case-specific insights concerning the relationship
between the purposes of punishment and guideline sentences.'1 3 In
181 Limited exceptions to the general failure of departure cases to include explicit
normative discussion were those few cases in which courts looked to the purposes of
punishment to explore whether a factor put forward as a basis for a departure even
qualified as an "aggravating or mitigating" circumstance. See, e.g., Mason, 966 F.2d at
1494-96; United States v. Crippen, 961 F.2d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1992); see also infra
note 311 (noting rare cases in which lower courts considered sentencing purposes).
182 See Miller & Wright, supra note 113, at 766 ("The vast majority of federal
courts, in literally thousands of published decisions, have simply regurgitated the
statement from the guidelines introduction, and then announced that the facts and
factors before the court either are or are not within the guidelines 'heartland.'"); see
also Stith & Cabranes, supra note 6, at 1277 (noting that, in departure cases, "appel-
late courts have often been bogged down by consideration of a threshold issue:
whether the ground cited by the trial court as a basis for departure has already been
factored into the Sentencing Guidelines").
183 In a few settings, the very factor on which courts debated "extraordinariness"
did relate to the purposes of punishment. For example, a line of cases concluded
that, though "ordinary" post-offense rehabilitation had been "adequately taken into
consideration by the (Guidelines'] acceptance of responsibility reduction," rehabilita-
tion that qualified as "extraordinary" could be the foundation for a departure.
United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1990)); see, e.g., United States v. Williams,
948 F.2d 706, 708-11 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 116 (1st
Cir. 1990). Essentially, by definition, courts considering whether a defendant's post-
offense rehabilitation was extraordinary were necessarily giving some thought to the
traditional punishment purpose of rehabilitation. However, even within such cases,
the extent and depth of courts' examination and discussion of normative considera-
tions was disconcertingly limited. See Patricia H. Brown, Note, Considering Post-Arrest
Rehabilitation of Addicted Offenders Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 10 YALc L. &
POL'Y REv. 520, 526-33 (1992) (discussing problems with case law on post-offense
rehabilitation as basis for departure).
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the words of Professor Kate Stith andJudgeJos6 Cabranes, departure
case law has been "speculative and trivial, addressing not whether a
particular circumstance is relevant to just sentencing, but simply
whether the Sentencing Commission can be said to have already con-
sidered the particular circumstance."'
84
Professor Kevin Reitz has recently remarked that "the most disap-
pointing aspect of the appellate departure jurisprudence has been its
divorce from the underlying goals of punishment" and noted with la-
ment the absence of "positive contributions" to "substantive lawmak-
ing" in this jurisprudence.18 5 This reality is indeed disappointing, but
hardly surprising given the focus of departure decision-making on the
descriptive component of the SRA's departure standard. Because of
how departure authority was set forth in the initial Guidelines and
developed by the courts, departures came to serve and to be seen only
as a means to fill in gaps that the Commission might have missed in
the Guidelines. Lost along the way was an appreciation of departures
as a mechanism through which judges could provide meaningful feed-
back concerning the Guidelines as they related to the fundamental
purposes of punishment.
In the end, by failing to engage in prescriptive deliberation-by
failing to seriously consider whether factors "should result" in a sen-
tence outside the Guidelines-departure decisions lacked thoughtful
discussion of sentencing purposes, and judges thus missed their op-
portunity to contribute from their case-specific vantage points to the
principled evolution of the Guidelines. 8 6 Because courts focused
only on what the Commission considered, judges did not themselves
engage in moral reasoning when contemplating, rendering, and re-
viewing departure decisions. Consequently, day-to-day Guidelines sen-
tencing did not bring thoughtful judicial contributions to sentencing
lawmaking.'8 7 Moreover, because departure jurisprudence gave the
184 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 6, at 1277.
185 Reitz, supra note 43, at 1468.
186 Cf Freed & Miller, supra note 60, at 298. Freed and Miller urge judges to
consider sentencing purposes because doing so
enables courts to adjudicate situations that were not adequately considered
by the Commission, and to furnish analyses from which the Commission an
improve its guidelines. This is the sort of interaction Congress envisioned
between a Commission that formulates rules but does not adjudicate cases,
and ajudiciary that generates principled decisions that the Commission can
integrate into its rulemaking process.
Id. at 351.
187 Circuit court rulings that decisions not to depart and that departures alleged to
be too parsimonious were not appealable, see supra notes 116, 132, further under-
mined effective appellate contributions to sentencing law through departure decision-
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impression that it did not even permit judicial considerations of just
punishment, it is of little surprise that judges came to view their role
under the Guidelines as 'Judicial accountants"'188 operating a "bureau-
cratic scheme" that left no room for 'Jurists to exercise wisdom and
judgment... [and] humanity.' 89 This perhaps explains judges' will-
ingness to countenance efforts to circumvent the Guidelines' strict
terms, as they may well have believed it was the only way to consider
matters of purpose and justice in the case at hand.
In short, the Guidelines' early departure jurisprudence produced
systemic problems that ran even deeper than, and may have even con-
tributed to, the Guidelines' failure to effectively balance judicial sen-
tencing discretion. This jurisprudence's narrow focus on the
descriptive component of the SRA's departure standard produced
purposeless departures and a purposeless departure jurisprudence
that undermined the development of principled sentencing law under
the Guidelines. Departures failed to foster judicial contributions,
through the development of a "common law of sentencing," to the
principled evolution of the guidelines system.
III. KOON v. UNITED STATES: THE SUPREME COURT'S FAILED EFFORT
TO REMEDY A TROUBLED DEPARTURE JURISPRUDENCE
Review of the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v. United States'90
makes two things clear: the Court sought to expand sentencing
judges' authority to depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
and its efforts to do so left much to be desired.' 9 ' The Supreme Court
making. These doctrines eliminated sets of departure decisions from the appellate
process and thus skewed the cases through which appellate courts could contribute to
a sentencingjurisprudence. SeeYellen, supra note 118, at 264-65 (complaining that
these doctrines undermined the "important role" of appellate review and departures
"in helping the Commission identify and correct flaws" in Guidelines); see also Hofer,
supra note 70, at 11 (stressing that appellate departure jurisprudence has been lack-
ing in part because "circuit courts [have] a lopsided view of the departure process").
188 Weinstein, supra note 147, at 361.
189 Jos6 A. Cabranes, Reforming the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Appellate Review !f
Discretionary Sentencing Decisions, 1 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 177, 178-85 (1994); supra
note 147.
190 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
191 Of course, much more can and has been said about the factual and legal
events that led up to the Koon defendants' federal sentencing. See generally READING
RODNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993) (col-
lecting essays); Akhil R. Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodniy
King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1995); Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal
Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Tria 41 UCLA L. REV. 509
(1994).
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deserves praise for recognizing harms stemming from the Guidelines'
restrictive departure jurisprudence and for trying in Koon to achieve a
better balance ofjudicial sentencing discretion by liberalizing depar-
ture authority. However, the Supreme Court also deserves criticism
for its shoddy execution in Koon. As detailed in Section A of this Part,
the poor development of the legal standards adopted in Koon under-
mined the Court's efforts to achieve a more effective departure mech-
anism and produced confusion and disparities in the lower courts.
Moreover, as explained in Section B of this Part, the Koon decision has
even deeper conceptual problems that serve to hinder principledjudi-
cial contributions to sentencing law and thus pose even greater long-
term harm for departure jurisprudence and the guidelines system.
A. Failing to Achieve Better Balance in Judicial SentenAing Discretion
The Supreme Court in Koon, apparently heedingjudicial and aca-
demic complaints that a restrictive departure jurisprudence created
undue guideline rigidity, 92 quite clearly set out to enhance sentenc-
ing courts' departure authority under the Guidelines. 9 3 The Court
asserted that it granted certiorari simply "to determine the standard of
review governing appeals from a district court's decision to depart"
from the Guidelines. 194 But the Court's wide-ranging opinion-which
discussed at length sentencing discretion, departure authority, and
the role of the courts and the Commission under the Guidelines' 9--
suggests that the Court was looking to significantly recast departure
jurisprudence in order to expand district courts' authority to depart
It is hard not to wonder why the Supreme Court chose the notorious Rodney
King case, rather than one of the many other available and less sensational sentencing
cases, as its vehicle for addressing departure authority under the Guidelines. For in-
teresting discussions of Koon with emphasis on its meaning as a police brutality case,
see generally David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fic-
tional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L RE%-. 18 (1999);
Alexa P. Freeman, Note, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention ofJust Sentencingfor
Police Brutality, 47 HAsriwos LJ. 677 (1996).
192 See supra text accompanying notes 140-48 (detailing complaints about the
Guidelines' rigidity).
193 See Reitz, supra note 43, at 1463 n.73, 1466 & n.88 (suggesting that the Su-
preme Court was persuaded by critics' protestations of the Guidelines' inflexibility
and that Koon was an effort "to cancel some of the pro-rigidity inclinations" of devel-
oping departure jurisprudence); see also Mark D. Harris & Douglas A. Berman, The
Koon Case:Departures and Discretion, 9 FED. SENMN.'Nc_.G REP. 4,4-5 (1996) (reviming
a set of commentaries on Koon and noting "general agreement that the Keen decision
evinces an intent by the Supreme Court to give sentencing courts greater leeway to
fashion sentences outside the prescribed ranges").
194 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996).
195 See id. at 92-100, 106-09, 113.
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and thereby achieve a better balance in judicial sentencing discretion
within the guidelines system. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court un-
dermined its own efforts through an opaque opinion which has mud-
died departure law. Consequently, the Koon decision has not
produced an improved balance in sentencing discretion under the
Guidelines. Rather, it has produced doctrinal confusion and depar-
ture disparities in the lower courts.
1. Muddling Departure Law
The Supreme Court's discussion of departure authority in Koon
had a schizophrenic quality: the Court simultaneously espoused and
spumed district court discretion and appellate court deference in de-
parture decision-making. In addition, the Court entirely failed to ad-
dress the important issue of the extent of departures. Taken together,
the opinion brought more cloudiness than clarity to the rules gov-
erning departure authority under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
a. Espousing Discretion and Deference
Much of the Koon opinion reads as a ringing endorsement of dis-
trict court sentencing discretion and of departure authority's impor-
tant role in enabling individualized sentencing under the guidelines
scheme. The Court, per Justice Kennedy, began its legal analysis by
stressing that the SRA called for "sentencing procedures that take into
account individualized circumstances." 19 6 The Court closed by declar-
ing that "[i]t has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial
tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person
as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings
that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the pun-
ishment to ensue." 19 7 In between, the Court asserted that "district
courts retain much of their traditional sentencing discretion" under
the Guidelines and suggested that a departure decision "embodies the
traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court."'19 8
Giving doctrinal content to these notions, the Supreme Court
embraced and stressed the "heartland" concept as central to the de-
parture inquiry. The Court explained that departure decision-making
first calls upon a court to examine "[w] hat features of this case, poten-
tially, take it outside the Guidelines' 'heartland' and make of it a spe-
196 Id. at 92 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (1994)).
197 Id. at 113.
198 Id. at 97-98.
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cial, or unusual, case." 199 Then, after examining whether the
Guidelines forbid, encourage, discourage, or leave unmentioned the
factor considered as the basis for a departure, a court's ultimate con-
cern should be whether "certain aspects of the case [are] unusual
enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the
Guideline."200
Moreover, continued the Supreme Court, districtjudges are best
able to decide when a case falls outside the Guidelines' heartlands. In
the words of the Koon Court, a district court "informed by its vantage
point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing" has "an insti-
tutional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of de-
terminations."201 Accordingly, because of a district court's special
competence to decide whether a "particular factor is within the heart-
land given all the facts of the case," decisions to depart from the
Guidelines should "in most cases be due substantial deference."2 0 2
Thus, concluded the Supreme Court, the de novo standard of review
applied by the Ninth Circuit (and all other circuits203 ) was erroneous;
departure decisions should instead be reviewed under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard.
20 4
b. Spurning Discretion and Deference
The Supreme Court's broad statements about sentencing individ-
ualization, discretion, and deference would seem well-designed to in-
vigorate district courts' departure authority and thereby help remedy
199 Id. at 95 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)).
The Rivera decision and its departure framework on which the Koon Court heavily
relied were the work-product of then-CircuitJudge Stephen Breyer. See 994 F.2d at
945. It seems reasonable to surmise that, althoughJustice Breyer did not author the
majority opinion in Koon, he significantly influenced the Supreme Court's adoption
of Riverds departure framework. Of course, Justice Breyer's involvement with the
Guidelines extends far past his involvement in the Koon and Riera decisions; he uas
one of the original Sentencing Commissioners who drafted the initial Guidelines. See
U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELmEs MANUAL, at V (1987); see also Breyer, supra note 29, at
18-31 (giving an insider's account of trade-offs made by the Commission in drafting
the initial Guidelines). See generally Miller & Wright, supra note 113, at 771-77 (high-
lighting the role ofJustice Breyer in the First Circuit departure cases and in the devel-
opment of the initial Guidelines).
200 Koon, 518 U.S. at 95-96, 98.
201 Id. at 98.
202 Id. at 98, 99-100.
203 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (detailing circuits' adoption of de
novo review of departures).
204 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 99; see also id. at 91 ("The appellate court should not
review the departure decision de novo, but instead should ask whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion.").
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rigidity problems under the Guidelines. Indeed, some initial observ-
ers heralded Koon as a "resounding victory" for federal district
judges,20 5 which would "encourage creative sentencing litigation and
liberal exercise of the power to depart."20 6 But, as other commenta-
tors recognized at the time, contradictory aspects of Koon undermined
the Court's efforts to liberalize the use of departure authority.
2 0 7
The Supreme Court spumed its own message of discretion and
deference in Koon. Though the Court espoused the importance and
availability of departures, its opinion also threw splashes of doctrinal
cold water on departure authority. For example, the Court closed its
articulation of the heartland methodology for departures by asserting
that a "court must bear in mind the Commission's expectation that
departures based on grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be
'highly infrequent. "' 20 8 Thus, in the course of explaining that the
Guidelines were only to cover "a heartland of typical cases," the Court
prominently endorsed the Commission's suggestion that the Guide-
lines' heartlands were very large and thereby covered nearly all cases.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's final paragraph describing the abuse
of discretion standard for reviewing departures undercut much of its
rhetoric about appellate court deference. The Court here indicated
that some departure decisions must be viewed as making "a legal de-
termination"20 9 about available grounds for departure and then
stressed that a "district court by definition abuses its discretion when it
205 Harvey Berkman, Judges' SentencingDecisions Bolstered, NAT'L LJ., June 24, 1996,
at A12; see also Stephanie Stone, U.S. Supreme Court: Federal District Courts' Sentencing
Decisions Due Substantial Deference, WEsT's LEGAL Nzvs,June 14, 1996, at 5686, available
at 1996 WL 330460 (quoting Lawrence S. Goldman, author of an amicus brief submit-
ted to the Supreme Court in Koon, describing the decision as a "victory for judicial
independence" and "a vote of confidence for district judges").
206 Abraham L. Clott, An Assistant Federal Defender Responds to Koon, 9 FED. SEN.
TENCING REP. 25, 25 (1996); see also Cynthia KLY. Lee, A New "Sliding Scale of Deference"
Approach to Abuse of Discretion: Appellate Review of District Court Departures Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 35 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 1, 4 (1997) (noting that Koon's adoption of
a seemingly less rigorous standard for review of departures "prompted many court
observers to claim that sentencing discretion ... had been restored to district court
judges").
207 See, e.g, David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal Guideline
Sentencing, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 881, 901-02 (1996); Kate Stith, The Hegemony of the Sen.
tencing Commission, 9 FED. SENTENCING RE'. 14, 14-17 (1996); see also Stone, supra note
205 (quotingJudy Clarke, chief federal defender for the Eastern District of Washing-
ton, as wondering whether Koon is "really giving or... taking" departure power).
208 Koon, 518 U.S. at 96 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(b)
(1995)).
209 Id. at 100.
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makes an error of lav."210 Accordingly, the Court explained,
"whether a factor is a permissible basis for a departure under any cir-
cumstances is a question of law, and the court of appeals need not
defer to the district court's resolution of the point."1 1 In this way, the
Court indicated that, despite its adoption of an abuse of discretion
standard, the "legal" aspect of departure decisions would still merit
close scrutiny through appellate review.
212
Significantly compounding the mixed messages in the articula-
tion of departure standards was the Court's even more puzzling appli-
cation of these standards.2 13 To begin, it is unclear why the Supreme
Court even decided to apply its newly announced standards in Koon.
After concluding that the court of appeals had applied the wrong
standard of review, the Court might simply have remanded the case to
the Ninth Circuit to allow reconsideration of the district court's depar-
tures under the proper standard.214 In other cases during the same
term in which the Supreme Court altered a legal standard (including
a case clarifying Fourth Amendment review standards released just
two weeks before Koon), the Court decided it should remand to give




212 See Stith, supra note 207, at 14-16 (noting that KIon's discussion of the "legal"
aspect of departure decisions indicates that a "reviewing court should not apply a def-
erential standard to the basic issue that arises in every departure case"); see also Lee,
supra note 206, at 4, 29-47 (contending that Koon in fact calls for a "sliding scale of
deference" in departure cases, which implicates "differing degrees of deferential re-
view depending on the nature of the inquiry," including de novo review of some depar-
ture issues).
213 See Frank 0. Bowman, HI, Places in thw Heartland. DepartureJurispnidence After
Koon, 9 FED. SErNT.cnG REP. 19, 19 (1996) (noting the "conflicting signals the Court
gave" through its close review of the district court's departure decision folloving its
adoption of a seemingly deferential review standard); Harris & Berman, supra note
193, at 6 (discussing the "disparity between the Court's rhetorical embrace of defer-
ence and its highly non-deferential behavior"); Lee, supra note 206, at 39 ("The
Court's instruction that appellate courts review district court departure decisions
under an abuse of discretion standard seems inconsistent with its own searching scru-
tiny of the district court's departure decision."); Stith, supra note 207, at 14 (noting
that Koon's "proclamations about the extent of deference due sentencingjudges are
difficult to reconcile with the reasoning and holdings stated elsewhere in the
decision").
214 Cf Lee, supra note 206, at 38 ("After the Koon Court's lengthy defense of the
need for appellate courts to defer to district court departure decisions, one might
have expected the Court to end the discussion with a remand, instructing the Ninth
Circuit to defer to the district court's departure decision.").
215 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996); Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99, 116 (1995); Field v. Mars, 516 U.S. 59, 77 (1995).
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In any event, the Supreme Court's decision in Koon to apply its
new departure standards certainly did not add clarity to its ruling.
The district court in Koon, relying on Guidelines section 5K2.10, had
departed downward five offense levels based on its conclusion that the
victim's "wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the
offense behavior." 216 The district court also relied on the combina-
tion of four other factors to depart downward an additional three
levels.217 The Supreme Court, following its trumpeting of district
court discretion and appellate court deference in departure cases,
proceeded to reject two of the five grounds relied upon by the district
court.2 18 And three Justices wrote separately, contending that the
Court should have gone even further and rejected all but the one de-
parture ground that was expressly encouraged by the Guidelines as a
basis for departure in section 5K2.10.219
Moreover, the majority's methodology in resolving these matters
was at best inconsistent and at worst nonsensical. Only paragraphs
after asserting that district courts are better able than appellate courts
to judge whether certain circumstances are atypical of a particular of-
fense, the Court rejected the district court's conclusion that the de-
fendants' expected loss of employment and tenure were "unique
burdens flow[ing] from their convictions."220 Yet, in its next breath,
the Court accepted two other grounds for departure-based on the
defendants' susceptibility to abuse in prison and successive prosecu-
tions-with little more explanation than reliance on these factors was
216 United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 786 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (citing U.S. SrN.
TENCING GUIDEUNES M'ANuAL § 5K2.10), afj'd in part and vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416
(9th Cir. 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
217 The four reasons combined by the district court for the additional three-level
reduction were: (1) the defendants' susceptibility to abuse in prison, (2) the defend-
ants' collateral employment consequences, (3) the absence of a need to protect the
public from further criminal activity by the defendants, and (4) the burdens resulting
from the defendants' successive state and federal prosecutions. See Koon, 833 F. Supp,
at 787-91. Collectively, the district court's departure decisions allowed it to move
from a guidelines sentencing range of seventy to eighty-seven months imprisonment
to a range of thirty to thirty-seven months, and the court imposed a final sentence of
thirty months. See id. at 792.
218 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 109-11 (1996).
219 See id. at 114-18 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
118-19 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens ap-
peared to be the only member of the Court who fully accepted the Court's assertions
about discretion and deference, as he wrote a brief, separate opinion indicating that
he did not think the district court had abused its discretion in any way. See id. at 114
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
220 Id. at 109-11.
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"not beyond the cognizance of the District Court"22' and involved
"just the sort of determination that must be accorded deference by
the appellate courts."
222
In short, despite the apparent effort in Koon to endorse and fos-
ter a more flexible approach to departures, the Court ultimately sent
equivocal messages about departure authority. The Court's bold state-
ments about discretion and deference were undercut by restrictive
language within its articulation of the applicable departure standards
and by the rejection of several grounds upon which the district court
had departed. Though portions of the opinion certainly had the po-
tential to liberalize the law and practice of departures, other aspects of
the decision gave observers reason to conclude that Koon would "not
change[] matters significantly, and perhaps not at all."2 -3
c. Failing to Address the Extent of Departures
While the Supreme Court in Koon sent a mixed message about
the scope of departure authority, it sent no explicit message at all con-
cerning the extent of departures. As discussed in Part II, the Commis-
sion and the lower courts before Koon had largely treated the extent
of any allowed departure as an afterthought.22 4 The Supreme Court
in Koon ignored this issue altogether.
Notably, nowhere in the Supreme Court's broad discussion of de-
parture authority and appellate review did the Court mention the por-
tion of § 3742 that instructs appellate courts to determine whether a
sentence outside the applicable guideline range "is unreasonable. " 22-
Moreover, the Koon Court gave no consideration to the extent of the
district court's departures in its assessment of the grounds relied upon
for them.226 This omission is especially notable in the context of the
Supreme Court's affirmance of the district court's five-level downward
221 Id. at 112.
222 Id.
223 Stith, supra note 207, at 14; see also Robinson, supra note 207, at 901 (forecast-
ing that the "likely effect [of Koon] is quite limited").
224 See supra text accompanying notes 130-35.
225 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (3) (1994); see also supra note 119 (discussing the appellate
review provisions of the SRA).
226 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 101-12; see also Catharine M. Goodwin, The Role of the
Probation Officer in Applying Koon v. United States, 9 FED. SvwrNC'INo REP. 34, 35
(1996) ("The Supreme Court did not discuss the reasonableness analysis of the extent
of departure at all in Koon."); Deborah E. Dezelan, Comment, Departures from the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines After Koon v. United States: More Discretion, Less Direction, 72
NOTRE D~zru L. REv. 1679, 1710 (1997) ("One main area of Sentencing Guideline
departure jurisprudence left open by Koon is tie appropriate rediew of dhe ixtent of
departure.").
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departure based on the victim's misconduct in provoking the offense
behavior. Though this departure had the effect of reducing the de-
fendants' sentences by as much as three years (over forty percent),227
the Supreme Court did not even formally state, let alone discuss, why
the extent of this departure was reasonable. 228
In sum, the Supreme Court's Koon decision gave unclear gui-
dance as to the scope of district court discretion and appellate court
deference concerning whenjudges can depart from the Guidelines. It
gave no guidance as to the standards for district courts to decide and
for appellate courts to review how much judges should depart when
allowed to depart.
2. Confusion and Disparities in the Lower Courts
The Supreme Court's decision in Koon has brought sound and
fury, but little real change, to the application of departure authority in
the lower courts. Koon is now always cited and often discussed in
lower court departure decisions. But, because of Koon's opaque dis-
cussion of departure law, it has had little substantive impact on the
federal sentencing landscape other than to exacerbate doctrinal con-
fusion and sentencing disparities in the realm of departures.
a. When Judges Can Depart
As detailed in Part II, even before Koon, courts' varied under-
standings of the scope of departure authority and the Commission's
"heartland" concept produced differences in departure attitudes and
outcomes from circuit to circuit.2 29 Koon's muddled discussion of dis-
trict court discretion and appellate court deference has deepened
these disparities in the application of departure authority. Post-Koon
decisions reveal that Koon has liberalized the use of departure author-
ity only in courts already receptive to departures, while it has barely
227 The calculated guidelines sentencing range for the defendants before any de-
partures was seventy to eighty-seven months' imprisonment based on a final offense
level of twenty-seven and criminal history category I. See United States v. Koon, 833 F.
Supp. 769, 791 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir.
1994), afd in part and rev'd in part, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). A five-level departure to
offense level twenty-two served to reduce the applicable sentencing range to forty-one
to fifty-one months. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 309 (1998).
228 The Supreme Court simply concluded its discussion of this departure by stat-
ing that the district court "did not abuse its discretion in departing downward for
King's misconduct in provoking the wrong." Koon, 518 U.S. at 105; see also id. at 113
(concluding the majority opinion by stating that the five-level downward departure
for victim misconduct was "well within the sound discretion of the District Court").
229 See supra notes 121-29, 149-52 and accompanying text.
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changed the status quo in other circuits. Despite Koons effort to en-
hance departure authority, those circuits traditionally hostile to depar-
tures have continued their restrictive approach. Meanwhile, those
circuits traditionally open to departures have relied upon Koon to be
even more deferential in their review of departures. Thus, paradoxi-
cally, Koon has done little to alleviate the problem of undue rigidity
under the Guidelines in most jurisdictions, but, in a few jurisdictions,
Koon seems to have contributed to a converse problem of undue
flexibility.
In a comprehensive early review of Koon's impact based on offi-
cial data, a group of Commission staffers reported that Koon had not
significantly altered lower courts' approaches to or rates of depar-
ture.2 0 This analysis revealed that, because of Koon's poor explana-
tion of what aspects of a departure decision should be reviewed
closely, circuits were able to conduct either deferential or strict review
of decisions to depart by defining the issue in whatever terms would
facilitate the form of review desired.231 Circuits traditionally un-
friendly to departures, such as the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, typically
deemed the appropriateness of various departures as involving legal
questions requiring strict review. They, in turn, continued to disallow
many departures. 232 At the same time, circuits traditionally friendly to
departures, such as the Second and Ninth Circuits, stressed the factual
nature of the departure decision to apply a more deferential form of
review and thereby approved departures in many settings.
3
Other commentators have confirmed that Koon has primarily for-
tified circuits' existing approaches to departures. Researcher Dana
Shoenberg, examining departures based particularly on family ties
and responsibilities, found that "the Koon decision has in fact had lit-
tie effect on such departures," because its "equivocal message left cir-
230 See PaulJ. Hofer et al., Departure Rates and Reasons AfterKoon v. United States, 9
FED. SENrENCJNG REP. 284, 284-90 (1997).
231 See id. at 286 (explaining that "the circuits are finding in [Koon] what they
need to continue their departure jurisprudence in the direction it was already
headed").
232 See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 126 F.3d 789, 793 (6th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d 512, 515-16 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Withers, 100
F.3d 1142, 1148 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 759 (4th Cir.
1996); United States v. Hairston, 96 F.3d 102, 104-09 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 831-34 (6th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Kapitzke,
130 F.3d 820, 821-24 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing departure); United States %. Haut,
107 F.3d 213, 219-20 (3d Cir. 1997) (same).
233 See, eg., United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1034-36 (2d Cir. 1997);
United States v. Lopez, 106 F.3d 309, 310-11 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rioux,
97 F.3d 648, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1996).
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cuit courts leeway to ... continue reviewing cases as closely as they
choose."234 Similarly, Professor Ian Weinstein has found in his review
of circuit case law that "Koon has changed the rhetoric of departure
jurisprudence... , but it has done little to change outcomes. '235 In
his examination of downward departure decisions following Koon,
Weinstein discovered that a number of circuits have actually "applied
the elastic abuse of discretion standard as a general rule to reverse
every downward departure."236 At the same time, "one court has af-
firmed every downward departure it has reviewed," while other cir-
cuits "use the language of individualized, discretionary sentencing
when they affirm, and write of the importance of uniform sentencing
when they reverse district court decisions to depart downward from
the Guidelines."2
37
The Commission's most recent data on departure rates confirm
these variations in departure practices and spotlight the seriousness of
the inter-circuit disparity that has developed in the wake of Koon. In
most circuits, the rate of downward departure (based on grounds
other than cooperating with the prosecution in the investigation of
others238) has remained quite low. In the Fourth Circuit, for exam-
ple, only 3.6% of all cases in fiscal year 1998 involved a downward
departure. 239 Similarly, only 6.4% of all sentences in the Sixth Circuit
involved a downward departure, while the percentage in the Seventh
234 Dana L. Shoenberg, Departures for Family Ties and Responsibilities After Koon, 9
FED. SENTENCING REP. 292, 292 (1997).
235 Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion: Koon 's Failure
to Recognize the Reshaping ofJudicial Discretion Under the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REv. 493,
526 (1999).
236 Id. at 526-27 (emphasis added).
237 Id. at 527 (footnotes omitted).
238 As noted earlier, the general use of "substantial assistance" departures granted
pursuant to Guidelines section 5K1.1 implicates distinct issues. See supra note 86,
There may well be, however, some jurisprudential and statistical relationships be-
tween cooperation departures and other departures. See Francesca D. Bowman, Has
Koon Undermined the Guidelines?, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 32, 32-33 (1996) (suggesting
relationship between number of substantial assistance departures and other depar-
tures); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year ofJudicial Revolt on
"Substantial Assistance"Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETSON
L. REV. 7, 59-63 (1999) (discussing interplay of different means of departing from the
Guidelines).
239 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING Sm.
TISTics 53 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 SENTENCING STATISTCS]. The data for fiscal year
1998 reflects information collected by the Sentencing Commission on the approxi-
mately 50,000 Guidelines sentences imposed between October 1, 1997 and Septem-
ber 30, 1998. See 1998 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. Rrv. 36 [hereinafter 1998 ANN.
REP.].
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Circuit was 4.8%, and in the Eleventh Circuit it was 5.2%.2 40 These
departure rates are not considerably different from the rates in these
circuits before the Supreme Court's decision in Koon.2 41 Accordingly,
it appears that in these jurisdictions Koon has done little to alleviate
the problems of undue rigidity in the guidelines scheme.
Meanwhile, in other circuits, there has been a far greater number
of downward departures. During 1998, in the Second Circuit 23.4%
of all cases involved downward departures, while in the Ninth Circuit
a whopping 29.6% of sentences involved such departures. 42 The
large percentage of departures in these jurisdictions has prompted a
few observers to question whether Koon has now contributed to undue
sentencing flexibility in some quarters.2 43 Ninth Circuit Judge Alex
Kozinski, for example, has expressed concern that departures "are
coming to be the norm rather than the exception," and he has urged
the Sentencing Commission to "consider whether the frequency with
which departures are now being granted by district courts is consistent
with the basic premise of consistency and uniformity."
244
One might reasonably dispute whether the high downward de-
parture rates within the Second and Ninth Circuits are now creating
problems of undue sentencing flexibility or are simply helping to rem-
edy continuing difficulties with the Guidelines' rigidity.2 45 What can-
not be disputed, however, is that the remarkable contrast in
downward departure rates from circuit to circuit itself raises concerns
about regional disparities under the Guidelines.2 46 The goal of sen-
240 See 1998 SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 239, at 54-55.
241 See U.S. SNrENcING COI M'N, 1996 SOURCEOOK OF FEDmL SJ nrEcjzxG ST,%-
risrcs, tbl. 26 (1997); see also Hofer et al., supra note 230, at 284-90 & tbl.1 (docu-
menting the consistency of low departure rates in numerous circuits before and after
Koon).
242 See 1998 SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 239, at 53, 55.
243 See Alex Kozinski, Carhage Must Be Destroyed, 12 FED. SENENCING REP. 67,
67-68 (1999); see also Frank 0. Bowman, I, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear ofJudging
and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. J. 299, 327-57 (2000)
(reviewing departure statistics and expressing concern that high departure rates may
be contributing to the undermining of the Guidelines).
244 Kozinski, supra note 243, at 67.
245 Many participants in guidelines sentencing within the Second Circuit exspress
positive views on the system because of the openness of the Circuit to departures. See
Deborah Pines, Ten Years Later, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Go Down Easier, N.Y. UJ.,
Nov. 3, 1997, at 1, 6. But cf. id. at 6 (quoting Southern District U.S. Attorney Mary'Jo
White as stating that flexibility in the Second Circuit has "gone beyond what's appro-
priate" and is undermining the Guidelines' aim of ending disparity).
246 Interestingly, the percentage of upward departures does not vary much across
circuits. The greatest number of such departures during fiscal year 1998 wsas in the
First Circuit, where they came into play in two percent of all cases. Se 1998 SE,%Nr-
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tencing consistency cannot be well served when a defendant in the
Ninth Circuit is nearly ten times more likely to benefit from a down-
ward departure than a defendant in the Fourth Circuit. If nothing
else, these figures suggest that Koon's most tangible impact has been
to heighten the extent of inter-circuit disparity concerning when
judges can depart from the Guidelines. 247
b. How Much Judges Should Depart
The Supreme Court's failure to address the extent of departures
in Koon has also produced doctrinal confusion and perpetuated sen-
tencing disparities in the lower courts. Because the Supreme Court
did not discuss in any way how much judges should depart when hav-
ing authority to do so, circuit courts are divided over whether Koon's
adoption of an abuse of discretion standard should alter their prevail-
ing approaches to reviewing the extent of departures.248
A few circuits have expressly held that Koon did not impact their
prior methodology for assessing the extent of departures.2 49 A num-
ING STATISTICS, supra note 239, at 53. In all the other circuits, upward departure rates
varied only within the narrow range from 0.6% to 1.3% of all sentences. See id. at
53-55. This lack of variation, as well as the small total percentage of upward depar-
tures, suggests that federal judges across all circuits feel little need for, and find rela-
tively few cases calling for, sentences higher than provided by the Guidelines. See
Weinstein, supra note 235, at 514 n.111 ("The very small number of upward departure
cases.., suggests that manyjudges believe the Guidelines are generally harsh enough
and need to be moderated with leniency.").
247 It certainly should not be overlooked that, both before and since Koon, there
have been significant inter-district disparities in the application of departure authority.
See 1998 SErTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 239, at 3-5; see also Gelacak et al., supra
note 33, at 360-63 (discussing the "large variation in departure practice among dis-
trict courts within circuits" before Koon). As Professors Michael Gelacak, Ilene Nagel,
and Barry Johnson note, "large variations in departure practice within circuits ...
cannot be explained by variations in the appellate caselaw" and suggest "the existence
of a sentencing 'ethos' within some districts that is resistant to efforts to impose na-
tional uniformity." Id.; see also Farabee, supra note 164, at 591-632 (examining depar-
ture practices in two districts and reporting differences in departure attitudes and
outcomes that were not merely a reflection of circuit case law).
248 See HuTC-ISON ET A.., supra note 74, at 1421 ("Several courts have questioned
whether their approach to reviewing the extent of departures should be modified in
light of Koon.").
249 See United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Koon did not change its pre-Koon doctrine that district courts should make analogies
to guidelines to explain the extent of departures); United States v. Cali, 87 F.3d 571,
579-81 (1st Cir. 1996) (indicating that Koon did not change appellate review stan-
dards concerning the extent of departures); see also United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91
F.3d 826, 834 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Although Koon has changed the standard of review to
an abuse of discretion standard, the rationale for requiring an explanation of reasons
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ber of other courts have reached this conclusion implicitly by continu-
ing to rely on their pre-Koon cases and standards for reviewing the
extent of a departure.2 0 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that
Koon overruled its previous requirement that district courts gauge the
extent of a departure by drawing analogies to the Guidelines. '
Thus, at least one court has concluded that Koon now requires an
even more deferential review of how much district courts choose to
depart when authorized to do so.
In the end, this doctrinal split is a dispute over style more than
substance. As detailed in Part II, before Koon lower courts gave rela-
tively little attention to the extent of departures; the circuits stressed
that they should show great deference on this issue and regularly af-
firmed even very large departures as long as the district courts pro-
vided some minimal rationale for their extents. 25- Unsurprisingly, the
Supreme Court's failure to address the extent of the departures in
Koon has not significantly altered these dynamics. The appellate
courts continue to affirm departure sentences in many cases without
giving any significant consideration to the extent of the departures)2
3
Even when applying pre-Koon precedents that call upon district courts
to somehow link a departure's extent to the Guidelines, the circuits
still stress the deference due to the district court and find departures
of all sizes "reasonable" based on even nominal justifications for their
extent.
254
for departure and the extent thereof still remains."). But see Horton, 98 F.3d at 321
(Evans, J., dissenting) (asserting that Koon "casts a pall over all ... earlier departure
jurisprudence").
250 See; eg., United States v. Adelman, 168 F.3d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 798-801 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Collins, 122
F.3d 1297, 1308-09 (10th Cir. 1997).
251 See United States v. Sablan, 114 F.3d 913, 917-19 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(overruling United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
252 See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying texL
253 See, e.g., United States v. Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357,373-78 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 172 (1999); Addman, 168 F.3d at 87; United States v. Owens, 145
F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gunby, 112 F.3d 1493, 1502-03 (11th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1034-37 (2d Cir. 1997); United
States v. Carter, 111 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Valdez, 103 F.3d
95, 98-99 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Beasley, 90 F.3d 400, 402-04 (9th Cir.
1996); United States v. Taylor, 88 F.3d 938, 948 (l1th Cir. 1996).
254 See, eg., United States v. Melvin, 187 F.3d 1316, 1322-24 (11th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied; 120 S. Ct. 2664 (2000); United States v. Schumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1428 (10th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 771 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Baird, 109 F.3d 856,872 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1581
(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hawkins, 87 F.3d 722, 730-31 (5th Cir. 1996).
20001
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Consequently, because Koon has left unchanged or even mini-
mized the already minimal restraints on how much judges depart,
there continues to be considerable variation in the extent of depar-
tures. As was true before Koon, departures of varying extents have
been upheld even though premised on seemingly similar grounds.
215
Likewise, very sizeable upward and downward departures are still be-
ing affirmed on a number of grounds256 and often based on facts that
appear to be not too dissimilar from cases disallowing a departure.2
57
Thus, after Koon, significant disparities continue not only among cases
that involve departures, but also between those cases that involve de-
partures and those that do not.
Put simply, then, Koon failed on its own terms. The Supreme
Court deserves credit for its apparent effort to remedy the restrictive-
255 For large variations in upward departures on similar offense-related grounds,
compare United States v. Davis, 170 F.3d 617, 623-25 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding eight-
level upward departure for extreme psychological harm to victim), cert. denied, 120 S,
Ct. 151 (1999), with United States v. Oliver, 118 F.3d 562, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1997) (up-
holding two-level departure on similar facts). For large variations in upward depar-
tures based on criminal history, compare United States v. Lowe, 106 F.3d 1498, 1503
(10th Cir. 1997) (approving a large departure), With United States v. Melgar-Galve, 161
F.3d 1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 1998) (approving a one-level departure). For large varia-
tions in downward departures on similar offender-related grounds, compare United
States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1034-36 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding departure to a
term of probation from a sentencing range of forty-six to fifty-seven months based on
family circumstances), with United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 806-08 (10th Cir.
1999) (basing small departure on very similar facts), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 250 (1999).
256 See, e.g., Melvin, 187 F.3d at 1321-24 (approving fifteen-level upward departure
from range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months to 120 months' imprisonment); Da-
vis, 170 F.3d at 623-25 (affirming upward departure from range of thirty-seven to
forty-six months to a sentence of 108 months); United States v. Nevels, 160 F.3d 226,
230-31 (5th Cir. 1998) (approving a seven-level upward departure), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1185 (1999); United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 52-54 (2d Cir. 1998) (a'f-
firming fourteen-level upward departure); Owens, 145 F.3d at 929 (approving down-
ward departure to statutory minimum amounting to a forty-eight-month departure
from low end of the range); Galante, 111 F.3d at 1036 (affirming thirteen-level down-
ward departure to time served (eight days) plus twenty-four months home detention);
United States v. Hardy, 99 F.3d 1242, 1253 (1st Cir. 1996) (approving upward depar-
ture from range of thirty-three to forty-one months to 120 months' imprisonment).
257 Compare Owens, 145 F.3d at 929 (approving large downward departure based
on family circumstances), and Galante, 111 F.3d at 1034-36 (same), with United
States v. Archuleta, 128 F.3d 1446, 1449-52 (10th Cir. 1997) (reversing a departure
based on similar facts); compare Hardy, 99 F.3d at 1253 (upholding a large upward
departure based on criminal history), with United States v. Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84, 87-88
(2d Cir. 1998) (reversing a departure based on similar facts); compare Davis, 170 F.3d
at 623-25 (upholding a large upward departure based on extreme psychological
harm to victim), with id. at 627-29 (reversing a departure for separate defendant
based on facts that district court thought were similar).
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ness of the Guidelines' departure jurisprudence and thereby to
achieve a better balance in sentencing discretion under the Guide-
lines. But lower court case law and statistics reveal that the Koon deci-
sion has not significantly changed departure attitudes or outcomes,
except perhaps to exacerbate prior disparities in the application of
departure authority.258
B. Hindering Principled Judicial Contributions to Sentencing Law
Unfortunately, the problems with the Supreme Court's decision
in Koon run deeper than its failure to achieve a better balance injudi-
cial sentencing discretion under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The Koon Court, apparently failing to appreciate the broader pur-
poses of departure authority, ultimately put forward a shallow concep-
tion of departures and eschewed purpose considerations in departure
decision-making. As a result, the Koon decision aggravates a mis-
guided departure jurisprudence by further hindering the role of de-
partures in fostering principled judicial contributions to sentencing
law under the Guidelines.
1. A Shallow Conception of Departure Authority
As stressed in Part I, sentencing reformers and the SRA's drafters
expected departures to contribute more to a guidelines system than
258 As noted before, the very perception of the Guidelines' rigidity before Koon
prompted some sentencing participants to craft plea agreements or strike other bar-
gains to avoid the strict application of the Guidelines. See supra text accompanying
notes 153-58. Consequently, if the Supreme Court's decision in Koon at least creates
the perception of increased sentencing discretion and flexibility, it may help alleviate
some of the disparity problems resulting from the Guidelines' circumvention. Yet,
the low rate of departures in most circuits gives reason to suspect that Koon has not
radically changed the tendency of some sentencing participants to use circumvention
of the Guidelines as a means to achieve justice in particular cases. &e Weinstein &
Turner, supra note 154, at 298 ("Whatever the effect of Koon, injustices under the
guidelines often have been, and continue to be, avoided by a variety of circumven-
ions and tinkering around the margins."); see also Douglas A. Berman, A Year in the
Life of the Guidelines: The Supreme Court Speaks, the Commission is Quiet and Federal Sentenc-
ing Continues Largely Unchanged, 9 FED. SNrENcING REP. 280, 281 (1997) (suggesting
"Koon's impact has been muted largely because the sentencing system had already
developed mechanisms for dealing with troublesome cases well before the Supreme
Court wrote favorably about district courts' discretion to depart"); cf. Schuihofer &
Nagel, Guideline Circumvention, supra note 153, at 1302 (concluding from pre-Koon
cases that "participants sometimes choose evasion over overt departure simply be-
cause the former route is easier and entails no accountability"). &egenerally infra text
accompanying note 298 (discussing the value of a refocused departure jurisprudence
as a way to minimize circumventions of the Guidelines).
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simply balancing judicial sentencing discretion.259 Through articula-
tion and review of reasons for departing, judges would share-with
each other and with the Sentencing Commission-case-specific in-
sights on sentencing policy and practice and thereby contribute to the
development of principled and purposeful sentencing law. But the
Supreme Court's decision in Koon undermined this broader role for
departures under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Court's ac-
count of the "heartland" and "abuse of discretion" standards em-
braced a conception of departures as mere gap-fillers in the
guidelines system and thus devalued departure authority as a means
for judicial contribution to the evolution of the sentencing law under
the Guidelines.
Consider first the "heartland" concept as articulated in Koon.
Seizing upon language in the Guidelines Manual's introduction, the
Court asserted that each guideline captures "a heartland of typical
cases" and thus it is only "[a] typical cases [that] were not 'adequately
taken into consideration"' by the Commission. 260 Consequently, con-
tinued the Court, only "factors that may make a case atypical provide
potential bases for departure."261 But, as Professor Kate Stith has ef-
fectively highlighted, this entails that departure authority is available
only in cases that are "atypical" . . . [and] prohibit[s] departures
based on anything other than the "atypicality" of the case at hand.
There is no room to question the reasonableness of the Commis-
sion's judgments about just punishment in the "typical" (or "heart-
land") case, and no room to question any determination the
Commission has made regarding the proper (and improper)
grounds for departure from the guidelines ranges.
262
In other words, by confining the use of departure authority to
atypical cases, Koon restricts the possibility for departures to foster ju-
dicial involvement through a common-law sentencing dialogue in all
Guidelines cases. Departures are conceived and described by the Su-
preme Court in Koon merely as a means to achieve individualized
sentences in "atypical" cases-which, the Court highlights, lest we for-
259 See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
260 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1994)).
261 Id. at 94; see also id. at 100 ("What the district court must determine is whether
the misconduct that occurred in the particular instance suffices to make the case
atypical.").
262 Stith, supra note 207, at 16 (emphasis added); see also Srr & QwRNm s, supra
note 5, at 101-02 (discussing the limitations on the use of departure authority re-
tained by the Koon decision).
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get, are expected to be "highly infrequent."2 3 Koon's articulation of
the heartland concept thus embraces the notion that departures
should only serve and only be seen as a means to deal with gaps in the
Commission's Guidelines. To again borrow the words of Professor
Stith, the Supreme Court in Koon confirmed the "hegemony of the
Sentencing Commission" by confining departures to the "atypical"
cases and by failing to give "judges a role in determining ajust punish-
ment... in all cases."264 In this way, the Supreme Court's develop-
ment of the "heartland" concept devalued and thwarted departures as
a means for significant judicial contribution to sentencing law under
the Guidelines.265
The same shallow conception of departures as mere gap-fillers is
also reflected in the Supreme Court's development of the abuse of
discretion review standard in Koon. The Supreme Court supported its
adoption of this standard by claiming that sentencing facts are so
"multifarious, fleeting, special, [and] narrow" that they "utterly resist
generalization." 66 The Court asserted that, because a "district court's
departure decision involves the consideration of unique factors that
are little susceptible ... of useful generalization,... de novo review is
unlikely to establish clear guidelines for lower courts."267 In this way,
and also by emphasizing "the factual nature of the departure in-
263 Koon, 518 U.S. at 96 (quoting U.S. SmErmEciNG GumIDNES M'ANuAL § 1A4(b)
(1995)).
264 Stith, supra note 207, at 17; see also Miller & Freed, supra note 128, at 235-37
(arguing the SRA's departure standard should be understood as "provid[ing] the test
for imposing the appropriate sentence in every case").
265 Professors Marc Miller and Ronald Wright make a compelling argument that it
is the very "heartland" concept itself, and not simply the Supreme Court's elaboration
in Koon, that defeats effective judicial contributions to sentencing law under the
Guidelines. See Miller & Wright, supra note 113, at 728, 765-800. Discussing the diffi-
culties created by the heartland concept even before the Koon decision, they explain:
The problem with the heartland concept was its high level of generality. For
any given crime or type of offender, there was no way to know what exact
factors brought a case within the heartland. Judges could only guess about
what sort of case fell within the heart, and presumed that most guideline
sentences mirrored prior judicial practice. As a result, judges never became
seriously involved in developing a common law of sentencing. They never
played an important role in improving the supposedly evolutionary
guidelines.
Id at 728.
266 Koon, 518 U.S. at 99 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Cooter & Gell v.
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quiry,"268 the Supreme Court suggested that departure determina-
tions are principally fact-driven, case-by-case decisions that have no
broader purpose or impact than to achieve an individualized sentence
in the case at hand.
2 69
But the very notion of sentencing facts as resistant to "generaliza-
tion" cuts against the very project of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 270 while the suggestion that departure determinations cannot
establish "guidelines" cuts against departure authority's role as a
mechanism for judicial contributions to the development of sentenc-
ing law under the Guidelines. Though sentencing reformers and the
SRA drafters recognized that sentencing guidelines cannot and
should not try to completely codify every variation of offense and of-
fender, they called for a guidelines system precisely because they
thought sentencing could and should be governed by principled "gen-
eralizations" rather than be entirely subject to the "multifarious, fleet-
ing" judgments of hundreds of different sentencing judges.
Moreover, as detailed in Part I, Congress expected and desired not
only the Sentencing Commission but also federal judges to be in-
volved in developing these "generalizations," and judges were to do so
primarily through articulating and reviewing the reasons that seemed
to necessitate a departure from the Commission's Guidelines.27' Yet,
the Supreme Court's adoption and defense of an abuse of discretion
review standard for departure determinations seems to misapprehend
both the ability and the importance of departures as a means for judi-




269 SeeWeinstein, supra note 235, at 522 (discussing Koon's "choice to treat [depar-
ture decisions] as a case-specific, or factual matter"); see alsoJohnson, supra note 70, at
1743 (criticizing Koon for suggesting that the departure determination is "ad hoc,
fact-bound [in] nature").
270 See Harris & Berman, supra note 193, at 6 (noting that "generalization is the
entire project of the guidelines"); cf Weinstein, supra note 235, at 524-25 (criticizing
Koon for failing "to distinguish between the [pre-Guidelines] tradition of complete
secondary (non-reviewable) discretion and the post-SRA regime of reviewable primary
(decision-making) discretion," and discussing the problems resulting from the fact
that Koon "fosters continued debate about the way things were done under the old
law, when it should refocus on the question of how discretion should be exercised
under the new law").
271 See supra text accompanying notes 62-77.
272 Professor Barry Johnson makes this point effectively in his recent critique of
Koon, with particular emphasis on the Supreme Court's "devalu[ing of] the proper
institutional role of appellate review of departures." Johnson, supra note 70, at 1724,
Professor Johnson complains that Koon's adoption of a deferential review standard
undermines the efforts of the courts of appeals to develop a "body of legal sentencing
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In the end, it is unlikely that the Koon Court really believed that
courts could not make generalizations or establish guidelines for lower
courts through departure determinations. Much of the early depar-
ture jurisprudence, as well as the very Ninth Circuit decision being
reviewed in Koon, plainly demonstrated that appellate courts could
make generalizations and establish guidelines for lower courts
through decisions in departure cases.27 Moreover, consider the
Court's response to the Government's arguments that certain factors
relied upon by the district court were wholly impermissible as depar-
ture factors:
Those arguments, however persuasive as a matter of sentencing pol-
icy, should be directed to the Commission. Congress did not grant
federal courts authority to decide what sorts of sentencing consider-
ations are inappropriate in every circumstance.... [F] or the courts
to conclude a factor must not be considered under any circum-
stances would be to transgress the policytaking authority vested in
the Commission.2 7
4
This very statement reveals that the Supreme Court recognized that
the federal courts could make generalizations through departure deci-
sions, but that the Court's real point was that the courts should not
make categorical generalizations through departure determinations
that preclude the consideration of certain sentencing factors.2 7-5
principles, ajurisprudence of sentencing, that would constrain judicial decisionmak-
ing," id. at 1740-45, and he thus calls the Koon decision "fundamentally inconsistent
with the roles of departure and appellate review envisioned by Congress in creating
the Guidelines system." I& at 1698; cf. Lee, supra note 206, at 35 (noting that a more
rigorous form of review of departure determinations "would enable appellate courts
to provide guidance to district courts on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of
relying upon certain factors as the basis for departure").
273 The Ninth Circuit had, for example, reversed one ground on which the district
court departed by ruling that "a downward departure based on public outrage over
the crime that was committed is contrary to the Guidelines' goals of promoting re-
spect for the law and imposing sentences that reflect the seriousness of the crime.'
United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994), affd in part and reu'd in part,
518 U.S. 81 (1996). Though one might reasonably dispute this substantive sentencing
judgment by the Ninth Circuit, one cannot reasonably dispute that the Ninth Circuit,
by precluding reliance on public outrage as a basis for departure, made a "generaliza-
tion" that provides guidance for lower courts. Making a similar point, Professor Barry
Johnson calls the Koon Court's "generalization" claims "demonstrably inaccurate,"
and he substantiates his point by documenting that the pre-Koon "departure case law
is replete with examples of the kind of appellate-driven jurisprudential development
that Koon suggests is not possible." Johnson, supra note 70, at 1738-41.
274 United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81, 106-07 (1996).
275 See Miller & Wright, supra note 113, at 783 (discussing this portion of Koon and
noting that the Court's "language suggests that appellate courts-including, presuma-
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On this point, the Koon decision finally merits praise. The Su-
preme Court was faithful to the role of departure authority when it
prudently and properly explained that the federal courts should not
in departure cases make categorical rules to limit the consideration of
certain sentencing factors.276 The broader role of departures is to en-
able judges to provide case-specific contributions to the development of
sentencing law, and thus departure decisions should not be announc-
ing system-wide rules that restrict or seriously thwart potential sentenc-
ing considerations.
277
Unfortunately, as detailed below, the Supreme Court carried this
sound pronouncement one unsound and harmful step further. In
what seems to be one of the most significant and yet most overlooked
passages in Koon, the Supreme Court went beyond clarifying that
courts should not be making system-wide declarations in departure
cases to suggest that they should not even be making principled or
purposeful determinations in departure cases.
2. Keeping Departures and Departure Jurisprudence Purposeless
The Government in Koon argued for the impermissibility of cer-
tain factors as the basis for a departure by pointing to the SRA's articu-
lation of the purposes of sentencing in § 3553(a) (2).278 As the
Supreme Court explained the argument, "the Government interprets
§ 3553 (a) (2) to direct courts to test potential departure factors
against its broad sentencing goals and to reject, as a categorical mat-
ter, factors that are inconsistent with them."279 Reiterating that courts
should not be deciding what sentencing factors should be "ruled out
on a categorical basis," the Supreme Court rejected the notion that
"§ 3553(a) (2) directs courts to decide for themselves ... whether a
given factor ever can be an appropriate sentencing consideration."
280
In the same sequence, however, the Court also parsed the language of
§ 3553 (a) being relied upon by the Government to make the follow-
ing assertion: "The statute says nothing about requiring each potential
bly, the Supreme Court-could never reject factors categorically unless the Commis-
sion had done so").
276 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 108.
277 Cf. Miller & Freed, supra note 128, at 236 (criticizing courts for making cate-
gorical sentencing judgments under the Guidelines and stressing that the language of
the SRA's departure standard gives "the courts responsibility for weighing the care
and sensitivity ith which the Commission's guidelines address individualized circum-
stances on a case-by-case basis").
278 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 106.
279 Id. at 108.
280 1&
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departure factor to advance one of the specific goals [of punishment
set forth in § 3553(a) (2)]. So long as the overall sentence is 'suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply' with the above-listed
goals, the statute is satisfied."
281
To the extent that the Supreme Court's reference to "the statute"
was only to § 3553(a), it is on solid ground here, since nothing in that
section of the SRA speaks to departure decision-making at all. But, to
the extent the suggestion is that nothing in the SRA requires "each
potential departure factor to advance one of the specific goals" of
punishment, the Court's assertion seems much more questionable. As
stressed in Part II, the SRA's departure standard of§ 3553(b) requires
a court to find not only that there exists a factor "not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission," but also that this
factor "should result in a sentence different from that described [in the
Guidelines]." 28 2 This component of § 3553(b)-described above as
its prescriptive requirement-does seem to at least suggest, if not to
require, that courts examine "each potential departure factor" to see
if departing on the basis of that factor would "advance one of the spe-
cific goals" of sentencing set forth in the SRA.
Thus far, lower courts appear to have given a broad reading to
this part of Koon to conclude that departure decision-making need
not in any way incorporate the purposes of sentencing set forth in the
SRA. The Seventh Circuit has stated that Koon "rejected th[e] limita-
tion on sentencing discretion" that "a departure from the guidelines
range, in order to be allowable, must be consistent with the statutory
sentencing goals."28 3 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has expressly rebuf-
fed the claim that "in making the determination that a downwvard de-
parture is warranted, one or more of the statutory sentencing goals
(deterrence, incapacitation, retribution and correction) must be im-
plicated."28 In other words, the circuit courts have interpreted Koon
to mean that the SRA's elaboration of the purposes of sentencing
need not play any role in departure decision-making.
In this way, the Koon decision appears to both endorse and fortify
the narrow focus of departure jurisprudence on the descriptive com-
281 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994)).
282 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (emphasis added); see also supra text accompan)ing
notes 93-94 (discussing the two components of the SRA's departure standard).
283 United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1996); w-e also United States
v. Carter, 122 F.3d 469, 473 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that "the Koon Court actually
reected a limitation on sentencing discretion by holding that a departure from the
guidelines does not always have to be consistent uith the four goals" of punishment
set forth in the SRA).
284 United States v. Coleman, 188 F.3d 354, 359-60 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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ponent of the SRA's departure standard. Though the Government
pushed too far by arguing for courts to declare categorical limits on
departure factors, the basic premise of its argument was sensible and
sound for promoting purpose considerations as an integral part of
departure decision-making. But, rather than recognize the value and
importance of judges considering the purposes of sentencing when
contemplating departures, the Supreme Court eschewed such norma-
tive considerations.28 5 In so doing, the Court essentially ensures that
departure decisions will continue to involve only descriptive delibera-
tion and continue to lack prescriptive deliberation. As a result, the
Koon decision, like the departure jurisprudence that preceded it, un-
dermines the development of principled sentencing law within the
Guidelines by allowing for purposeless departure decisions in individ-
ual cases and a purposeless departure jurisprudence across the range
of cases.
The Koon Court's own application of its adopted departure stan-
dard highlights these very problems. The Court's review and assess-
ment of the departure factors relied upon by the district court was ipse
dixit and unenlightening-and has proven confusing to lower
courts-in large part because the Court only engaged in descriptive
deliberation. Considering each departure factor, the Court simply
proceeded to make a variety of abstractjudgments (or simply supposi-
tions) about what the Commission considered and about the heart-
land of the applicable Guidelines. 286 Lacking throughout the Court's
analysis of the proffered grounds for departure was any serious consid-
eration of purpose. As Professor Barry Johnson has noted,
285 Significantly, Justice Souter in his separate opinion in Koon did not overlook
the prescriptive component of the SRA's departure standard, and he expressly
brought normative considerations into his analysis of the district court's stated
grounds for departure. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 114-18 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Quoting the full language of the SRA's departure standard,
Justice Souter asserted that "both Congress and the Commission envisioned that de.
partures would require some unusual factual circumstance, but would be justified
only if the factual difference 'should' result in a different sentence. Departures, in
other words, must be consistent with rational normative order." Id. at 115. Justice
Souter then explained why he thought a departure based on the defendants' suscepti.
bility to abuse in prison would amount to a "moral irrationality" and why he thought It
would be "normatively obtuse" to permit a departure based on the defendants' succes-
sive prosecutions. Id. at 115-18; see also infra text accompanying note 312 (discussing
Justice Souter's approach to departure review).
286 See Miller & Wright, supra note 113, at 784-93 (criticizing the Koon Court's
analysis of the specific departure grounds at issue and highlighting that the "Supreme
Court used the same techniques as other federal courts to give heart to the heartland:
it created presumptions about the guidelines as a whole, and about the work of the
Commission, and then made conclusory assertions about particular guidelines").
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"[n] owhere does the Court consider whether the[] factors [relied
upon by the district court] reflect appropriate penal policy, or
whether they are consistent with the structure and purposes of Guide-
lines sentencing."2
87
Lower courts, unfortunately, have followed suit. Nearly all depar-
ture cases continue to analyze proposed departure factors through the
lens of specific guidelines provisions, as courts try to determine
whether a particular factor was considered by the Sentencing Commis-
sion. The post-Koon case law has no shortage of elaborate judicial de-
bates over "heartlands" and "atypicality" and "extraordinariness."2- 3
But still absent in all this case law is the significant normative analysis
that the prescriptive part of the departure standard seems to require
and that a principled and evolutionary guidelines system needs. Con-
sequently, the day-to-day practice of sentencing under the Guidelines
still fails to bring thoughtful judicial contributions to sentencing law-
making. Departure decision-making still has yet to foster the develop-
ment of a meaningful "common law of sentencing" to aid the
principled evolution of the guidelines system.
287 Johnson, supra note 70, at 1721-22; see also Hofer, supra note 70, at 9-11 (not-
ing that only the separate opinion ofJustice Souter brought normative considerations
to the analysis of the heartland concept).
288 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 197 F.3d 1263, 1266-70 (9th Cir. 1999) (dis-
cussing at length "the heartland of the offense of possessing child pornography and
the offenders who commit it" (quoting United States v. Stevens, 29 F. Supp. 2d 592,
599 (D. Alaska 1998) (brackets omitted), vacatei 197 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 1999)));
United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204, 1208-16 (10th Cir. 1999) (debating, major-
ity and dissenting opinions, the heartland covered by a guidelines discussion of coer-
cion and duress and the significance of parental influence), ce. denied, 120 S. C. 243
(1999); United States v. Allery, 175 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 1999) (debating, between
the majority and dissent, the heartland for sexual abuse crime and whether the of-
fense was "atypical because of the minimal amount of force used"); United States %.
Leahy, 169 F.3d 433, 438-43 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing at length the heartland of
Guidelines used to sentence a defendant convicted of "knowingly possessing a toxin,
specifically, ricin, for use as a weapon"); United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d
556, 561-67 (9th Cir. 1998) (debating, by the majority and dissent, the heartland of
drug distribution guidelines and coming to different conclusions as to whether a "$20
heroin sale was a typical, ordinary heartland event"); United States v. Woods, 159 F.3d
1132, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing at length the heartland for money launder-
ing offenses); United States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.d 347, 360-64 (5th Cir. 1998)
(discussing at length whether "mone)-laundering for purposes of concealing a corpo-
rate contribution to a defeated candidate" were atypical or instead fell within the
heartland of the money-laundering guidelines); United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d
1029, 1032-39 (2d Cir. 1997) (debating, majority and dissenting opinions, what sorts
of family circumstances should qualify as "extraordinary"); see also Miller & Wright,
supra note 113, at 793 (noting that "Koon has sparked something of a heartland
revival").
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In sum, the Koon decision's problems run deeper than its failure
to refocus departure jurisprudence to achieve a better balance injudi-
cial sentencing discretion. The Court's shallow conception of depar-
tures as gap-fillers and its eschewing of purpose considerations in
departure decision-making further undermine principled and pur-
poseful judicial contributions to the development of sentencing law
under the Guidelines.
IV. HARMONIZING THEORY AND PRACTICE: IMPROVED GUIDELINES
SENTENCING THROUGH A REFOCUSED DEPARTURE JURISPRUDENCE
The foregoing review of both the purposes and problems of de-
parture authority under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines makes
clear the need to refocus departure jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court's work in Koon failed to put departure jurisprudence on an im-
proved path. As detailed in Part III, the decision appears to have ag-
gravated many of the worst aspects of an already troubled
jurisprudence. A new direction is needed so that departure authority
might ultimately achieve its goals of balancing judicial sentencing dis-
cretion and fostering principled and purposeful judicial contributions
to an evolving federal guidelines sentencing system.
Helpfully, the foregoing review also illuminates the keys toward
developing an improved departure jurisprudence. In order to better
balance judicial sentencing discretion under the Guidelines, depar-
ture decisions should focus principally on the extent of departures
rather than on the threshold decision to depart. And, in order to
better foster principled and purposeful judicial contributions to the
Guidelines, departure decision-making should focus primarily on the
prescriptive component of the SRA's departure standard and on the
purposes of punishment set forth in the SRA.
A. Balancing Discretion by Focusing on the Extent of Departures
It is often said that an excessive number of departures can
threaten a guidelines system's efforts to achieve greater sentencing
consistency and uniformity.2 8 9 But this claim is not entirely accurate,
especially in the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
289 See, e.g., Gelacak et al., supra note 33, at 303 ("Ifjudges depart from the Guide-
lines too frequently or for inappropriate reasons, they may defeat the SRA's purpose
of eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparity."); Lee, supra note 206, at 3 (assert.
ing that "frequent departures could undermine the goal of achieving sentencing uni-
formity"); Nagel, supra note 7, at 939 (discussing "the potential disparity introduced
by excessive judicial 'departures' from the guidelines"); see also sources cited supra
note 34.
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Rather, it is only excessively large departures that pose a real threat of
serious sentencing disparities under the Guidelines. Consequently, it
is actually far more important for the Guidelines to regulate closely
the extent of departures than the threshold decision to depart.
This important reality can be best understood by way of an exam-
ple. Consider the hypothetical case of a defendant convicted of
armed bank robbery who, after various guidelines enhancements and
adjustments, is assigned a final offense level of thirty. ° Assuming
that this defendant is a first-time offender and thus comes within crim-
inal history category I, his applicable sentencing range according to
the Guidelines' Sentencing Table would be 97-121 months of impris-
onment.29' Because a district judge has complete discretion to select
a sentence from within that range, this defendant's sentence can -,ry
as much as two years (or twenty-five percent) even in the absence of a
departure. If the sentencing judge finds this defendant especially
sympathetic, she can impose the minimum sentence of ninety-seven
months' imprisonment. If she finds him especially unsympathetic,
she can impose the maximum of 121 months. As an original Commis-
sioner once put it, the sentencing ranges in the Guidelines' Sentenc-
ing Table-which each provide a maximum possible sentence that is
twenty-five percent (or at least six months) greater than the minimum
possible sentence-mark out the "tolerable level of disparity accept-
able to Congress" under the Guidelines.
292
290 I am loosely drawing this example from a guidelines calculation exercise pro-
vided by the Sentencing Commission which appears on its webpage at U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission, Robbery Exercise, available at http://wativussc.gov/training/
robbryex.pdf (last modified Oct. 15, 1997). For a basic review of the steps involved in
calculating a guidelines sentence, see HAw s Er At., supra note 116, at 12-13.
291 See U.S. SENTENCINo GUIDELINES NU.AL 309 (1998).
292 Nagel, supra note 7, at 933. The SRA specifically dictates that "if a sentence
specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the maximum of the
range established... shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than 25
percent or six months." 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2) (1994).
Significantly, though the Sentencing Commission could conceivably formulate
guidelines that specify an exact sentence for each offense and offender, the Sentenc-
ing Table has always set forth the widest ranges authorized by the SRA by having the
longest term of imprisonment in each sentencing range twenty-five percent greater
than the shortest term. See U.S. SENTECING GumENES MANuA 309 (1998). Some
commentators have suggested that sentencing ranges this broad provide judges in
nearly all cases with sufficient discretion to individualize sentences. Swe Bowman,
supra note 84, at 712-13 (stressing that the size of ranges entail that "twenty-five per-
cent of the sentence will rest on the sentencingjudge's virtually unreviemable assess-
ment of individualized factors"); see also U.S. SENncINo Cowss'N, supra note 20, at
25-26 (stressing that sentencing ranges provide "considerable latitude forjudges" to
consider various aggravating and mitigating factors); Mar-'in E. Frankel, Sentencing
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Now consider the potential impact of a small departure. If the
judge believes she might have reasons to depart downward and moves
two levels down the Guidelines' Sentencing Table to reach offense
level twenty-eight, the applicable sentencing range becomes seventy-
eight to ninety-seven months' imprisonment. 293 The final outcome in
such a case would be a sentence of no less than seventy-eight months
of imprisonment instead of the ninety-eight months that likely would
have been ascribed in the absence of a departure.294 Thus, the deci-
sion to go below the low end of the applicable guidelines range
through a two-level downward departure (which would take the sen-
tence from ninety-eight months down to seventy-eight months) pro-
duces in percentage terms no greater difference in the defendant's
final sentence than would the converse decision to select the highest
possible sentence within the applicable guidelines range (which
would take the sentence from ninety-eight months up to 121 months).
Put another way, potentially conflicting decisions about the appropri-
ateness of this two-level departure would produce no more significant
sentencing disparity than potentially conflicting decisions about the
appropriateness of selecting a sentence at the low or high ends of the
applicable sentencing range.
The example is meant to highlight that, given the Sentencing
Commission's construction of the Sentencing Table with overlapping
sentencing ranges, small departures (that is, departures of two levels
or less) create no greater disparity concerns than the unregulated dis-
cretion that district judges already have to select sentences from
within applicable sentencing ranges.295 Put more simply, small depar-
tures do not transgress what Congress seems to consider a "tolerable"
level of disparity in sentencing.
Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE LJ. 2043, 2050 (1992) (intimating
that the Guidelines' ranges are sufficiently broad to provide judges with ample oppor-
tunity to individualize sentences).
293 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 309 (1998).
294 Presumably ajudge considering a downward departure would sentence at the
bottom of the applicable Guidelines sentencing range in the absence of a departure.
Interestingly, Commission data reveals that the vast majority of sentences under the
Guidelines are ultimately set at the minimum of the applicable sentencing ranges. See
1998 SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 239, at 60.
295 Though the above example involves a downward departure to a lower offense
level, the same principles and dynamics apply to upward departures and also to depar-
tures based on a defendant's criminal history category. The Sentencing Commission
constructed the Sentencing Table in such a way that a movement of two "boxes" In
any direction will produce no greater difference in the sentence than already allowed
by the applicable sentencing range. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 309
(1998).
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Large departures, of course, are a much different matter and do
pose a serious risk of undermining the SRA's interest in reducing sen-
tencing disparities. For our hypothetical defendant, if the judge in-
stead opted for an eight-level downward departure to reach offense
level twenty-two, the applicable sentencing range becomes forty-one to
fifty-one months' imprisonment. 296 The likely final outcome in such a
case would be a sentence cut by more than half and a term of impris-
onment almost five years shorter than the ninety-eight months that
would have been ascribed in the absence of a departure. This very
significant difference clearly exceeds the "tolerable" level of disparity
countenanced by Congress.
Once these dynamics are appreciated, the prevailing approach to
the granting and review of departures seems quite peculiar. As de-
tailed before, courts currently focus on the threshold decision to de-
part and give relatively little attention to the extent of allowed
departures.2 97 Circuit courts' review of decisions to depart is rigorous
(and remains so in most circuits even after Koon), while their review of
the extent of departures is highly deferential (and may be even more
so after Koon). But it is the extent of departures, rather than the
threshold decision to depart, that presents the real threat of signifi-
cant sentencing disparity; this approach is backwards. The extent of
any departure is what should be given the most attention and the most
rigorous review, because it is that choice, rather than simply the
threshold decision to depart, that creates the greatest risk of serious
disparities under the Guidelines. In other words, because the struc-
ture of the Guidelines' Sentencing Table makes the size of any depar-
ture of much greater overall significance, a jurisprudential focus on
the extent of departures would be far more sensible than the current
focus on the threshold decision to depart.
Beyond its logic, there would be considerable benefits from
refocusing departure jurisprudence to be highly discretionary and
deferential concerning the threshold decision to depart, but rigorous
in its examination and review of the extent of departures. Most criti-
cally, such an approach to departures could help achieve a balance in
judicial sentencing discretion that has heretofore proved elusive
within the guidelines scheme. Because this changed focus would pro-
vide sentencing judges with broad discretion to depart, it should
greatly alleviate concerns and complaints about the overall rigidity of
the Guidelines. Once aware that they can readily break from the
Guidelines' structure to consider any sentencing factor that seems
296 See id.
297 See cases cited supra notes 252-57.
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pertinent and important, judges can no longer reasonably contend
that the guidelines system completely deprives them of the discretion
needed in each case to achieve an individualized and just sentencing
outcome. Under this revised approach, judges will come to recognize
that they are not simply 'judicial accountants" operating a "mechanis-
tic scheme."
Greater authority to depart should also lessen both the pressure
and willingness of sentencing participants to circumvent the Guide-
lines. The need to resort to guidelines evasion to achieve "hidden"
departures will largely be eliminated because overt departures (at
least small ones) will be a much more significant, accepted, and regu-
lar part of sentencing decision-making.298 Moreover, by ensuring that
all departure decisions are in fact overt, greater accountability and
consistency can be achieved throughout the guidelines system because
both the appellate courts and the Commission can observe and assess
what facts and factors are really influencing front-line sentencing
actors.
At the same time, any disparity concerns stemming from a robust
use of departures should be kept in check by having district courts
attentive to, and reviewing courts closely examining, the extent of de-
partures. The sentencing ranges established by the Commission will
still have a powerful gravitational force; departures will likely become
somewhat more frequent, but relatively few will be very sizeable. As
long as the extent of departures are a matter of serious attention and
review, the bulk of sentences will still cluster closely around the Com-
mission's sentencing ranges.
Critically, refocusing departure jurisprudence on the extent of
departures does not mean judges should be allowed to depart for any
reason or that small departures should escape review. District judges
should still be required to justify their decisions to depart (and, as
explained in the next Section, required to do so with reference to
purposes of sentencing). But, of critical importance, the larger the
departure, the better must be the justification. Such an approach cer-
tainly seems to resonate with § 3742, which instructs appellate courts
to review departures to determine if the sentence outside the Guide-
lines "is unreasonable."299 The larger the departure from the applica-
ble sentencing range, the less "reasonable" it seems unless supported
by an ever more weightyjustification. In this way, both the grant and
298 Cf Schulhofer & Nagel, Guideline Circumvention, supra note 153, at 1301-03,
1313-14 (suggesting that defects in the existing departure mechanism are a root
cause of Guidelines evasion and encouraging greater use of overt departures to rem-
edy problems stemming from "hidden" departures through circumvention).
299 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (3) (1994).
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the review of departures will not be focused simply on the (less impor-
tant) threshold questions of whether the case at hand seems to call for
a sentence different than the applicable guidelines sentence. Instead,
the focus will be more fully on the (much more important) issues of
just why and how much the case at hand seems to call for a sentence
different than the applicable guidelines sentence.3 00
B. Developing Principled Sentencing Law Through Purposeful Departures
Because of the prevailingjurisprudence's focus on the descriptive
portion of the SRA's departure standard, departure cases now focus
on "heartlands," "atypicality," and "extraordinariness," rather than the
purposes of punishment. Butjust as the structure of the Guidelines'
Sentencing Table makes a focus on the extent of departures more
sensible, the very language of the SRA, considered together with the
institutional realities of guidelines sentencing, makes a focus on the
prescriptive component of the SRA's departure standard more sensi-
ble than a focus on its descriptive component. Indeed, the fact that
courts have come to focus on the descriptive component of the SRA's
departure standard is as surprising as it is troubling.
Recall that the descriptive component of the departure standard
turns on whether factors have been "adequately taken into considera-
tion by the Sentencing Commission."301 It seems reasonable to expect
that, in the course of adjudicating specific cases with particularized
facts, courts would readily discover countless factors that the Commis-
sion did not "adequately" consider. The Commission, after all, oper-
ates from an ex ante system-wide perspective; it has created guidelines
by examining sentencing outcomes in the aggregate without directly
considering any of the individual human beings who have violated
federal lav.302 In sharp contrastjudges operate from an ex post, case-
300 Professor Kate Stith andJudgeJos6 Cabranes astutely observe that in those few
settings in which the Guidelines explicitly encourage departures, courts often do "dis-
cuss issues of culpability and just punishment in the particular case." S-rrH &
CABRs, supra note 5, at 99. That these cases are among the "most thoughtful and
significant" decisions during the Guidelines era, id., is both telling and unsurprising.
It is in this small class of cases that courts (encouraged by the Commission's express
instructions) move quickly beyond their usual obsession with the threshold decision
to depart and instead reason and make judgments concerning the (more important)
issue relating to the departure's extent.
301 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
302 See Freed, supra note 60, at 1694 (highlighting that "the Commission neither
sees offenders nor decides cases"); see also Lots G. FouRr, A lCE TO PUNISH 169
(1994) (noting that "commissions can deal only wsith generalities and norms; they
cannot act upon specific cases and actual individuals"); Alschuler, supra note 83, at
906-07 (noting that "sentencing commissions have not considered cases [only] ...
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specific perspective; they ascribe sentences by individually considering
and passing judgment on the real persons who actually committed
offenses. Though the human realities of sentencing are especially sig-
nificant for trial judges who interact with defendants first-hand,303 ap-
pellate judges also have a contextualized experience with sentencing
that is different from the experience of the Sentencing
Commission.
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Given these institutional dynamics, it is truly puzzling why the fed-
eral courts have been so ready and willing to find in so many cases that
any Commission consideration of a factor (or even the likely consider-
ation of a factor) constitutes "adequate" consideration thereby pre-
cluding a departure on that basis.305 Consider, for example, the
matter of family ties and responsibilities. The Sentencing Commis-
sion's ex ante, system-wide assertion that such circumstances are "not
ordinarily relevant"-which is set forth by the Commission without
any serious justification or explanation 3°6 -seems a far cry from "ade-
aggregations of cases"), Specifically, the original Commission developed the initial
Guidelines by, in its words, "taking an empirical approach," that relied primarily upon
"data drawn from 10,000 presentence investigations... in order to determine which
[sentencing] distinctions are important in present practice." U.S. SENTENCINC
GuUinEUNEs MANuAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3, at 1.4 (1987); see also U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SuPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDEUNES
AND Poucy STATEMENTS 16-39 (1987) (explaining Commission's empirical approach
to the initial Guidelines).
303 SeeJack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on Seven Lean Years of Guidelines Sentencing,
8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 12, 12-13 (1995); Stith & Cabranes, supra note 6, at 1253;
Freed, supra note 60, at 1728.
304 See Schulhofer & Nagel, Guideline Circumvention, supra note 153, at 1298-301
(discussing the difference between the "macro" sentencing perspective of the Com-
mission and the "micro" sentencing perspective of sentencing judges).
305 See cases cited supra note 128; see also Miller & Wright, supra note 113, at 770
(noting the tendency of "federal circuit courts ... to categorically reject district court
reliance on a large number of factors because the Commission 'must have' or 'cer-
tainly' or 'obviously' or 'surely' or 'of course' considered the factor at issue"); Linder,
supra note 128, at 1144-47 (lamenting the willingness of courts to find "Commission
consideration of a circumstance... 'adequate' even where there is scant evidence to
support that conclusion").
306 Professors Marc Miller and Ronald Wright have argued that the Sentencing
Commission's general failure to explain or adequately account for any of its guide-
lines' determinations gives courts reason to conclude that no factor has truly been
"adequately" considered by the Commission. See Miller & Wright, supra note 113, at
800-02; see also Miller & Freed, supra note 128, at 236 (making a similar point). In a
similar vein, Professor Albert Alschuler argued right after the Guidelines became law
that the failure of the Sentencing Commission to give an account of its view of the
.normal" cases covered by the Guidelines might permit a court to depart based on the
Commission's "general failure adequately to consider aggravating and mitigating cir-
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quate" consideration of the endless variation of real-life family dynam-
ics that influence and impact the lives and crimes of a range of federal
offenders. Or, better yet, consider the underlying facts and conviction
in Koon. The Rodney King case was a singular event not only in fed-
eral law, but in all of modem American history. How can it be sensi-
bly said that the Sentencing Commission ever considered-let alone
"adequately" considered-the innumerable unique aspects of this re-
markable case?
The point here is not to suggest that the different institutional
positions of the federal judiciary and the Sentencing Commission
mean that ajudge could conclude that every possible factor in every
possible case was not "adequately" considered by the Commission and
thus presents a ground for departure. Rather, my point is to suggest
that the descriptive component of the SRA's departure standard is
neither intended, nor well-designed, to operate as the central limit or
the primary focus of departure decisions. Instead, it is the prescriptive
component of the SRA's departure standard-the requirement that a
court find an aggravating or mitigating circumstance "that should re-
sult in a sentence different from that described"307 in the Guide-
lines-that is intended and well-designed for this role. This
requirement, which calls upon a sentencing court to assess why and
how it believes particular factors in the case at hand normativelyjustify
a sentence outside the Guidelines' prescribed range, should be the
focus of departure decision-making. Litigants and judges should not
be spending their time and energies contemplating and debating
whether particular factors in particular cases are outside heartlands or
are atypical or extraordinary. They should instead be spending their
time and energies debating whether particular factors in particular
cases "should result" in a sentence outside the Guidelines because
they serve the purposes of punishment set forth in the SRA. After all,
as stressed in Part I, the list of sentencing purposes repeatedly refer-
enced in the SRA appears in the Act's instructions to judges concern-
ing the "Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence."305 Thus,
to have departure decision-making focused on whether a particular
factor "should result" in a sentence outside the Guidelines seems to
fulfil the SRA requirement "that the judge consider what impact, if
cumstances." Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agry'ements Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459, 460-69 (1988).
307 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
308 Id. § 3553(a).
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any, each particular purpose should have on the sentence in each
case."309
Beyond its harmony with the language and spirit of the SRA,
refocusing departure jurisprudence on the prescriptive component of
the SRA's departure standard would have considerable benefits be-
cause such an approach would finally foster the development of prin-
cipled sentencing law under the Guidelines. Judges would no longer
be bogged down in abstract and banal debates over heartlands and
extraordinariness; instead, the focus would be on whether factors in
the case at hand might normatively justify a sentence above or below
the sentencing range specified by the Guidelines. Put another way,
departure cases would no longer involve only "descriptive delibera-
tion," but they would involve serious "prescriptive deliberation" with
courts contemplating and discussing from their case-specific perspec-
tive exactly why they think particular factors should result in a sen-
tence outside the Guidelines. Such a refocused departure
jurisprudence would ensure purposeful departure decisions in indi-
vidual cases, and it would produce a purposeful departure jurispru-
dence across the range of cases. Departures might then finally be
successful in fostering judicial contributions, through the develop-
ment of a "common law of sentencing," to the principled evolution of
the guidelines system.
In this context, it is critical to realize that, at some level, judges
are probably already engaging in just the sort of normative analysis
being urged here. As noted before, though the existing jurisprudence
has developed and formal decisions have been rendered without sig-
nificant consideration of sentencing purposes, underlying concerns
and judgments about culpability, crime control, and the traditional
purposes of punishment seem to be influencing departure rulings and
outcomes.310 But such normative considerations remain unarticu-
lated and undeveloped because they are currently buried under the
cover of descriptive deliberation or entirely hidden through the pro-
cess of guidelines circumvention. In the end, this proposal to refocus
departure jurisprudence on the prescriptive component of the SRA's
departure standard is perhaps ultimately nothing more than a sugges-
tion to make overt and subject to discussion what has been covert and
unstated for too long.
309 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 77 (1983) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.CAN. 3182, 3260.
310 See supra text accompanying note 177.
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C. Making it Happen
Fortunately, even though the Supreme Court's Koon decision did
not light the way toward an improved departure jurisprudence, it did
not entirely foreclose the possibility that lower courts could find their
own way. Indeed, the Supreme Court's obvious efforts to give district
courts more discretion to depart and its adoption of an abuse of dis-
cretion review standard, if carried forward the right way, might serve
as an important first step on the path toward an improved departure
mechanism. One can still hope that the lower courts will ultimately
come to honor those parts of Koon that promote discretion and defer-
ence on the threshold decision to depart and then turn their focus
and energies toward regulating the extent of departures, so as to
guard against possible unwarranted disparities and thereby create a
truly balanced departure authority. One can also hope that lower
courts will recognize, notwithstanding Koon's apparent holding that
purpose considerations are not statutorily required, that the prescrip-
tive component of the SRA's departure standard still calls for serious
and explicit normative analysis in departure decision-making so as to
produce a truly purposeful departure authority.
Nurturing the hope that the lower courts might find their own
way to an improved departure jurisprudence are those few court deci-
sions-some before and some since Koon-that seem to appreciate
(implicitly, if not explicitly) the importance of focusing on the extent
of departures and of bringing purpose considerations into departure
analysis.31' Such hope may be further fostered by Justice Souter's sep-
arate opinion in Koon, in which he stressed the prescriptive compo-
nent of the SRA's departure standard and asserted that departures
"must be consistent with rational normative order."312 Thoughjustice
311 Se, eg., United States v. Mason, 966 F.2d 1488, 1494-96 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(looking to the purposes of punishment to explore whether a factor put fonWard as a
basis for a departure even qualified as "aggravating or mitigating" circumstances);
United States v. Crippen, 961 F.2d 882, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); United States
v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1990) (calling for courts to justify the extent
of a departure "in light of the Guidelines' purposes"); United States v. Weaver, 920
F.2d 1570, 1573-77 (11th Cir. 1991) (examining departure decision in light of sen-
tencing purpose of deterrence); United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 344-46
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing at length the role of rehabilitation in sentencing); United
States v. Vue, 865 F. Supp. 1353, 1359-60 (D. Neb. 1994) (examining "just desert"
considerations in the analysis of availability of departure); United States v. Carrozza,
807 F. Supp. 156, 161-65 (D. Mass. 1992) (examining whether "do%%nward departures
required by the plea agreements would satisfactorily serve the statutory purposes of
sentencing"), afd, 4 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 1993).
312 United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81, 114-18 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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Souter's opinion focuses on the threshold decision to depart and
seems unduly willing to second-guess a district court's sentencing
judgment, his opinion at least serves as a helpful example of the
meaningful judicial contributions to sentencing that follow from
bringing normative considerations into an analysis of grounds for
departure.
In the end, probably only false hope supports the notion that the
federal courts will themselves get departure jurisprudence back on
track. The lower courts significantly contributed to the very jurispru-
dential problems at issue here, and it is only the rare case in which
courts manage to break from the prevailing jurisprudence's focus on
the threshold decision to depart and on the descriptive component of
the SRA's departure standard. Moreover, as noted in Part III, most
lower courts have relied on Koon to continue moving departure juris-
prudence in the wrong direction.
3 13
Thus, in the end, the best hope for an improved departure juris-
prudence requires a return to where this story started-the Sentenc-
ing Commission. As detailed in Part II, the Commission is largely
responsible for getting departure jurisprudence headed in the wrong
direction by initially putting forward a narrow and restrictive concep-
tion of departure authority.314 Thus, the Commission has a unique
responsibility, in addition to being uniquely positioned, to put depar-
ture authority back on the right track.
Fortunately, the timing and opportunity for bold and thoughtful
Commission action on departures seems just right. For the last few
years, the Sentencing Commission was a crippled agency because of a
shortage of Commissioners. 31 5 But late last year, the political stale-
mate ended that had kept Commissioner positions unfilled, and now
there is a full slate of seven new Commissioners able, and hopefully
ready and willing, to take the steps necessary to improve the federal
sentencing system.
316
313 See supra text accompanying note 288.
314 See supra text accompanying notes 89-109.
315 SeeJulia Malone, Sentencing Agency, Lacking Commissioners, Unable to Perform Du-
ties, Hous. CHRON., May 29, 1999, at 22A; see also William H. Rhenquist, The 1998 Year-
End Report of the Federal Judiciary, reprinted in 11 FED. SENTENCNG RFA,. 134, 134-35
(1999) (complaining that vacancies on the Sentencing Commission "is paralyzing a
critical component of the federal criminal justice system").
316 See News Release, Judge Murphy Named to Chair United States Sentencing Conmis-
sion-Seven New Commissioners Confirmed (Nov. 12, 1999), reprinted in 12 FED. SENTENc.
ING REP. 122 (1999); see also id. ("Many challenges lie ahead for us as commissioners,
and I know that all of us are eager to roll up our sleeves and get started." (Statement
of Sentencing Commissioner Chair Diana Murphy)).
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A major step the Sentencing Commission now should take would
be to codify in the Guidelines a revised approach to departures. Spe-
cifically, the Commission should rewrite those portions of the Guide-
lines Manual that address departure authority and urge courts to
focus departure decision-making and review, not on the threshold de-
cision to depart, but rather on the extent of departures. In the same
vein, these provisions should also be reiwitten to urge courts to focus
departure decision-making and review, not on the descriptive compo-
nent of the SRA's departure standard, but rather on its prescriptive
component.
The Commission should clarify and stress that, although it has
considered many sentencing factors in the abstract, it has not and
could not give truly adequate consideration to a great many of the
case-specific contextualized situations that district courts necessarily
encounter when sentencing actual defendants in individual cases.317
Emphasizing the soundest component of the Koon decision, the Com-
mission must reiterate that courts ascribing Guidelines sentences are
not and should never be in the business of creating categorical limits
on the consideration of sentencing factors. The Commission should
explain that the courts' business is to contemplate and craft balanced
and purposeful departures in individual cases and thereby produce a
balanced and purposeful departure jurisprudence across the range of
cases. This mightjust be achieved if the Commission can explain, and
district and circuit courts take to heart, that departure decision-mak-
ing should be concerned primarily with the extent of departures and
focused on the purposes of punishment.
CONCLUSION
A misguided and harmful departure jurisprudence is certainly
not the only problem with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. There
has now been well over a decade of constructive criticisms of the
317 To its credit, the Sentencing Commission has explained from the outset that it
was essentially unable to create a "single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast
range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision," U.S. SEznrENc-
ING GununqF.s MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b), at 1.7 (1987), and also
that the circumstances "that may warrant departure... cannot, b) their very nature,
be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance," and thus controlling decisions as
to precisely when a departure is warranted "can only be made by the court at the time
of sentencing." Id. at ch. 5, pt. K, introductory cmt. 2, at 5.36. But this critical mes-
sage has been lost on most courts-in part because of tie many ayIs in which tie
Commission has also suggested it has adequately considered most factors. &e supra
text accompanying notes 98-104. Thus, this critical point must be made again, more
clearly and more emphatically.
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Guidelines that provide the new Sentencing Commissioners with
plenty of reform agenda items.3 18 But the Commission, as well as the
courts, must recognize that a troubled departure jurisprudence consti-
tutes the most profound and most damaging problem within the
guidelines system. Beyond serving as a critical linchpin in the effort to
balance judicial sentencing discretion, departure authority should
also serve as an engine propelling a guidelines system's progressive
and principled evolution. But, under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, this engine has been misfiring from the outset. The Commis-
sion or even the lower courts, perhaps aided by the Supreme Court's
noble but unsuccessful efforts in Koon, need to give departure author-
ity a tune-up.
There is still reason to believe that a well-functioning departure
authority-which is balanced by focusing on the extent of departures
and purposeful by focusing on the fundamental goals of punish-
ment-could help drive the Federal Sentencing Guidelines toward
the ideal sentencing system envisioned by sentencing reformers. How
nice it would be if one enduring legacy of the Rodney King case was
that it provided a necessary jumpstart to departure authority and
thereby helped restart federal law's movement toward a more effec-
tive, principled, and just sentencing system.
318 See generally Forum, Advice to the New Commissiones, 12 FED. SENTENcING Rm'. 63
(1999) (providing a collection of commentaries with numerous suggestions for im-
proving the federal sentencing system).
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